By Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff,
RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Volume 10, Issue 3 | March 2018
Background
Radicalisation of the ‘Guilty’
About the author:
Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff is a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Volume 10, Issue 3 | March 2018
Background
A few months before Islamic State (IS)-affiliated terrorists attacked Marawi City on 23 May 2017, a young Muslim girl from Manila, Siti (not her real name), in a bid to atone for her ‘sinful life’, fell prey to IS’ social media groups called “da’wa” (preaching) which are esponsible for spreading IS militant ideology online. Siti reached out to an IS recruiter on Facebook, Abu Yaqeen, who shared her story on his Facebook page as a testimony of his work. Before radicalisation, Siti had held mainstream views about jihad; she did not believe that jihad – in the IS-jihadist sense of the word i.e. armed militancy – was mandatory in Islam. This frustrated her recruiter who then took advantage of Siti’s lack of religious knowledge by inculcating in her a militant-exclusivist mindset. Eventually, she was convinced into believing that the Philippines society was un-Islamic and unfit for her to live in, and that she needed to make the so-called hijrah (migrate) from such a life and to fight alongside terrorist groups to attain a so-called Islamic life. Siti’s isolation from her community, friends,and family manifests her desire to repent and to distance herself from ‘her previous [sinful] life’. She went into isolation for about a year and resurfaced online in October 2017, when she communicated with her recruiter to thank him for guiding her. By then, Siti had become the leader of IS’ female wing in Marawi. Abu Yaqeen and other IS supporters and sympathisers shared her story on Facebook, glorifying her as an ideal for other females to follow.
Radicalisation of the ‘Guilty’
Siti’s pathway to online radicalisation is a common trend in Islamist militancy today. Vulnerable young Muslims who feel the need to repent from an ‘un-Islamic’ lifestyle have a tendency to blame secularism and the modern urban environments, whether it is Manila or any other city in the United States, Europe or elsewhere. They overlook Islam’s
emphasis on mercy and forgiveness and the wide latitudes Muslims have in practising their faith. Out of a sense of guilt, they despise themselves and their community and society, believing them to be in gross error, and that they therefore have to socially isolate themselves to truly repent and change. In contrast, many young Muslims find the guidance they need from mainstream and widely recognised and legitimate sources. They are able to reconcile Islam with modernity and are confident in expressing their identity and practising their religion. Without sufficient religious knowledge and guidance, radical ideologues would push vulnerable youths to reject their contemporary moderate Islamic life. Since the 1980s, Islamists have been propagating the idea that Islam has to be practised, as it was in 7th Century Arabia in literal terms. They argue that Muslims have to revive classical Islamic institutions of governance to achieve social justice. To them, present-day, secular institutions are at odds with Islamic teachings, and a source of inequality, sociopolitical backwardness and various social ills. These ideas continue to permeate the imagination of some common Muslims.
In addition, terrorist ideologues have been arguing that the only source of salvation for Muslims like Siti is armed jihad. Lost, and without the means to differentiate militant ideology from mainstream religious knowledge, they become vulnerable to exclusivist teachings and terrorist recruitment. Using Theology for Ideology Before and after 9/11, jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) showed videos of Muslims suffering in conflict zones to elicit an emotional response and a commitment to ‘jihad’. Since the Syrian civil war, terrorist groups have learned to capitalise on the vulnerabilities of Muslim youths, particularly their naivety and lack of religious understanding. Prior to the Syrian conflict, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) realised the potential of sectarian tensions in the Middle East to grow and mobilise its supporters. To normalise violence among Muslims, the group, which eventually became the socalled Islamic State (IS), began indoctrination of new recruits through classes on their version of Islamic theology prior to any other training.
Terrorists manipulate Islamic theology, using theological frames that classify ‘truths’ in black-and-white terms – right vs wrong, Darul-Aman vs Dar-ul-Harb, Muslim vs non-Muslim. Terrorists use these categories –Muslim/non-Muslim – to demarcate their enemies along theological lines. By labelling fellow Muslims and the religious ‘other’ as a kafir (disbeliever), murtad (apostate), taghut (transgressor), or ahl al-bid’ah (blasphemer), terrorists morally disengage and dehumanise their victims. Through these theological frames, terrorists believe they have a divine mandate to commit acts that are morally forbidden in their own religion such as suicide attacks, burning people alive, and disfiguring dead bodies.
Way Forward
In response to global terrorism, many governments have funded institutions to counter radical, so-called-religious ideologies. Such efforts are useful to understand how terrorists think and provide insights into their rehabilitation. However, providing counter-points and debating with terrorist ideologues may not be enough. Prospective terrorist recruits are not
concerned with what such institutions have to say about religion and terrorism. Sometimes,
these institutions are undermined as authoritative sources of counter-ideology by being overtly associated with governments. Social intervention efforts should also focus on providing adequate opportunities to allow youths to access religious resources as well as programmes that cater to their needs and the challenges they face in modern life. On one hand, counselling alone would be insufficient as these youths are looking for religious guidance as a solution to their problems. On the contrary, many youths feel that some religious institutions fail to contextualise religion to modern and contemporary settings as they may overemphasise Islamic rituals or be rigid in some Islamic doctrines. Hence, there is a need to rethink religious education programmes that are specialised for the youth and can cater to their contemporary needs. These programmes have to be based on evidence-based research that would aim to understand the challenges they face in their lives. Otherwise, terrorist recruiters may fill this gap. Notions such as Islam requires Muslim youth
to engage in armed jihad for salvation, or that repenting requires them to isolate themselves and reject the social and political realities of modernity are false. Islam – as well as other religions, traditions and philosophies – has vast resources to help their followers to achieve the good life in any temporal context or socio-political setting. Religious institutions and communities need to communicate this well to the present generation to counter radicalisation now and in the future.
Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff is a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
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