By Riazat Butt and Henry Truck
Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Cross-Country Evaluation
Report
Introduction
This
report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and
de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners'
Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then
provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the
approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the
environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report
will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned
from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a
larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and
interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this
paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case
studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful
initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation.
Although
the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their
geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by
radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural
environments that inform them. For
example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of
far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its
smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within
these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The
way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on
the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the
impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues
taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that
counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot “simply be
transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They
have to develop organically in a specific country and culture.” Despite this,
by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts
it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could
potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere.
Defining Key Terms
Definitions of the concepts of radicalisation,
de-radicalisation, extremism and counter-extremism often vary considerably.
This variation is important as it can alter the focus, intentions and outcomes
of both policies and programmes in these areas. This report adopts particular
definitions of these concepts, but accepts that there is not an internationally
recognised consensus on how they should be understood.
How
these terms are defined depends on how the radicalisation process is
understood; it has become central to the study of terrorism and the formation
of counter-terrorism policy, yet there is no universal theory of radicalisation
and no one size fits all terrorist profile. Some states within the European
Union (EU) have tended to concentrate on jihadist inspired radicalisation,
while others have a broader mandate to incorporate other forms of extremism
such as the far-right, the far-left or ethno-nationalist organisations. There
are also differing legal interpretations of the threshold between illegal and
unsavoury extremist behaviour. In other instances, there have been attempts to
deal with anti-democratic behaviour regardless of whether or not it is linked
to a specific ideology or the use or threat of violence. In order to encompass
this variation in approaches the European Commission has adopted a wide-ranging
definition of radicalisation as the “phenomenon of people embracing opinions,
views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism.”
For
the sake of clarity this report takes a broad approach to the contested and
controversial term and defines it as “the process through which an individual
changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or
extremist, especially where there is intent towards or support for violence”.
This definition is flexible enough to incorporate a range of extremisms,
including but not limited to Al-Qaeda inspired jihadist groups, far-right and
far-left movements, and ethnonationalist, animal rights or environmental
extremist organisations. It is important to note however that radical attitudes
do not always precede or lead to violent acts, although counter-radicalisation
programmes, by their very nature, are based on the wholesale prevention or
curtailment of a process that could lead to violence.
Academics,
policy-makers and practitioners agree that no single cause contributes to
individuals becoming radicalised. There are many factors that, over time, can
work either in isolation or combination to alter an individual’s behaviours and
beliefs. These could include a lack of integration into society or the local
community, political disenfranchisement, objections to foreign policy, or
exposure to extremist individuals, groups or organisations. The local, cultural
and social context also affects the radicalisation process and, accordingly,
government responses to the problem reflect this. For example, European
countries take a different approach to jihadist extremism than many of their
counterparts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Most European states have
tended to avoid theology and therefore have not explicitly challenged jihadist
ideologies, narratives or messages.6 Instead they have initiated projects that
focus on enhancing integration and social cohesion in conjunction with their
de-radicalisation and intervention programmes.
This
report uses the definition of counter-radicalisation adopted by the United
Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism,
which distinguishes counter-radicalisation from de-radicalisation. It defines
the former as “a package of social, political, legal and educational and
economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly
already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming
terrorists”. The latter, deradicalisation, is defined as “programmes that are
generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of
re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence”.8
Counter-radicalisation is therefore concentrated on prevention, while
de-radicalisation seeks to reverse the process by helping to refute extremist
ideologies and facilitate the departure of individuals from extremist groups.
Disengagement entails a change in behaviour (refraining from associating with
potentially violent groups or employing the use of violence) but not
necessarily a change in political or ideological beliefs.
II. The Netherlands
The
Netherlands has not experienced a terrorist attack on the same scale as other
European countries such as the UK, Spain or Norway, yet it has had to deal with
several crises relating to extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. These
include the death of two Dutch citizens of Moroccan descent in Kashmir, killed
while apparently trying to join a local jihadist group, and another Dutch-born
citizen, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdering the controversial film-maker Theo van
Gogh. More recently concern has shifted towards the number of individuals
travelling to Syria to fight in the civil war as it is feared that their
experiences in Syria may result in further radicalisation and potentially
increase the likelihood of them attempting to commit attacks domestically on
their eventual return.
The
assassination of van Gogh in 2004 had a profound impact on the Netherlands,
shocking its traditionally liberal and tolerant society. Muslim communities and
institutions became the target of increased hostility, suspicion and in some
cases violence. The attacks and opprobrium took place amid a simmering climate
of heightened scrutiny of the country's Muslim communities, intensifying debate
around and feeling towards the religion and its adherents. Some suggested that
many among the Muslim community were on the fringes of mainstream Dutch society
and that radicalisation, violent or otherwise, represented a symptom of a
considerably more entrenched problem. It was feared that if integration was not
taking place effectively, and there were young minority populations who were
closed off from mainstream society as well as their own communities, then the
number of individuals at risk from radicalisation would only increase.
The
Dutch government consequently introduced new legislation to tackle the threat
of terrorism while also attempting to improve the levels of integration and
participation in society. The ‘Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan’,
launched in 2007, defined radicalisation as the “willingness to strive for
farreaching changes in society (possibly in an undemocratic manner) to support
such changes or persuade others to accept them”.
Radicalisation
was considered a consequence of societal breakdown, with redress lying in
programmes intended to reinforce social cohesion and the successful management
of a multicultural environment. The perception was that radicalisation, while
not necessarily violent, could heighten the potential for violence and is
therefore harmful to the democratic legal order. Many activities under the
four-year Action Plan therefore focused on the promotion of shared democratic
values, integration and social cohesion, with the hope that “improving the
material integration and the sense of belonging of young Dutch Muslims... would
reduce the breeding ground for radicalisation”. Alongside this there was an
emphasis on deploying protective, preventative and repressive measures as a way
to avert an individual or group's willingness to use violence. There were also
activities intended to eliminate a sense of perceived discrimination or
injustice as a way to prevent young people, especially males from minority
communities, from feeling frustrated or excluded.
The
strategy attempted to balance preventative and repressive measures and had a
number of elements:
Identify those vulnerable to radical
messages and reach out to individuals at risk of “slipping away from Dutch
society and legal democratic order” through radicalisation.
Targeted de-radicalisation and disengagement
programmes for those that have been radicalised.
Disruption of extremist networks through
effective law enforcement.
Weakening the pull of radicalising agents by
prosecuting those that seek to promote extremist ideologies and narratives.
The
Action Plan was not renewed after 2011, yet it offers insights into the
environment in which current programmes operate that are aimed at groups at
risk of radicalisation and those that are attempting to deradicalise or
disengage. These include Personal Intervention Against Young People in
Right-Wing Extremist Circles, Nuansa, and the Slotevaart Action Plan to Prevent
Radicalisation .
III. Sweden
As in
the Netherlands, Sweden has been spared large-scale terrorist attacks similar
to those that have occurred in elsewhere in Europe in recent years. Authorities
however recognise that events in Europe, and further afield can affect Sweden’s
domestic security and overseas interests. One such event was the publication of
cartoons in 2007 by the Swedish artist Larks Vilks depicting the Prophet
Mohammed. This sparked condemnation and protests from people, and a number of
governments, from across the Muslim world, as well as some threats. In 2010
there were a number of significant incidents. Vilks' home was attacked in May
and two Swedish brothers, of Kosovar origin, were consequently convicted of
arson. In November an al-Shabaab fighter appeared in a propaganda video,
encouraging Muslims in Sweden to kill Vilks. In December 2010 an Iraqi-born
Swedish citizen, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, died in an apparent botched
suicide bombing near a busy central shopping district in Stockholm after an
explosive charge detonated prematurely. Also that month a planned attack on the
offices of the newspaper Jyllands-Posten in Denmark by four Swedish residents
was foiled thanks to co-operation between Swedish and Danish authorities. There
have also been a number of instances where Sweden has been used as a base – to
raise money for extremist groups, disseminate propaganda or various other
activities supporting violent extremism.
Violence-promoting
extremism is not currently considered as the primary threat to Swedish society,
democracy or central government. A more pressing concern has been civil unrest,
in the form of demonstrations and protests. Nonetheless extremism in Sweden remains
a threat to others, especially overseas. In 2010 the Swedish security service,
Säpo, highlighted the increasing threat from individuals planning, supporting
or financing terrorist attacks in areas of conflict abroad. Their report on
violent jihadist extremism concluded that the largest threat was ‘returnees’
that come back to Sweden having attended training camps or participated in
violent struggles abroad. Recently, as in the Netherlands, there have been
fears over the number of Swedish citizens that may have travelled to Syria and
the potential risks that they could pose on their return. The focus has shifted
towards identifying individuals planning to travel to Syria and engaging in
preventative messaging and dialogue, as well as speaking to those returning
from such travel. In 2012 Säpo estimated that there were approximately 20
individuals from Sweden engaged in violence or in terrorism training camps in
conflict zones such as Syria, Somalia and Pakistan. More recent figures estimate that there are
between 39 and 87 individuals that may have travelled from Sweden to fight in
Syria.
In the ‘Action plan to safeguard democracy
against violence-promoting extremism’, published by the Swedish government in
2011, violent extremism is categorised into three different “violence-promoting
ideologies”: far-right White Power, left-wing autonomous and violent jihadist
extremism. According to the Swedish plan, radicalisation “denotes the process
whereby an individual goes from being non-violent to being in favour of
violence” and de-radicalisation “describes the opposite process”. It reflects
current understandings of the social factors that can lead to radicalisation,
including discrimination, segregation, a lack of community cohesion and
feelings of marginalisation or exclusion. Such an environment, suggests one
report, could create a situation “where it is easier for those who advocate
violence and extreme measures to obtain a hearing”. Exclusion and a lack of
social cohesion have consequences for individuals and wider society as tensions
and conflicts with ethnic, cultural or religious undertones can arise and
possibly contribute to further polarisation, radicalisation or even
violence.
Initiatives
such as the Tolerance Project and the Karlskrona Municipality network are used
to overcome exclusion through improved integration and urban development, and
are therefore considered as measures that can prevent the circumstances in
which radicalisation can often occur from arising. These are used in
conjunction with various programmes aimed specifically at preventing
individuals at risk from radicalisation from falling prey to extremist
recruitment, ideologies and narratives, as well deradicalisation initiatives
such as Exit Fryshuset.
IV. Denmark
Again
Denmark has not been the victim of a mass-casualty extremist violence, yet in
2005 the publication of cartoons by Kurt Vestergaard featuring the Prophet
Mohammed in the Danish newspaper JyllandsPosten led to what has been described
as the country's “biggest political crisis since World War II”. Reactions were
initially restrained and far from uniform; whilst thousands protested in
Copenhagen and some Muslim groups, individuals and institutions expressed
disapproval, others took more moderate positions. There were also a number of
protests outside Denmark, some of which turned violent. In 2006, the Danish
embassies in Syria, Lebanon and Iran were attacked and in 2008 a car bomb
exploded near the embassy in Islamabad, killing 6 and injuring at least 30
people. Some groups went as far as issuing threats against Denmark and its
overseas citizens and interests, including an article entitled ‘The Cartoon
Crusade’ that appeared in the first issue of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula’s (AQAP) magazine Inspire in 2010.
The
cartoons were reprinted in 2008 and Denmark, Jyllands-Posten and Vestergaard
himself were again identified as high-priority targets. In 2009, two
individuals were arrested in Chicago for planning an attack on the
Jyllands-Posten offices. In January 2010, the Somali Mohamed Geele attempted to
attack Vestergaard in his home, and was given a nine year sentence in February
2011. In September 2010, Lors Doukaev, a Belgian citizen of Chechen origins inadvertently
detonated a bomb at the Hotel Jørgensen in Copenhagen that was most likely
intended for Jyllands-Posten. Later that year in December a planned ‘Mumbai
style’ attack on the offices of the newspaper by four Swedish residents was
foiled due to cooperation between Swedish and Danish authorities.
The
fallout from the Vestergaard cartoons continues and Danish authorities claim
that there is a “significant” threat of terrorism against the country.40 Recent
assessments of the security threat have identified an increase in the number of
Danish-based groups, networks and individuals that adhere to a militant
jihadist ideology. Despite the significant number of attempted attacks
associated with the controversial cartoons, the fear is largely from smaller scale
or individual attacks rather than larger, more coordinated plots. There is
concern over the potential of Danish citizens traveling to conflicts or
training camps abroad in unstable countries or regions such as Syria, Somalia
or Pakistan and returning to commit attacks in Denmark. While perhaps not to
the same extent there is also the threat posed by either far-right or far-left
extremist groups or individuals, which has been raised since the attacks on
Oslo and Utøya by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in July 2011. This has been
fuelled by an increase of anti-immigrant sentiment in Denmark and the
anti-immigration Danish People’s Party has gained in popularity, ensuring that,
as elsewhere in Europe, debates surrounding migration, integration and community
cohesion remain contentious.
In
order to counter these threats the Danish government released its ‘A common and
safe future: An action plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among
young people’ in 2009. The plan had two guiding principles; identifying and
addressing problems related to extremism and radicalisation, and developing
integration and cohesion within Danish society. Radicalisation is defined as,
“the process in which a person gradually accepts the ideas and methods of
extremism and, possibly, joins its organised groups”. The plan also recognises
a number of elements that can play a role in the radicalisation process ranging
from “personal circumstances” and “group dynamics” to “political, financial and
cultural factors”. It was renewed under the current government, elected in
September 2011, again stressing the threats posed by jihadist extremism and
radicalisation, but also with a greater focus on far-right extremism following
the attacks in Norway in July of that year.
The
Danish plan identifies radicalisation partially as a symptom of inadequate
social integration. Its strategy to counter extremist radicalisation was
therefore divided into preventative activities and targeted interventions.
Preventative activities focused on increasing social cohesion and democratic
capital and further integrating alienated groups into mainstream society. This
was done by reaching out to young people and encouraging them to find healthier
social alternatives to extremist groups through community dialogue initiatives
and increasing the effectiveness of multi-agency partnerships. The plan did not
therefore attempt to tackle violent extremist narratives and ideologies
directly, preferring instead to focus on improving the socio-economic
conditions of potentially vulnerable young people.
V. Germany
Historically Germany has been more concerned
with combating far-right and far-left violent extremism than violent jihadism,
so its de-radicalisation activities have traditionally been focused in these
areas. The Red Army Faction (RAF) for example was the most notorious far-left
terrorist group in Europe, committing numerous assassinations and bombings from
their founding in 1970 until they disbanded in the 1990s. Extremist violence
associated with the far-left has however been less prevalent in recent years.
Contrastingly there have been a number of recent incidents of violence
associated with groups from the far-right. Members of the Autonome
Nationalisten (Autonomous Nationalists) group attacked far-left protesters and
police officers in 2009, leaving dozens injured. 2011 saw the arrests of five
individuals from the National Socialist Underground (NSU) suspected of
involvement in a series of murders and several bombings between 2001 and 2007. The group was only discovered following the
deaths of two members after a failed bank robbery, prompting accusations that
the security services underestimated, or in some instances were even complicit
in the threat posed by far-right extremists.
The trial of the remaining member of the group, Beate Zschäpe is
ongoing, although the case has already prompted an investigation into the
mistakes that allowed the group to go undetected for so long.
As
well as a history of far-left and far-right extremist violence, Germany has
also been affected by a number of jihadist related incidents. These include the
trials of members of the so-called ‘Hamburg Cell’ for their association with
the September 11th 2001 attacks on the U.S.
, the attempted bombing of a Strasbourg Christmas Market in 2004 and the attempted bombing of trains in
Dortmund and Koblenz in 2006. There was
also the ‘Sauerland Group’ who were prevented from carrying out a series of attacks
on American targets in Germany by the security services in 2007. The only
successful attack to date occurred at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011 when
gunman Arid Uka, a 20 year old native of Kosovo, killed two US soldiers.
Figures from that year show that there were 19 arrests and 12 convictions
related to jihadist terrorism, which represented the highest levels since 2006.
There was also an increase in the estimates of the number of jihadist
extremists present in Germany to 38,080.
As in the other countries mentioned in this report there has also been
concern over the potential threat posed by returning German ‘foreign fighters’
that have fought, and potentially been radicalised, in Syria. German officials therefore continue to rate
the level of the threat from jihadist extremism as its greatest challenge.
Germany
does not currently have a specific national action plan for combating extremist
radicalisation, nor an official concept of what the term entails. ‘Extremist
activities’ are defined by the Ministry of the Interior as “those which oppose
our democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values, norms and
rules, and aim to overthrow the liberal democratic order and replace it with
one in line with the ideas of the respective group”. 59 Radicalisation in the
German context can therefore be understood as the process an individual
undergoes in order to hold views or commit actions (not necessarily violence)
that are in line with the above definition. The responsibility for preventing
radicalisation and implementing deradicalisation programmes falls under the
remit of the wider German counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy emphasises
the distinction between repressive and preventive measures, using law
enforcement and general criminal prosecutions (existing statutes on homicide or
public order offences for example) to deal with the former, and softer
approaches for the latter.
Germany's
counter-terrorism policy has five primary aims, the second of which is to fight
the causes of terrorism and extremism by thwarting the radicalisation
process.61 Despite the lack of a specific standalone plan or strategy for
countering radicalisation much attention is given to this objective in the
wider counter-terrorism strategy. It incorporates a multidimensional approach
by the Ministry of the Interior which includes civic education to reinforce
fundamental liberal democratic values, attempts to foster interfaith and
religious-political dialogue, and broader policies aimed at improving
integration and social cohesion within German society. Attempts are also made
to counter and refute extremist ideologies, narratives and messaging. For
example in 2011, the Federal Government established formal, institutionalised
dialogue between Muslims and the security services to fight radicalisation,
violence, and jihadism. This was done through annual summits and the funding of
partnership projects between the security services and representatives of the
Muslim community to identify and challenge radicalisation at an early
stage. In
tandem with these various initiatives there are also a number of
de-radicalisation programmes that encourage and provide support for those
hoping or attempting to leave extremist groups.
VI. Lessons Learned
This
section identifies elements of good practice and the lessons that can be learnt
in the fields of radicalisation prevention and de-radicalisation, utilising the
experiences of the programmes examined from the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark
and Germany.Programmes
and initiatives must account for the context in which they operate. Both
national policy strategies and frameworks, as well as the local environment,
need to be considered in order for a programme to be successful and relevant to
its intended target audience. The Slotevaart Action Plan to Prevent
Radicalisation from the Netherlands and the Karlskrona Municipality project
from Sweden both consulted and partnered with local communities and
organisations in order to set the goals and methodologies of their programmes
for example. The development of working relationships and trust between project
partners and stakeholders is also crucial to the success of any initiative. A
multiagency approach is required to address the range of causes of
radicalisation and support those that wish to de-radicalise. Work in this field
can involve numerous public and private actors, as well as communities
themselves and cooperation is therefore vital at local, national and
international levels. The Personal Intervention Against Young People in
Right-Wing Extremist Circles project from the Netherlands or the Danish
De-radicalisation - Targeted Interventions programme both represent good
examples of such cooperation as they brought together local authorities,
central government and a combination of local actors to define the aims and
scope of their programmes. Finally it is important that the facilitation of the
sharing of information between projects continues so that past successes can be
replicated elsewhere and previous mistakes can be avoided in future. The Nuansa
project represents an important step in this direction, within the Netherlands
at least, as its primary aim is to enable an integrated, multiagency approach
to the challenges posed by radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Their advisory
service also offers information and advice for others that have questions or
concerns related to radicalisation, a model that could easily be adopted
elsewhere.
Constructive
and healthy personal relationships between practitioners and participants can
also be crucial, especially in de-radicalisation programmes. Sustainability is
therefore important as this can only realistically be achieved through the
continuity of both funding and staff. The Violence Prevention Network in
Germany for example has had success by offering consistent and long-term
contact between individuals on the programme and their counsellors both inside
and outside of prison in order to build up a trusting and beneficial
relationship. It is also essential that both practitioners and participants are
committed to the programme in question as de-radicalisation especially can be a
difficult and long-term process in which set-backs are far from unusual.
Programmes should therefore be voluntary where possible, such as those offered
by EXIT Fryshuset, EXIT Germany or the Violence Prevention Network, who will
only work with individuals that have referred themselves and are motivated to
change their behaviour and beliefs. Programmes should be tailored to
individuals where possible as there are not universal requirements for those at
risk of radicalisation or attempting to de-radicalise. Effective working
relationships are essential in understanding the nature of each participant’s
specific problems and needs and addressing them in a satisfactory manner.
The
use of ‘formers’ that have personal experience of both the processes of
radicalisation and deradicalisation can also help to achieve the goal of
building constructive working relationships as they offer a unique
understanding of the dangers and problems that participants may encounter. EXIT
Fryshuset and EXIT Germany represent successful attempts at such an approach as
they are both primarily staffed by individuals that have previously been
associated with far-right white supremacist movements, precisely the groups
from which participants in their program are attempting to extricate
themselves. The sensitivities surrounding state involvement should also be
considered. Legitimacy and credibility are crucial as many of the individuals
that programmes are intended to reach are often distrustful or openly hostile
to the authorities due to their ideological beliefs. The use of ‘formers’ is
one potential way of ensuring that participants have someone to work with that
they feel they can trust. However it should also be ensured that programme
staff must be well trained and supported, and be aware of the potential signs
of radicalisation and the barriers to de-radicalisation that their charges may
encounter. Reformed extremists may be in a better position in this sense as
they should be well aware of both the radicalisation and de-radicalisation
processes. Both the Tolerance Project in Sweden and the Back on Track
initiative from Denmark have specifically emphasised the importance of staff
training as a vital element of their respective projects.
VII.
Conclusion
This
report has explored the range of approaches taken in four European countries to
the problem of radicalisation. It has examined a number of programmes from
these countries that are intended to limit the threat from radicalisation or
assist those that have been radicalised to reintegrate themselves back into
mainstream society and identified areas in which they have been successful. It
is however important to reiterate that such programs do not represent
comprehensive solutions to these problems, they should instead be considered as
pieces of a larger puzzle. There are numerous factors that can work in tandem
to lead an individual to adopt extremist views or participate in violent
extremism, and subsequently there are a range of measures and programs that are
required to combat radicalisation. The four countries examined in this report
have largely recognised this and adopted policies that aim to address both the
individual and societal factors that can contribute to the radicalisation
process. Despite this, counter-radicalisation remains a relatively recent
concern for many governments and communities. Consequently considerable gaps
remain in both our understanding of the process of radicalisation and our
knowledge of what makes for effective policies and practices in this area. This
report has therefore attempted to highlight those programmes that have had
success in order to inform future efforts at tackling the threat of
radicalisation. However, more needs to be done to facilitate the dissemination
of good practice both domestically and internationally. Any attempts at
counter-radicalisation, whether by governments or other actors, must understand
that success can be difficult to quantify and will require long-term planning,
commitment and cooperation of all those involved in order to achieve the
desired results
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