By Abdul Basit, RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Volume 10, Issue 3 | March 2018
Introduction
In the last few years, the traction of IS ideology in South Asia has mobilised a new generation of radicals among the educated youth of urban middle and upper-middle classes. This generation of educated jihadists operate in a de-centralised manner in cell formations or as lone-wolf actors making their detection and eradication a challenging task. Moreover, with improvements in urveillance capabilities of the security institutions to monitor the openend social media platforms, these militants have moved to encrypted channels like Telegram and Whatsapp to avoid detection and disruption of their operations.
Against this backdrop, this paper explores the emergence of urban jihadists in South Asia along with outlining push and pull factors which have facilitated or hindered IS ingress in the region. The concluding part probes the implications of this trend for regional peace and security.
IS’ Ideological Ingress in South Asia:Push and Pull Factors
Push Factors
Unlike Syria and Iraq where IS grew rapidly,the ground realities in South Asia are largely different. The state sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional countries, barring Afghanistan, are intact. The presence of strong institutional structures, robust militaries and security institutions and syncretic culture will impede IS efforts to expand its presence in South Asia beyond its current footprint.1 IS’ so-called message of caliphate is over-simplistic in comparison with the complex socio-cultural and religiopolitical environment of the region.Moreover, the South Asian militant landscape is structured and highly competitive. The well-established militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jasih-e-Muhammad and others will hinder efforts of IS-affiliates to encroach into their spheres of influence. The South Asian ISaffiliates have neither the numbers nor the resources to challenge these well-grounded and extensive militant groupsAlso, IS is an outsider to South Asia; the impermissible barriers of language, culture, geography and distance will not allow the terror group to carve out a niche in the region.4 More importantly, IS is a Salafi- Takfiri-Jihadi group while most of the militant groups in South Asia follow Deobandi-Hanafism. As such, IS would not find ideological traction given the limited appeal of Salafism in South Asia beyond attracting some disenfranchised elements and selfradicalised individuals.
Pull Factors
However, there are deep-seated communal and sectarian fault-lines that IS can exploit to its advantage. IS divides its targets into murtadeen (apostates, the US-allied governments and security institutions), rafideen (deviants, Islamic and other religious minorities) and taghoot (imperialists, US and Western forces in Afghanistan). The participation of Pakistani and Afghan Shias in the Syrian conflict gives IS another reason to target the Shia community in South Asia. Iran has been recruiting, training, and sending the Hazara Shias from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria.7 As many as 4,000 Shias from Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently fighting in Syria under the Li Wa Al-Fatimiyun (The Brigade of Fatima, named after Prophet Muhammad’s youngest daughter),8 and Liwa Al Zainebiyoun (The Brigade of Zainab, named after Prophet Muhammad’s grand-daughter and sister of Hussain) militant groups. Geographically, South Asia gives IS an opening to Central and Southeast Asia along with offering tremendous opportunities for hiding, recruiting, fundraising and training in different parts of the region.10 IS has mentioned the South Asia region as pivotal to its eastward expansion into Myanmar and Southeast Asia and Westward expansion into Central Asia and the Caucus region.
Secondly, South Asia is home to 507 million Muslims with a sizable number of them possibly being vulnerable to radical recruitment; this gives IS an ideal opening.The deep-seated communal and sectarian fault-lines, running Islamist insurgencies in Kashmir and Afghanistan, porous borders,informal economies and the ease of procuring weapons and funds, make South Asia an ideal place for IS. Moreover, the readily available ungoverned spaces (physical sanctuaries), an environment conducive to growth of extremist ideologies (social sanctuary), and a large youth cohort susceptible to militant recruitment (demographic sanctuary) make Pakistan naturally attractive for the IS.
Thirdly, the return of South Asian self radicalised individuals who went to join IS in Iraq and Syria would offer IS another opportunity to grow in the region. The returning South Asian foreign fighters can create their cells or link up with the existing regional IS-affiliates. Their inclusion will boost the operational and organisational capabilities of IS-affiliates.Finally, the unregulated cyber space in South Asia is another potential avenue which IS can exploit to further its ideological narrative. The 480 million internet users in South Asia are the second largest in the world. IS’ multifaceted online media strategy has been instrumental in the spread of its extremist ideology.15 In areas where the terror group cannot grow physically, it can use the cyber space to expand its footprint. The decentralisation of information and government’s inability to regulate the cyber space can potentially work to IS’ advantage. Social media pages and Islamist forums have been the usual meeting place between the recruiters and the vulnerable youth.16 The threat of cyber radicalisation in South Asia is real.
South Asia’s Urban Jihadists
One concerning trend of IS ingress in South Asia has been the emergence of educated militants from middle and upper-middle class of urban areas. The impact of IS’ extremist message and social media propaganda has been felt more strongly in the cities than in the rural areas.17 Barring Afghanistan, the South Asian IS-affiliates have a very robust urban footprint. Whether it is the self proclaimed IS-cell in Karachi, which targeted the bus of Ismaili Shias in September 201418,the Gulshan café attacker in Dhaka19, the Kalyan Cell in India, all come from well-to-do families with university or college-level education.20 This generational shift has created new themes, motivations, trends,and narratives. These urban militants hail from mixed ethnic, socio-economic, and educational backgrounds.IS has combined the pan-Islamist narrative with an overt anti-Shia agenda, which equally appeals to the Islamist and sectarian militants in South Asia. Three main militant groups cooperating with IS in Pakistan include, Jandullah, Tehrik-i-Khilafat (TK) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-alami (LeJA), are based in the country’s settled areas.22 IS has fuelled recruitment in major South Asian cities like Lahore, Karachi, Dhaka, Mumbai,Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Ahmedabad,Colombo and Malé, capital of Maldives.This generation is tech and media savvy,overambitious, and compared to the other militant groups better aware of political and religious history that inspires their rhetoric and motivations. More importantly, they are aware of their religious and sectarian identities.23 Generally, they have Salafi-Takfiri leanings. Most are between 18-30 years old and they have gone through a relatively short period of radicalization.While the motivational factors may vary from individual-to-individual and area-to-area, they all seem to be obsessed with ideas of so called Caliphate, hijrah and end-times narratives Arguably, this pro-IS South Asian breed of educated, urban militants constitutes the fourth generation of South Asian jihadists. In retrospect, the alumni of the 1980s Afghan jihad constitute the first generation like Hizbe-Islami, Harkat-ul-Jihadi Al-Islami et al. The emergence of Al-Qaeda, the Kashmirfocused militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, and the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s are the second generation. Meanwhile, the post-9/11 pro-Al-Qaeda militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jandullah, Punjabi Taliban,the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B) are the third generation South Asian jihadists.
As a trend within religious movement and religio-political organisations, the younger generation is unhappy and dissatisfied with the older generation.26 The newer generation sees the older generation as status quo oriented and not doing enough. The younger generation is overambitious and driven by
grander objectives. This rift between the new and old guard can result in dissension where the younger-generation forms their own group and leaves the older group. The wave of IS allegiances in 2015 and 2016 from South Asian militant groups can be explained by a generational shift within these organisations. These highly motivated groups saw a new opportunity in the emergence and rise of IS in 2014 and jumped onto the IS bandwagon. The new generation is extreme in its methods, morally consequentialist and unapologetically brutal. For them, the ends justify the means. They do not necessarily have ideological baggage or historical grievances. Al-Qaeda's pan-Islamist Jihadist traditions, Taliban’s Afghan-centric approach, or the Kashmiri group’s Kashmir-only-policy do not bind or restrict them, instead they are Sunni supremacists.28 This new generation of dedicated and globally oriented militants do not subscribe to a narrow and parochial approach to jihadism. Rather than drawing inspiration from Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, they look towards IS for mentorship and legitimacy.29 This generation is unapologetically brutal and savage in its modus operandi. The grievances and resentment of the educated youth towards the state due to unemployment and corruption, and the search for a strong ideological identity, need for excitement and an urge to belong allows
IS to exploit them through its slick social media propaganda.Characteristically this breed of South Asian militants is different from their predecessors and do not conform to the stereotypical profile of militants perceived to be from rural and poor backgrounds, educated in madrassas and radicalised during their religious education. Most of the fourth generation jihadists are self-radicalised on internet, by their university fellows, through familial networks or modern religious institutions like Tanzeem-e-Islami (TI) and Hizb-ut-Tahr ir (HT).31 Recruiters penetrate religious organisations and groups like TI and HT to target young people and establish subgroups. When a bond of trust has been established after starting off with discussions of spirituality and are then exposed to a more radical version of political Islam.
Implications
The IS ambition in South Asia is to enhance its prestige not territorial expansion. IS neither has the capability to capture territory nor will it try to do so in the near term. IS will continue to work with local militant groups to get recruits and enhance public relations. IS policies in South Asia are driven by pragmatic-realism rather than ideological over ambition. It will work with the like minded militant groups through marriages of convenience to maximise gains without provoking larger militant groups in South Asia. While the rhetoric and propaganda will remain hyperbolic, the intelligence community in South Asia will do well to keep an eye on the modus operandi rather than falling for the narrative, which could be misleading. The South Asian governments are fully capable of managing the operational threat from IS. However, the bigger challenge will be how to counter the ideological threat and wage an effective ‘war of ideas and narratives’. It would require ‘counter-ideology’ and ‘counter-narrative’ responses that cannot be addressed through traditional law enforcement or operational responses. Ideas cannot be fought by bullets, but through better and stronger ideas. Most of the self-radicalised pro-IS cells and individuals in South Asia are from the urban areas and they got influenced by private religious organisations and charities and mainstream movements like Tanzeem-e-Islami, Al-Huda and Islamic Research Foundation of Dr. Zakir Naik. A serious debate is needed: how to organize religious activism within these institutions without disturbing the overall equilibrium. Such religious institutes and organisations may not be directly involved in violent radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, but the worldview they construct through their teachings make the job of violent-extremist organisation easier.
Conclusion
There is a clear case for reformation to ensure that the slippages of Islamist activists towards violent-extremism are blocked. So a serious dialogue has to start on where to the draw the line. The broader-goal of such a dialogue should be reformation; if the goals are security-centric then it is a recipe for disaster. However, this process of reformation should be internal and self-driven through dialogue and debate with the concerned state institutions. Anything imposed from outside will not only jeopardize the existing balance but will also further tilt the scale in favour of extremist organisations. While too much outside control and interference is bad, too much internal laxity and complacency is equally dangerous. If these platforms of religious activism are banned, removed or meddled with externally, it will replace a protective layer from the society which is keeping religious activism within the acceptable limits, norms and values of the respective states. Where the line should be drawn should be decided through debate and mutual discussions between the stakeholders.
About the author:
Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore
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