By Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff and Remy Mahzam
RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Volume
10, Issue 1 | January 2018
The ‘Islamic State’ (IS) After the Fall of Mosul and Raqqa:
Still a Persistent Threat
The
year 2017 marked the defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria, three years after it
declared the establishment of a caliphate‘ in June 2014. The group has lost all
its strongholds including Mosul in Iraq and its de facto capital‘ Raqqa in
Syria, and almost all the lands it controlled. It has also lost many of its top
leaders, commanders, strategists and fighters, with the remaining leaders,
including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, on the run and in hiding. It is a matter of
time before alBaghdadi too will meet the same fate as his predecessors and
mentors like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden. With the defeat, IS has
also lost its main sources of revenue from seized oilfields, illegal taxes and
other unlawful means. The output of its much touted‘ online propaganda
materials has also declined substantially. Overall, the defeat constitutes a
serious blow to its leadership of the global jihadist movement and its
propaganda slogan of remaining and expanding‖ (Baqiya wa tatamaddad).
The Terrorist Threat Persists
IS‘
territorial defeat, however, does not spell the end of the group. Nor does it
sufficiently reflect its current strength and versatility to reinvent itself
and return with force. It should be remembered that IS leaders, in particular
al-Baghdadi, have faced territorial losses and challenging situations before,
such as when IS founder Zarqawi was killed in a drone attack in June 2006 and
when the Sahwa movement rose against IS (then known as Islamic State in Iraq)
in late 2006 and drove them out of areas they controlled. IS reconsolidated in
the ensuing years, exploited the Arab Spring, expanded into Syria in 2011,
recaptured Iraqi Sunni territories it lost to the Sahwa tribal militias, and
declared the establishment of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April
2013 and later IS in June 2014.
Despite
the territorial losses in its heartlands in Iraq and Syria, IS still has four
substantial ‗assets‘ it could count on to remain relevant in the jihadist
movement and pose a serious security threat: (a) its jihadist ideology and
vision of a global caliphate, (b) its wilayat (governorates) and enclaves, (c)
its army of loyal followers and fighters, and (d) the Internet and social media
platforms. With these assets, IS is likely to persist as a global jihadist
movement, recruiting and radicalising more followers, launching opportunistic
and targeted terrorist attacks, and supporting the local religious and political
agenda of its wilayat.
Ideology
IS‘
vision of a worldwide caliphate has some resonance among certain vulnerable
segments of the Muslim community. Consequently, over thirty thousand foreign
fighters and civilians from over 80 countries flocked to Iraq and Syria from
2014 to 2016 to defend and build up the caliphate. Many thousands more continue to be beguiled
by IS religious and political narratives and battlefront news weaved in glossy
and wellpackaged online propaganda magazines (first Dabiq, then Rumiyah, and
now other small scale versions). Although propaganda output is down, IS media
outlets and its army of social media warriors‘ continue to produce, repost and
recycle articles and videos, radicalising new ones and reinforcing the
extremism of existing supporters.
IS‘ virulent anti-Shia sectarian agenda
coincides with the current confrontation between two major regional players --
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran -- and their proxy wars. The group views
Shias, among others, as heretics and uses this ideological justification to
target them. IS‘ anti-Shia narratives skilfully exploit the discrimination and
marginalisation of Sunnis in Shiacontrolled Iraq and Syria to win and expand
its support base. Zarqawi and later alBaghdadi carried out numerous attacks
against Shia neighbourhoods, shrines and mosques, killing and injuring many
thousands. The question arises whether the ongoing Sunni-Shia geo-political
conflict would increase support for IS‘ anti-Shia propaganda, and enlarge the
catchment for IS recruitment.
Wilayat, Foreign
Fighters and Other ‘Assets’
IS‘ military setbacks since late 2016 has
resulted in displacement of its foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. It is
estimated that there were about 31,000 foreign fighters from 86 different
countries from Africa, Asia and the West.1 Many have been killed but those who
survived are returning to their home countries or IS wilayat like IS Khorasan
and IS Philippines. These returnees pose a significant threat to the countries
concerned as they are ideologically-hardened and experienced combatants who
will strengthen IS in conflict zones.
IS could also rely on the returnees and its
existing networks of supporters to spread its ideology, increase recruitment,
raise funds and mount terrorist operations. As it came under intense pressure
and began losing territories, IS had exhorted its supporters worldwide to
launch mass-casualty and high impact attacks as well as lone-wolf attacks using
whatever means, including knives and vehicles. Some of these strikes,
particularly those by radicalised lone-wolves, are hard to detect and prevent
as they occur without warning. Some of the major attacks in 2017 included the
New York truck attack in October that killed 8, the Barcelona van attack in
August which killed 14, the London Bridge van and stabbing attacks in June,
killing 8, and the concert bomb attack in Manchester in May in which 22 were
killed. There were worst attacks in the Middle East, Africa and South
Asia.
With
the dislocations and disruptions caused by the loss of territories, manpower
and resources, IS will place greater importance on the Internet and social
media platforms, particularly encrypted messaging applications, for strategic
communications, propaganda, recruitment and operations. Internet enables IS to
establish a ‗virtual caliphate‘ and bide its time as it did between 2007 and
2010 when it was driven out of its Sunni strongholds by Sahwa militias in Iraq.
It is not known what exactly is the size of IS ‗army‘ of supporters and sympathisers
on the Internet but there are some online persona with several thousand
followers. For instance, a Malaysian foreign fighter in Syria had a following
of some 72,000 on his first few Facebook pages in 2015.
Conclusion
With its jihadist ideology, wilayat, loyal
followers and social media apps, IS will continue to pose a formidable security
challenge in respect of terrorist attacks. Dislodging IS from its heartlands in
Iraq and Syria is a significant achievement as it would deprive IS of a base to
operate, generate revenue and plot attacks. To further neutralise and
decapitate it, the following will need to be done: (a) continue efforts to
neutralise IS leadership as well as IS leaders in the various wilayat; (b)
debunk its jihadist ideology and expose its distortion and misrepresentation of
Islamic doctrines and practices; (c) address prevailing grievances that have
allowed groups like IS, Al-Qaeda and other militant and extremist groups to
emerge and flourish; and (d) disrupt its communications and curtail its
dissemination of virulent propaganda. Any let-up in these areas will see the IS
expanding further in cyberspace, and emerging stronger in poorly governed and
volatile areas like Africa and the Khorasan.
IS Propaganda after
the Fall of Mosul and Raqqa
Following
eviction from its remaining Iraqi and Syrian strongholds, IS has lost its
tenuous claim of being a ‗Caliphate‘ and control of its previously
self-proclaimed wilayat. The recent setbacks have not only shrunk the group‘s
finances, destroyed their training camps and forced the exodus of foreign
fighters, but also caused a considerable decline in the group‘s social media
propaganda as well.
Decline in Propaganda
Since July 2017, IS‘ distribution of
governance-related media has been reduced by two-thirds, especially after the
fall of Mosul. Only 255 visual reports
covering IS activities in Syria and Iraq were observed in the period between
July and September 2017, a sharp decrease from the 486 propaganda materials
released earlier between May to July 2017.3 In 2015, IS media activity was at
its record high with over 892 units of propaganda being published.
Since
September 2017, Al-Hayat Media has not released any new Rumiyah magazine, the
group‘s main online propaganda publication since the cessation of its more
substantive magazine Dabiq in July 2016. The multilingual Rumiyah is usually
distributed in the first week of every month.5 The delay in its publication or
even its possible cessation may be attributed to the lack of news, developments
and updates on the ‗caliphate‘, its ‗wilayat‘ and military operations, as well
as declining morale and possible decimation or departure of its editorial
staff. The daily broadcast of, Al Bayan Radio, another IS propaganda
mouthpiece, has also ceased since October 2017.6 The only consistent and
operational publication is the 16-page Arabic-language news bulletin,
Al-Naba.
Marawi
Narrative: New Strategic Shift
IS central media office is clearly desperate
for a new media strategy and fresh narrative to sustain its future propaganda.
In the tenth issue of Rumiyah entitled ―The Jihad in East Asia‖ released in
June 2017, the group focused on alternative fronts, putting its stakes on the
city of Marawi in the Philippines. Before 2016, IS had limited interest in
Southeast Asia and has never recognised the Philippines as an official wilayat.
The release of a 20-minute video titled ―Al-Bunyan Al-Marsus‖ (The Solid
Structure) in June 2016, which introduced three East Asian fighters calling for
hijra (emigration) to IS-held territories 8 and a united leadership under
Filipino militant commander Isnilon Hapilon became the turning point.
With
the rapid rise of IS-affiliated militants in the Philippines,9 IS central
reportedly sent nearly US$2 million to the Philippines wilayah.10 During the
Marawi siege, IS official news agency, Amaq, regularly released updates on the
battlefront in the form of videos, news bulletin and infographics. An
infographic report released on 19 August 2017 claimed that the IS Maute group
had killed over 335 army soldiers, of which 37 were shot by snipers during the
first 86 days of fighting. The report also claimed that Pangarungan, Marinaut
and Alaa districts in Marawi city were still under IS control.11 These updates
were futile attempts to counter mainstream news that were reporting on the
siege. Official figures put the death toll of the Philippine soldiers at 129.
On 21
August 2017, Al-Hayat Media centre released ―Inside the Khilafah 3‖, the third
installment for the ―Inside the Khilafah‖ video series, which covered Marawi.
The sixminute video featured militants from the Maute group who shared their
experiences amidst fighting in Marawi. When the militants were defeated,
Al-Hayat Media Centre released a two-minute English nasheed (religious hymn)
―Brothers in Marawi‖ on 12 October 2017, and paid tribute to the soldiers who
died in battle.
Sustaining the ‘Virtual Caliphate’ through Encrypted Social
Media Apps
Notwithstanding the absence of Rumiyah and the
decline in IS propaganda, the parallel information warfare still rages on. IS
messaging thrives on an off-line propaganda strategy with the group‘s
media-savvy supporters keeping the group‘s virtual caliphate‘ alive. To fill the
production void propaganda is now disseminated on encrypted platforms such as
WhatsApp and Telegram as well as
file-sharing platforms like Google Drive and Archive.org, which are harder to
detect. Past propaganda materials including videos, magazines and reports have
been made available in small downloadable file sizes and are shared on mobile
communication channels.
Independent
media outlets such as Khattab Media and Wafa‘ Media Foundation continue to
release new propaganda materials in support of IS‘ ideology. An infographic
video on the IS- claimed Las Vegas shooting massacre was distributed by Khattab
Media in the English language.16 Wafa‘ Media released posters that threatened
to carry out attacks in Russia during the FIFA World Cup 2018, as well as in
Vatican City during Christmas.
Through
potent propaganda, IS has developed a loyal following in the digital realm even
if it stops producing new materials. The ‗Just Terror Tactics‘ segment which
provides instructions for aspiring militants to execute do-it-yourself attacks
in their home countries in Rumiyah, exemplifies the form of messaging that was
sufficient to inspire attacks around the world in recent years, including
attacks in Nice, London and New York. IS‘ digitisation of its propaganda and
the comprehensive resource options of accessing its content reflect a long-term
strategy to increase the group‘s digital metabolism to sustain and win continued
support from IS followers worldwide. Even though IS might have been defeated
militarily, its ideology lives on, with its leadership and followers remaining
committed to realising their religio-political goal of establishing a
caliphate.
Going forward, governments and social media
companies must decide which measures can counter and prevent mass dissemination
of online extremist messages. The continuing radicalisation in the virtual
world, and the communication of terrorist attacks in encrypted social media
apps indicate that more efforts are needed in this direction. The need of the
hour is not only to stop the dissemination of extremist propaganda, but to
accompany this direction with counter-ideology efforts as well as to rebut the
exploitation and misrepresentation of religious doctrines by extremist groups.
Terrorist groups that face operational defeats in the real world would take
refuge in virtual communities, where they can push their agenda effectively.
After Mosul, Raqqa and Marawi, the next great challenge is to deny them this
space and limit their reach and influence.
About the author
Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, is a
Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), NTU. Huzaifah authored the operational analysis of recent
losses suffered by IS in the Middle East.
Remy Mahzam, is an Associate
Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), NTU. Remy analysed IS’ social media propaganda operation
following its defeat in Mosul and Raqqa
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