By Adeel Rasheed , IDSA
Journal of Defense Studies,
Vol. 10 No.-02, April-June 2016 Page- 39-76
Vol. 10 No.-02, April-June 2016 Page- 39-76
The Need for Couter-radicalisation Programmes
In the
aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks and the US-led Iraq War of 2003, thousands
of religious extremists and radical youths were arrested, convicted or
imprisoned in various countries. As most of them could not be prosecuted for
serious offences, it became problematic to keep them behind bars indefinitely
and in order to mitigate the potential threat they might pose to society after
their release. The problem became more acute after the Madrid bombings of 2004
and the London bombings of 2005, as governments found it difficult to explain
how their own people had conducted acts of mass violence against fellow
citizens. It was at this time that several governments launched separate
‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) programmes to arrest the proliferation of
radical and extremist ideologies in society by violent non-state actors. This
process of an individual’s transformation from a moderate, law-abiding citizen
into an active anti-state extremist is referred to as ‘radicalisation into
violent extremism’ (RVE), or more commonly as ‘radicalisation’. As the global
jihadist threat widened, several countries in Europe, the Middle East and Asia
developed their own counter-radicalisation programmes to encourage
disengagement and de-radicalisation of the vulnerable sections of their
respective societies. Many radicalised people and groups were put under
surveillance and, in some cases, referrals were made for their counselling and
training courses. Again, as most counter-radicalisation programmes were
designed and developed to counter
radical Islamist threat, they were not able to equally focus on the problem of
radicalisation found in other communities.
Thus, global counter-radicalisation measures have
sometimes been unjustly criticised for being primarily counter-jihadist in
their orientation. Initially, there was confusion over the methodologies and
terminologies used in counter-radicalisation programmes as these were developed
separately in different countries and were subject to constant revision. The
confusion over the terminologies was not just a matter of syntactical nuance,
as each one of them had to denote specific set of concepts and measures in
different stages of the lactic cycle of radicalisation, with characteristic
behaviour, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Thus, there was even a
lack of consensus over the meaning of ‘antiradicalisation’,
‘counter-radicalisation’ and ‘de-radicalisation’, with all three terms
sometimes being used interchangeably. Gradually, unanimity emerged. Now, the
term ‘anti-radicalisation’ is mainly associated with programmes aimed to
protect segments of population that have only recently come under the influence
of radicalisation and also covers measures related to detection and developing
deterrence.
On the other hand, ‘counter-radicalisation programmes’
target those radicalised elements that may have not yet joined forces of
violent extremism or terrorism and can be rescued before they attempt the
dangerous transition. The measures suited to counterterrorism operations
include disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.The third
category pertains to ‘de-radicalisation programmes’, devised for those
individuals who may have already aided, abetted or committed acts of violent
extremism. Thus, these measures cover post surrender and post-detention
programmes. However, all these three sets of programmes still generically fall
under ‘counter-radicalisation’. Many of these behaviour modification programmes
under the above-mentioned categories cover ideological or religious
counselling, vocational education, recreational and psychological
rehabilitation, inter-religious or inter-communal discourse programmes,
post-release surveillance and care, as well as involvement of family members
and civil society to foster rehabilitation. Although, theories on social
movements and social psychology have tried to explain the causes and processes
related to radicalisation since the 1960s, and various governments have
intermittently employed deradicalisation measures in the last century, the
discipline of counter radicalisation developed into a major anti-terrorism
discipline only after the post-9/11 global campaign against terrorism,
particularly with reference to countering the enormous and growing threat of
jihadist radicalisation. It is noteworthy that counter-radicalisation studies
and programmes have extended the scope and impact of counterterrorism
operations beyond conventional security and military paradigms by delving into
ideological, religious, socio-political, economic and, at times, historical
vectors. It is contended that this approach is far more effective than the
hitherto mainly militaristic and security-centric response to terror, which has
often proven inadequate and, in some cases, counterproductive. The central
premise of most counter-radicalisation programmes is that terrorism spreads in
societies because of the extremely divisive and violent propaganda and
indoctrination carried out by various extremist institutions and terrorist
organisations. Thus, British Prime Minister David Cameron avers that the ‘root
cause’ of terrorism is the extremist narrative and not so-called inequities of
poverty or foreign policy.3 However, the over-empahasis on countering extremist
ideological discourse by several
contemporary counter-radicalisation programmes has been criticised by various
counterterrorism experts and academicians, who have questioned the empirical
basis for linking extremist ideology with terrorist actions as well as the
preoccupation of counter-radicalisation programmes with Islamist
radicalisation, at the expense of extremism found in other communities.
Is ‘radicalisation’ the right Word? The difficulty with definition
To some academicians and anti-terrorism experts, the
term ‘radicalisation’ in and of itself is problematic. It is contended that
most revolutionaries of modern political thought, even the proponents of
individual liberty and human rights (like Thomas Jefferson and Nelson Mandela),
were radical leaders espousing violence to achieve their revolutionary goals.
Therefore, radicalism that opposes conventional beliefs, hackneyed and
oppressive societal values and state hegemony has often been a force for good
and has promoted human progress. Therefore, it has been argued that the
branding of obscurantist and regressive ideologies—such as those espoused by
contemporary terrorist groups—as radical is misleading. Again, it is averred
that the identification of an ideology and group by any government and society
as being radical or moderate is somewhat arbitrary and depends on the context
leading to its emergence. Some civil society activists contend that the use of
counterterrorism and counter radicalisation programmes by some governments is
outwardly an exercise directed against the menace of violent extremism, but
carry a hideous agenda of curtailing civil liberties and human rights in order
to exert greater state control and hegemony over various facets of individual
thought, liberty and private enterprise.4 To some counterterrorism experts like
Arun Kundnani and Alex P. Schmid, the very concept of radicalisation has gained
currency because it is viewed as being directed against Islamic extremism and
therefore, it has ‘become a political shibboleth despite its lack of
precision’.5 Some point out that the word ‘radicalisation’ came into its
present use following the 7/7 terror attacks in July 2005 and that the practice
of searching radicalised individuals in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US) has led to so-called ‘Muslim McCarthyism’. Thus, Arun Kundnani
notes: Following the neoconservative paradigm, models of radicalisation tend to
assume that extremist religious ideology drives terrorism. In addition, as with
the neoconservatives, they focus overwhelmingly on acts of violence carried out
by Muslims and rarely address political violence and terrorism more
generally…For some radicalisation analysts, the role of extremist religious
ideology in this process is akin to a ‘conveyor belt’ that mechanically pushes
an individual into terrorism. This implies that, once someone has adopted the
extremist ideology, terrorism is likely to follow sooner or later…Whatever
nuances are added to the picture, the underlying assumption in radicalisation
models is usually the same: that some form of religious ideology is a key
element in turning a person into a terrorist. This analysis has underpinned
counter-terrorism policymaking in the UK since 2006 and led to viewing certain
forms of religious ideology as an early warning sign of potential terrorism.7
Several terrorism experts contend that the process of ideological
indoctrination is not the main cause behind the transformation of a
peace-abiding individual into a violent extremist or terrorist. Empirical
evidence shows that terrorists often never receive formal indoctrination and do
not undergo a process of radicalisation before joining an extremist or
terrorist organisation. Many of them are usually drawn into radical
organisations for a variety of other reasons, such as familial ties or criminal
affiliations.8 Conversely, opinion polls conducted over decades reveal that
even when large sections of a population claim to be supportive of radical
ideologies and extremist violence, they never actively support or participate in carrying out acts
of terrorism.9 Olivier Roy, the noted French scholar of Islamic society, states
that even jihadi terrorism shares many factors with other forms of dissent,
either political or behavioral. Most radicals have broken with their families;
they don’t mention traditions of Islam or fatwas, but rather act on an
individual basis and outside the usual bonds of family, mosque and Islamic
association. Modern Islamic terrorism is an avatar of ultra leftist
radicalism—its targets are the same as the traditional targets of the ultra-left—US
imperialism, symbols of globalization.10 Thus, it is contended that terrorists
are often radicalised by factors like sense of political alienation and
disenfranchisement, perceived persecution and discrimination and socio-cultural
and psychological factors, rather than the extreme ideals of a radical ideology
per se.11 As John Horgan notes: ‘The relationship between radicalisation and
terrorism is poorly understood…Not every radical becomes a terrorist and not
every terrorist holds radical views.
Such conceptual confusions surrounding the term
‘radicalisation’ and its association with terrorism has led to a critical
wariness among some experts in recent times as attempts at reaching an
acceptable and comprehensive definition of the term has proven unsuccessful.
For example, Belgian counterterrorism expert Rik Coolsaet, part of an Expert
Group on Violent Radicalisation established by the European Commission, has
described the very notion of radicalisation as ‘ill defined, complex and
controversial’.13 Again, an Australian team of analysts recently concluded that
‘about the only thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that
radicalisation is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to
make existing research incomparable.’14 In response to such criticism, it
should be noted that radical ideological propaganda and indoctrination is the
principal means for the justification and dissemination of violent and
destructive campaigns conducted by various forces of terrorism and violent extremism.
The fact remains that terrorist organisations concoct religious and ideological
reasons to destabilise the global socio-political order. Clearly, this menace
needs to be confronted at religious, ideological and socio-political levels,
which underscores the necessity of developing and conducting effective
counter-radicalisation programmes. There is obviously no denying that several
factors, such as real or perceived discrimination or persecution, poverty,
unemployment, corruption and sectarianism, play a part in catalysing the
process of radicalisation, but it only makes sense that the rationale used by
terrorist organisations to defend the indefensible needs to be countered in
what is essentially an ideological war. Still, it is under this cloud of conceptual
and ideological dissonance within academic circles that governments around the
world have struggled to develop cogent and effective counterterrorism and
counter radicalisation programmes, or effectively coordinate their activities
in charting a coherent global campaign against the growing menace of violent
extremism. In the wake of differences over the proper meaning and definition of
the term ‘radicalisation’, various state intelligence agencies and security
services have come up with their own ‘working definitions’ for radicalisation
and its related concepts. Thus, the Dutch Security Service (AIVD) defines
radicalisation as: ‘Growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by
undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose
a threat to, the democratic order.’15 Under its CONTEST counterterrorism
strategy, the UK’s Home Office has
referred to radicalisation simply as: ‘The process by which people come to
support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join
terrorist groups.’
Causes and catalysts of radicalisation
Since the late 1960s, academic research has grappled
with the question of the causes and reasons behind a person adopting beliefs
and behaviours that lead him or her to engage in subversive or terrorist
activities. Several studies have attempted an answer by analysing terrorist
activity at different levels: individual, group, network, organisation, mass
movement, socio cultural context and international/inter-state contexts. For a long
time, scholars concentrated on the reasons for a person’s transformation into a
violent extremist at the psychological and individual levels. However, its
causes are now viewed not just at individual or psychological levels but also
at social and larger geopolitical levels:
1. Micro level, that is, the causes and
catalysts leading to the radicalisation of an individual at the psychological
level pertain to identity problems, failed integration with society, feelings
of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation,
humiliation (direct or by proxy), stigmatisation and rejection, often combined
with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge. Closely attached to
these problems are problems of confusion caused by inherent crisis of
splintered identity and loyalty (patriotism versus communal loyalty), the clash
of values (liberal versus conservative, state philosophy versus
religious/ideological indoctrination), childhood abuse/disturbed adolescence,
low self and low social esteem, alienation and deindividuation, rebel identity
and counterculture, cognitive readjustment of self-sanction to violence,
misanthropic and sociopathic tendencies, etc.
2. Meso level refers to the radical milieu in
the immediate social environment (‘the supportive or even complicit social
surround’) which fosters the radicalisation of individuals or groups, thereby
leading to the formation of terrorist organisations. At this communal or
societal level, there is a heightened
sense of religious or racial ethnocentricity, xenophobia, perceptions of
injustice and discrimination, heightened sense of desperation and
disenfranchisement, low personal and social esteem, extreme historical memory
and ideological indoctrination, sense of betrayal, breakdown of law and order,
growing polarisation of society, the decline of scientific temper,
proliferation of rabid extremist thought and tendencies in society, etc.
3.
Macro level, that is, role of national politics and governance issues within a
country or geopolitical events around the world in the radicalisation of public
opinion. Such issues could include tense majority–minority relationships, the
lack of socioeconomic opportunities for certain class or community of people,
national or international wars or conflicts involving religious or ideological
issues, the growing influence of transnational terrorist radicalisation and
recruitment activities, proliferation of failed states and civil strife, etc.
We can add to these the usual litany of so-called ‘root causes’ behind
terrorism, which would serve the process of radicalisation just as well. Some
of these ‘root causes’ were enumerated by spokespersons from around 170
countries in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly following the 11
September 2001 attacks in the US. A sample is listed next
1.
Communities struck by poverty, disease, illiteracy, bitter hopelessness
(Armenia).
2. Social inequality, marginalisation and
exclusion (Benin).
3.
Political oppression, extreme poverty and the violation of basic rights (Costa
Rica).
4. Injustices, misery, starvation, drugs,
exclusion, prejudices, despair for lack of perspectives (Dominican Republic)
5. Oppression of peoples in several parts of
the world, particularly in Palestine (Malaysia).
6. Alienation of the young in situations of
economic deprivation and political tension and uncertainty, sense of injustice
and lack of hope (New Zealand).
7. Rejection of the West with all its cultural
dimensions (Palestine).
8. Hunger, poverty, deprivation, fear,
despair, absence of sense of belonging to the human family (Namibia).
9. Situations which lead to misery, exclusion,
reclusion, the injustices which lead to growing frustration, desperation and
exasperation (Senegal).
For
its part, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research identifies more than 50
different alleged ‘causes’. Some of the causes mentioned are the following:
1.
Terrorism is rooted in political discontent.
2. A
culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth medium in
which the process of radicalisation commences and virulent extremism comes to
thrive
3. A
collective or individual desire for revenge against acts of repression may be
motive enough for terrorist activity.
4. The failure to mobilise popular support for
a radical political programme may trigger the decision to employ terrorism in
order to engineer a violent confrontation with the authorities.
5.
Modern terrorism occurs because modern circumstances make terrorist methods
exceptionally easy.
6. The
choice of terrorism represents the outcome of a learning process from own
experiences and the experiences of others.
Radicalisation Process: The Character Arc of a
Terrorist
In
spite of all this literature and after about 40 years of research into the study
of terrorism, research into the process of ‘radicalisation’ into violent
extremist action is ‘conceptual rather than empirical’ and remains ‘poorly
understood’.24 However, early assumptions that the ‘aberrant behaviour’ was the
consequence of some mental or personality abnormality have been convincingly
debunked. Although the exact mechanisms and processes of radicalisation remain
a matter of debate, it is clear that a different set of pathways and
circumstances affect people in different stages of life in transitioning to the
dark side. Thus, radicalisation is not viewed as ‘the product of a single
decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an
individual toward a commitment to violence over time.’25 Again, the process of radicalisation
cannot be inextricably linked to recruitment in violently extreme or terrorist
organisations. For example, Marc Sageman avers that there is no recruitment per
se to militant jihad or to Al-Qaeda. He presents a study that shows that nearly
90 per cent ‘join the jihad’ through friendship and kinship.26 However, it is
also true that terrorist organisations engage in radicalisation programmes
through propaganda not only to defend their indefensible actions to themselves
and others but to influence vulnerable minds towards accepting their points of
view and to draw recruits. Terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) brazenly urge Muslims around the world, through their online
literature and social media websites, to migrate to territories under the
group’s control and ‘join the jihad’ as part of a socalled religious
obligation.
Theories on the Radicalisation Process
Over the years, scholars have propounded various
theories to explain the process of radicalization that changes a person from
being an average citizen to a violent extremist, but many contemporary
researchers often question the conclusions of these theoretical frame- works in
the contemporary context. Still, there are some noteworthy theoretical
approaches, such as those derived from the social movement theory, social
psychology and conversion theory, which remain useful in exploring the
processes and the drivers of radicalisation.
The Social Movement Theory (SMT)
The
basic idea behind this theory, which was propounded in the 1940s, is that
radical social movements rise from strained socio-political conditions which
fester in a mass sentiment of discontent. People join such movements as they
passively succumb to overpowering social forces. In contemporary times, a new
school of SMT has come up with the so-called ‘framing theory’.27 According to
it, the ideologues of any radical movement attempt to frame messages in ways
that, to them, will best resonate with the interests, attitudes and beliefs of
their potential constituency. According to its proponents, the framing theory
is useful for understanding radicalisation because it focuses on processes, not
socio-demographics, and because it emphasises a mid-level analysis. Applying
this framework, an important study was conducted by Quintan Wiktorowicz which
looked into the way people came to join extremist Islamist groups in Western
countries.28 By employing the SMT framework, Wiktorowicz presented a
four-component development model for radicalisation. The study found that many
Westerners and educated people who become radicalised initially showed an
openness to accepting new and differing worldviews (called ‘cognitive
opening’). Soon, they see in a religion or a particular socio-political
ideology a life of significance and meaning, and eventually accept a group’s
narrative and ethos, which to them ‘makes sense’ (termed as ‘frame alignment’).
Eventually, through a process of greater interaction with members of an
extremist group, they become fully indoctrinated into the movement. In fact,
this process is quite similar to the process of any individual’s conversion to
any religion or socio-political group or organisation.
Social Psychology
Many theories of social psychology shed remarkable
insight into how individuals become radicalised once they get associated with
an extremist or terrorist organisation and commit acts which they could not
have imagined committing on their own. According to these theories, the process
of change into violent extremism starts after an individual joins an extremist
organisation. For over two decades, Clark McCauley29 has been one of the most
consistent voices of social psychology in the field of terrorism studies.
Scholars like McCauley have applied various tenets of social psychology to find
out that ‘individual opinions and attitudes tend to become more extreme in a
group context. Group opinions and attitudes also tend to be more extreme than
those held by its individual members, a phenomenon often referred to as “group
polarization.”’30 Again, individuals feel less responsible for ‘group’ actions
as they diffuse accountability over the entire group. Thus, there is a greater
disregard for carrying out immoral and extremely violent actions. This ‘diffusion
and displacement of responsibility’ often leads to the socalled
‘de-individuation’ of a horrible act by the perpetrator and the person often
points to the dubious moral justification learnt from the group and worse, by
blaming the victim or by speaking of them in
dehumanising terms. In psychological terms, this tendency is known as ‘the cognitive readjustment of
self-sanction’.31 In addition, radical and socially isolated groups tend to
deepen ‘ingroup/out-group bias’ and exercise greater control on the behaviour
of members.32 Often people join certain radical groups because of perceived
rewards or gains, acceptance and recognition within a community, and not out of
any strong ideological convictions towards the philosophy of the group. Thus, the
reasons for joining extremist groups are dynamic and variable for different
individuals. For some, social affiliation or personal sense of meaning and life
purpose may be the reason, while others may find a sense of adventure and
excitement appealing. Many young recruits may come from broken homes or a
family having a criminal background. They may be taking revenge on larger
society that did not accept them and so, these people develop a rebel identity
and develop a counterculture by joining the ranks of these groups.
Conversion Theory
Focusing on the psychology of the individual going
through the radicalisation process and given the fact that many contemporary
extremist movements follow an avowedly religious ideology or cause, many
theorists have studied the process of religious conversion itself (which can
happen with people converting from outside the religion or from within the
religious community itself to a more radically extreme version followed by a
radical group). On the basis of decades of study into developmental or stage
models in the study of religious conversions, Lewis Rambo has developed a
seven-component model which has been found among most extremist converts.33
Researchers have also found several ‘conversion motifs’ that lead a person to adopt
a new religious ideology, with or without direct external influence. These
include: ‘intellectual motif’ (by reading books, through the Internet,
television or other media); ‘mystical’ (which relates to personally
transformative epiphany or moment of supposed spiritual enlightenment);
‘experimental’ (where a seeker connects with a group to find an identity of
group membership); ‘affectional or romantic’ (where conversion results either
from strong emotional sentiment, attachment or bonding); ‘revivalist’ (refers
to a transformative experience occurring in the context of a crowd); and
‘coercive’ (where people capitulate to group pressure and influences into
accepting a radical viewpoint). After several decades of intense study,
terrorism experts have found no single definitive process or profile for
identifying a prospective radical extremist or terrorist, in terms of his or
her demographic or socioeconomic background. In fact, Walter Laqueur states
that the quest for a ‘general theory’ is misguided because: ‘Many terrorisms
exist and their character has changed over time and from country to country.’35
This is also applicable to the radicalisation process itself. In spite of
several attempts to articulate a general sequence of stages or issues that might
apply across and within group types, there is no clear answer on how people
come to adopt violent extremist ideologies to justify their use of terrorist
violence. In recent times, researchers like John Venhaus have conducted an
in-depth study of the life and motivations of Al-Qaeda fighters. Based on
interviews and personal histories of 2,032 ‘foreign fighters’ who sought to
affiliate with jihadi groups, Venhaus found that ‘they all were looking for
something…they wanted to know who they are, why they matter, and what their
role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled need to define themselves
which Al-Qaeda offers to fill.’36 Thus, he
categorised most radicalised jihadi recruits into four categories:
1. The Revenge Seeker: Highly frustrated and
angry militant, seeking to commit violence against certain people, group or
entity, whom he or she believes are at fault.
2. The
Status Seeker: A social misfit seeking recognition and esteem by joining a
militant organisation.
3. The Identity Seeker: Driven by a need to
belong or be part of something meaningful, which would define the person’s
identity.
4. The Thrill Seeker: The thrill and adventure
seekers were found to be less than 5 per cent of the lot, whose main motivation
in joining a terrorist group is to pursue excitement, adventure and glory. It
would be wrong to rigidly compartmentalise the types as there is often a great
deal of overlap across all these categories. For their part, McCauley and
Moskalenko37 have classified individual mechanisms of radicalisation in the
following ways: individual radicalisation through personal grievance, through
political grievance; gradual process of radicalisation through association with
terrorist group (the slippery slope); radicalisation through love or emotional
bond with radicals; radicalisation caused by a destabilising life event (a real
or perceived injustice or being a victim of violence or oppression); and
radicalisation to seek life purpose, adventure or status among outlaws.
Reversing radicalisation: The global response
About 40 countries in the world are currently running
various indigenously developed anti-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and
de-radicalisation programmes and campaigns. These can be broadly categorised
into 10 key categories:
1. Engaging and working with civil society: As
a government may not always have the resources to counter radicalisation and to
stop violent extremism from spreading, civil societies and local communities
can bring to bear a range of tools and informally reach out to a wider
population. In fact, working with communities and civil society enhances trust
and transparency and strengthens social cohesion. Therefore, several countries
have developed programmes to engage local communities in efforts to counter radicalisation
processes. One such programme is Norway’s Exit Project (established in 1997),
which seeks to support young people who want to disengage with or leave radical
racist or other violent extremist groups (for example, neo-Nazi groups).39
Meanwhile, the Russian government has set up consultative organisations for
enhancing cooperation with civil society groups in order to promote
inter-ethnic relations and prevention of extremism, xenophobia and ethnic
conflicts at regional and local levels. For its part, Singapore is fostering
engagement with religious minorities to discredit and debunk the false
propaganda by extremist organisations.
2.
Prison programmes: The incarceration of violent extremists and terrorists in
prisons has led to serious issues for various countries. Highly radicalised
extremists have found ways of turning prisons into their own training camps.
This has raised the issue of whether it is better to separate such extremists
from other inmates or to allow them to mix freely with others. ‘Allowing
violent extremists to mix freely has carried serious costs in allowing them to
seek out and successfully recruit fellow prisoners but evidence also shows that
segregating extremists in separate blocks has allowed them to maintain an
organizational hierarchy and hone their operational skills.’41 Saudi Arabia has gone to the extent of
establishing new and special prisons for violent extremists, which not only
separates them from regular detainees but also separates them from each other
in individual cells. Several other countries have developed similar facilities
that aim to prevent prisons from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism and a
place for recruitment. It is to be noted that most of the top leadership of the
ISIS, including Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, were incarcerated in Camp Bucca in Iraq,
which had veritably turned into a training camp for the nascent terror
organisation in its early days.42 In addition, various prisons have been
running several de-radicalisation programmes, such as in Saudi Arabia and
Indonesia, which provide psychological counselling, religious counselling and
correct religious teaching, vocational training and other prison programmes
that could help prisoners disengage themselves from radical groups and join
public life as law-abiding citizens once they leave prisons.
3.
Education programmes: Education features prominently in counter-radicalisation
programmes developed by various countries, given the important role of schools
and educational establishments in promoting the values of non-violence,
peaceful coexistence and tolerance. In multicultural UK, for example,
authorities work closely with providers of education at all levels. This has
resulted in the teaching in schools of subjects that promote intercultural
understanding and citizenship. Through schemes like ‘Children’s Plan’, state
officials engage directly with head teachers in order to ensure their access to
all forms of support needed, as well as ensuring support for young, vulnerable
people who may be exposed to violent extremist influences.43 In Austria, school
curricula and religious education classes instruct against intolerance as part
of civic education.44 Meanwhile, Belgian educational authorities have designed
educational programmes to inform pupils and parents about the dangers
pertaining to violent extremism and terrorism, and have also developed special
educational programmes to combat violent extremist beliefs and promote
tolerance and coexistence.
4.
Promoting alliance of civilisations and intercultural dialogue: Several
initiatives that promote intercultural dialogue and understanding to counter
radicalisation have been launched by various countries around the world. For
instance, New Zealand’s efforts to counter violent extremism has led it to
cosponsor ‘Asia-Pacific Interfaith Dialogue’ that brings together 15
representatives of the major faith and community groups in the Southeast Asian
and South Pacific regions. Similarly, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs, in cooperation with Islamic charities, launched the ‘Montreux
Initiative’ in 200545 to help counter extreme ideologies. In Thailand, moderate
Muslim organisations from abroad are being invited to exchange views and ideas
with local religious leaders in order to enrich an understanding of Islam and
promote true religious teaching. Thailand has also played a significant role in
supporting Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation (Indonesia, 2004), the
Asia–Middle East Dialogue (AMED) and the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) Interfaith
Dialogue, and it has cosponsored the Informal Meeting of Leaders on Interfaith
Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace during the 60th Session of the UN General
Assembly. Italy’s Ministry for Youth and Sport, jointly with the Ministry of
Interior, set up a Youth Advisory Board in 2006 for religious and cultural
dialogue.
5. Tackling economic and social inequalities:
Although empirical research does not show any direct link between economic and
social inequalities and the incidence of terrorism or violent extremism, with
terrorists and extremists coming from all economic backgrounds, several
countries have undertaken policies to tackle social and economic discrimination
against minority communities. For example, the Netherlands has introduced
several schemes for youths belonging to certain sections of society, susceptible
to the influence of radicalisation, to have fair prospects of employment in the
labour market. The government also provides language training to communities of
foreign origin and is facilitating the schooling and education of the young
belonging to these poor communities.47 Algeria provides direct financial and
welfare support to victims of violent extremism, whereas Saudi Arabia and
Malaysia provide tuition fees, medical treatment and financial support for food
and clothing. Malaysia even looks after the families of the detainees.48 This
helps in deterring other members of a radical’s family from joining the ranks
of extremist groups.
6. Countering radicalisation on the Internet:
Terrorist organisations have successfully taken advantage of the great benefits
of the Internet—low cost, ease of access, lack of censorship or regulations in
most countries, vast audience and fast communication and flow of information—in
order to disseminate their message of hate and gain more recruits.49 Many
governments have sought to intervene in this matter through censorship,
monitoring and counter-propaganda programmes. The UK government is now
supporting mainstream voices to articulate a moderate understanding of various
religions in the country. One example is the government’s active support and
encouragement for the ‘Radical Middle Way’ project,50 where young Muslims can
access a wide range of views and opinions from all the major Muslim schools of
thought. Meanwhile, Nigeria conducts forums and conferences on combating terrorism
through the Internet. The Singapore government encourages moderate religious
scholars and teachers to launch websites which carry arguments that rebut
violent extremist teachings and beliefs.
7.
Legislation reforms: Several countries have introduced legislation that
prohibit the dissemination of extremist literature, the delivery of hate
speeches and incitement to racism, xenophobia and violence. Canada is one of
the earliest countries to have enacted a law criminalising incitement to
extremist violence (1985) and hate crimes.52 France has also enacted laws
against groups that promote discrimination, hatred and violence towards a
person or a group of people based on their ethnic origin or religious, racial
or ideological affiliation.53 Algeria has used its legislation to create a
national consensus and reconciliation programme. Thus, the president is able to
pardon and/or reduce the sentences of individuals who have been convicted of
committing violent extremist acts if they have not committed mass murder, rape
or were involved in causing explosions in public places.
8.
Rehabilitation programmes: Several countries around the world have initiated
rehabilitation programmes that de-radicalise detainees charged with crimes of
violent extremism in order to reintegrate them into society once their prison
term ends. For example, Saudi Arabia has designed a special programme—AlRia’ya
(translated as ‘care’)—which transfers detained extremists to specially
designed facilities. This programme provides psychological counselling and
correct religious education that teaches tolerance and moderation. Singapore,
Indonesia and Malaysia have their own set of religious counselling programmes
and other de-radicalisation measures.
9.
Developing and disseminating information: Several countries have developed
close cooperation with each other in conducting counter-radicalisation
programmes, and some states in Europe have developed integrated information
systems on those involved in making hate speeches and incitement to terrorism,
both inside and outside the European Union. Most notably, the Italian Central
Directorate of Prevention Police has recently launched a project with the
European Group of Six relating to the sharing and analysis of information on
the movement of so-called ‘itinerant preachers’.
10.
Training of agencies involved in counter-radicalisation policies: Some
countries have introduced training and qualification programmes for their
officials and community workers involved in counter-radicalisation programmes. The
US, Canada and Belgium conduct special training programmes for their police and
law enforcement agencies in matters related to special aspects of their
community’s religious and cultural sensibilities and the way investigations
against extremism should be conducted by taking members of a religious
community into confidence. In 2003, Norwegian Police Security Service set out
police personnel to identify activities related to the radicalisation of youth
by right-wing extremists and to carry out ‘preventive conversations’ with youth
from falling prey to violent extremism.
Saudi Prevention, Rehabilitation and Post-release Care
(PRAC) Programme
In the
aftermath of a wave of terrorist attacks beginning in 2003, Saudi Arabia
launched its own indigenously developed form of counterradicalisation campaign.
The Saudi approach has been to combat intellectual and ideological
justifications provided by violently extreme jihadist organisations for
carrying out terrorist attacks. The Saudi strategy consists of three interconnected
programmes aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and post-release care.56
Although the jury is out over the success of the Saudi counter-radicalisation
programmes, they are said to have inspired similar campaigns in other countries
facing the threat, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore,
Indonesia and Malaysia. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regards extremists as
victims of an ‘evil ideology’, and considers many extremists as
well-intentioned men who wanted to do good deeds. By focusing on a correct
understanding of religion, the state aspires to help ‘misguided believers’
return to the right path. The Saudi
approach emphasises the defeat of the ideological infrastructure that supports
political violence and the Saudi campaign is directed against takfiri
(declaring people apostates) beliefs, rehabilitation of reclaimed offenders and
post-release ‘care’ to prevent relapses. ‘It takes on these challenges through
time-tested Saudi policies such as co-optation, patronage and coercion.’ As part
of the ‘prevention’ component of the strategy, hundreds of government-run
programmes, implemented through the ‘guidance department’ in the Ministry of
Interior, are aimed at educating the public about Islamic extremism and its
dangers to society.58 In schools, universities and mass media, recognised
religious scholars and authorities disseminate the ‘right’ religious
understanding to confront extremist propaganda. ‘The primary audience is not
extremists themselves, but the larger population that may sympathize with
extremists and those who do not condemn the beliefs that lead to extremism.’59
When it comes to de-radicalisation of extremists, the government heavily relies
on the importance of religious dialogue to address a detainee’s misconceptions about Islam.
However, in recent years, new emphasis is being laid on modifying a detainee’s
behaviour and not just a change in his or her religious beliefs. Thus, the
programmes have diversified and cover classes and counselling on sharia,
psychology, vocational training, sociology, history, Islamic culture, art
therapy and athletics. Many of these centres have updated classes on history
and culture to counter the growing influence of an alternative view of history
and culture presented by Al-Qaeda. As mentioned earlier, the government has
built special facilities (Al-Ria’ya programme) for the incarceration and
de-radicalisation of extremists, separate from ordinary criminals detained in
state prisons. As part of its post-release programmes, the government has expanded
the role of a detainee’s family: In addition to visiting during the program and
providing postrelease support, family members now provide input on how to
design specialized programs for each detainee and inform how his progress is
evaluated. Center staff also use sequenced trial releases with the families to
observe how each party responds to the other, assess the individual undergoing
rehabilitation, and determine whether family members will be capable of
supervising him after release. This last element is critical to ensure the
family can help prevent a formerly violent extremist from becoming a threat
again.60 PRAC also promotes a bond between detainee and a state-sponsored
cleric to establish a new ideological framework through authority and trust.
Then again, in order to address the social needs of a detainee, the Saudi
government provides financial assistance in the form of lost salary, family
health care and children’s schooling during the detainee’s incarceration. After
an impressive success initially, Saudi authorities accept recent setbacks in
the face of a rise in the recidivism rate among ‘deradicalised extremists’ by
as much as 10–20 per cent. In January 2009, authorities made the embarrassing
announcement that at least 11 former Guantanamo detainees returned to terrorist
activity after graduating from the Saudi programme.61 Still, Saudi Arabia has
developed a counter-radicalisation programme that has its admirers around the
world and the government continues to refine the process based on experience
and fresh insights. One of its salient aspects is that the programme is not
punitive in nature but is rather rehabilitative for the ‘victims’ of radicalisation.
The UK’s Preventing Violent Extremism (Prevent)
Strategy
The 5 million pound counter-radicalisation ‘Prevent’
strategy constitutes one of the four Ps that make up the British government’s
post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy, known as ‘CONTEST’: ‘Prepare’ for attacks;
‘Protect’ the public; ‘Pursue’ the attackers; and ‘Prevent’ their
radicalisation in the first place. The policy was not very popular to begin
with, but has become even more controversial after the current government under
Prime Minister David Cameron revised it, with a new and more controversial approach.
In 2011, the British government introduced the new version as an alternative to
the supposed failure of the previous policy that, according to the new Home
Secretary Theresa May, was unable to separate a policy of integration from that
of counterterrorism. In its critique to the earlier policy, the then newly
elected Tory government averred that greater integration in itself was not
sufficient for countering radicalisation, but a successful strategy was needed
to confront the ideologies behind extremism and terrorism head on. Thus,
‘Prevent’ defines extremism as a ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental
British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and
mutual respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs’.63 However, this
values-based definition of ideology has been contro- versial and its critics
claim it to be reflective of the political discourse of right-leaning European
political parties that reject the concept of multiculturalism and see it as a
failure. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron is being criticised by some
leaders of the British Muslim community for arguing that Britons should
confront multiculturalism with ‘muscular liberalism’.64 Thus, under ‘Prevent’,
the main shift in the government’s strategy against radicalisation has been
that it is targeting violent ideologies by asserting its own ideology and by
not confronting violent religious or ideological organisations within the
framework of their own avowed religious or ideological paradigms. Therefore, it is similar to the
Saudi PRAC in that it has taken an ideological ‘war of ideas’ approach to
spearhead the counter-radicalisation campaign, but is different from it in that
it does not seek to reclaim extremists by advocating the true or moderate
teachings of their religion or ideology, but by insisting that the radicalised
do not revert to their essential religious values but to British values of
democracy and human rights. Since 2011, ‘Prevent’ has seen conspicuous success
in its counterradicalisation campaigns. Its team for removing online extremist
content has scrapped over 75,000 pieces of ‘unlawful terrorist material’ from
the Internet.65 The government further claims it has worked with more than 250
mosques and 50 religious groups and has distributed over 20,000 leaflets and
posters in various languages, which urge people against travelling to Syria.
Through its de-radicalisation programme called ‘Channel’, the government uses
psychologists, social activists and religious experts to advise thousands of
people considered susceptible to extremist ideas.66 However, ‘Prevent’ has been
the most controversial ‘P’ of the other four in the CONTEST programme and has
become highly unpopular across large sections of the British Muslim community.
Its detractors criticise it for its inability to define ‘radicalisation’, for
singling out the Muslim community in Britain at the expense of British
far-right white supremacist groups, for turning the former into a ‘suspect’
community, for its assertion that ‘radicalisation’ is the main driver of
violent extremism and terrorism, for monitoring and ‘spying’ over the
population and ‘arbitrarily’ referring people to de-radicalisation programmes,
etc. Some critics point out that the 40 million pound annual budget allocated
for the programme has not been very useful and may have further polarised
British population and pushed law enforcement into the ‘pre-criminal’ space.
Others find Orwellian underpinnings that could pose a threat to the values of
democracy and civil rights in the
country.
Extremist fiction
and developing effective Counter narratives
Insanity
in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties, nations and epochs, it
is the rule. – Friedrich Nietzsche The subject of radicalisation cannot be
discussed in the absence of identifying some of the radical ideologies that are
fuelling the problem of violent extremism and terrorism in the world. In fact,
the US administration under former President George W. Bush had itself renamed
the so-called ‘war on terror’ with the slogan, ‘a global struggle against
violent extremism’.68 Most extremist and terrorist organisations of today are
the offshoots of certain political and/or religious revivalist/reactionary
movements that came into existence in recent centuries, mostly deemed deviant
by the traditional schools of their faith or political schools of origin. Thus,
the global campaign against extremism and terrorism is to be understood as
essentially a war against certain radicalised and politically motivated socio-political
or crypto-religious movements and is not directed against any community or
religion. Much like the rise of anarchism, fascism and communism in the
nineteenth-twentieth centuries, the biggest threat to global peace and security
in the early twenty-first century has come from extreme religio political
movements (particularly global jihadism). After stripping religions of much of
their spiritual trappings and mythological baggage, these crypto-religious
movements have sought to remodel their faiths along the lines of modern
political mass movements, and seek to establish theocracies based on their
religious laws and precepts as an alternative to the mainly liberal, secular
and democratic order of the international community. Prominent among these extreme
religious movements is the Islamisminspired jihadist-Salafi movement (which
began in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with its violent
opposition to all schools of Islamic sharia, both Sunni and Shiite), Zionism
(supported by modern Jews and even some Evangelical Christians of recent
‘dispensationalist’ orientations; opposed by all schools of Orthodox Judaism
and Christianity) and the Shiite theocratic model based on Khomeini’s expansion
of the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih
The Extremist Narrative
In order to justify their mixing of religion with
politics and militarism, many of these extremist movements have concocted
devious religiopolitical narratives which need to be carefully studied and
analysed in order to then develop effective counter-narratives against them. In
this context, let us understand the nature and role of an extremist narrative.
Extremist narratives do not encompass the core philosophy of a radical
ideology, whose minutiae remain vague to most of its followers. It is also not
a fully codified canon assembled in one place, but is diffuse and woven around
supposedly ‘inviolable’ values, associated concepts and even smaller rationally
constructed arguments. More important, it highlights the ‘evils’ and the
‘shortcomings’ of the rival communities or established order. Thus, a radical
narrative refers to a series of justifications and arguments in defence of the
supposed principles and values of an extremist ideology, and accusations
against the prevailing order which necessitates its violent destruction. Often,
radical extremists begin by exposing a real or perceived flaw in the prevailing
socio-political order, one that has a high possibility of resonating with the
targeted section of a population. The purpose is to create a cognitive
dissonance, particularly among the young, impressionable and vulnerable members
of that community. Thereafter, other radical ideas are gradually introduced and
slowly the full extremist dose is administered into the bloodstream of a
neophyte recruit. It is this cleverly constructed emotional and rational
exposition of dubious values and concepts that forms an extremist narrative,
which eventually radicalises a credulous person into a full-blown extremist.
Narratives are of various kinds. Almost all radical ideologies follow the same
set of narratives and, at times, they can be easily interchanged by just
removing the idiomatic expressions and phraseology belonging to one with the
other. Some of these narrative strands are as follows:
1. The
persecution complex: To begin with, almost all extremist narratives are very
high on emotional content and rather short on intellectual merit or historical
accuracy. They over dramatise any real or perceived insult or injury to the
community’s religious and cultural identity, values and heritage at the hands
of a foreign aggressor and evil collaborators from within the community. There
is always a feeling of grand conspiracy against the community that demands the
need for decisive action from the silent and insensate majority.
Incontrovertibly, decisive action becomes a euphemism for acts of violence.
This so-called conspiracy is often contextualised in historic, if not
primordial, terms and an entire alternate historical narrative is developed in
stark black-and-white paradigms.
2. Nostalgia for an imagined past: Most
extremist narratives hearken back to an age of pristine purity when the
supposedly persecuted religious community was at a presumed apogee of its
spiritual and material achievements because of its proximity to the divine and
its complete adherence to a sacred ethical code, in sharp contrast to the
morally degenerate members of the day. To the Muslim extremists, for example,
this was the time of the Salaf (the first three generations of Islam) from
which Salafism derives its name. This nostalgia forces many of these
organisations to try to reverse the course of history in order to take it back
to ancient and medieval times.
3. Myth of invincibility and bogey of
martyrdom: All extremist and terrorist organisations call members of their
community to action against an existential threat to their community. They
demand unquestioning loyalty to the leadership and a commitment to offer the
supreme sacrifice for which they would be more than adequately compensated in
the afterlife. In fact, ‘matyrdom’ is championed as the peak of a person’s
spiritual ascension, a consummation devoutly to be wished. It is for this
reason most violently extreme religious groups and terrorist organisations turn
into death cults, even doomsday cults.
4. Demonising ‘the Other’: To all extremist
organisations, truth is spelt with a capital T. They then separate the presumed
untruth practised by other communities by demonising them as the ‘Other’ and by
painting them with a broad black brush. In waging a campaign against a
so-called ‘enemy community’, they cannot afford to project the rival culture or
people in 50 shades of grey as that would jeopardise their campaign against it.
5. The supremacist and panacea construct: Most
extremist narratives envy the scientific growth and progress of the modern
world and claim that their communities were the progenitors of science and
civilisation. The modern world is said to have somehow stolen their pristine
knowledge and technological prowess and has created a world of immorality,
corruption and outright decadence. Therefore, it is either the Aryan race, the
Jewish intellect, or the Muslim faith which is projected as an invincible force
which will ultimately prevail. Again, most extremists aver that they have answers
to all the ills facing modern civilisation.
6. The
Armageddon and the blissful afterlife: Many extremist groups depend on some
dubious religious literature and reinterpret it to claim their own prominence
in shaping their community’s future. Some of them, such as the ISIS, imagine
taking part in a prophesised end-of-the-world Armageddon by fancifully
interpreting some Hadith literature. Again, the ultimate goal of all extremist
movements is to achieve the blissful land of their dreams. For the radical
Jews, it is Zion of the Mashiach; for Evangelical Christians, the 1,000 year
Millennial Kingdom of Jesus; for fundamentalist Muslims, it is the Caliphate of
Imam Mahdi and Eisa Maseeh; and even for the violently extreme communists, it
is the utopia of a stateless society. These wonderful predictions of the future
are meant to seduce the credulous into fighting for the community with
overzealous optimism. It is easy to develop convincing counter-narratives
against most of these extremist ideological strands as they are usually based
on weak or false religious traditions and ideological sources.
How to Develop Effective Counter-narratives
In order to develop effective counter-narratives, what
is known as a ‘strategic rhetoric’, three components are considered useful, as
enunciated by Aristotle in his great philosophical treatise, the ‘Rhetoric’.
The first is the ‘Ethos’, which means the credibility of the actors or channels
of communication delivering the message. For example, a government servant asking
a radical to change his ways may not be as effective a communicator as a
reclaimed terrorist or a religious scholar. The second component in any
counter-narrative is the ‘Logos’, which means the message itself, its
authenticity and how effective or rationally coherent it is in its claims. The
third aspect is ‘Pathos’, which refers to the deep emotional resonance and
cultural connect in the language and cadence of the message in order to
influence the target audience. These days, subtle ways of subliminal messaging
has been developed into an art form, which extremist groups like the ISIS
employ to great effect. Perhaps, it is time that anti-extremist
counter-narratives also employ the art. Clearly, any counter-narrative or
public relations exercise needs to develop a variety of carefully formulated
counter-narratives, developed by several experts on the subject, and needs to
be disseminated through different agencies of transmission suitable for
delivering the message to clearly designated sections of the target audience.
For example, if we wish to spread the message against extremist organisations
in the country, we would have to at least target the five usual channels of
recruitment: places of worship and seminaries, centres of extremist
organisations, community-dominated areas and forums, prisons, and cyberspace.
Here, let us also look into the various agencies that could be involved in
delivering counter-radicalisation messages. These might include:
1. government agencies;
2.
non-governmental organisations (NGOs);
3.
media outlets, both print and electronic;
4. private sector organisations (particularly
public relations and advertising companies);
5.
Internet and social media campaigners;
6.
victims of terrorism;
7. reformed extremists or reclaimed offenders; 8. religious leaders of eminence (both in
India and abroad);
9.
religious organisations;
10. anti-radical propaganda experts at
schools, seminaries, jails, public institutions, etc; and
11.
local community leaders for monitoring and informing govern- ment of any
radical elements operating in the neighbourhood.
Types of Counter-narratives
Now,
we come to the important types of counter-narratives that can be developed as
effective tools of counter-radicalisation.
1.
Positive narrative: Before developing counter-narratives to fight extremism, we
need to first strengthen and reinvigorate the national narrative by propagating
our core constitutional values of democracy, pluralism and secularism. We need
to develop a national vision so that every citizen knows how he/she would
benefit from and contribute to the country’s goals so that they feel they have
a stake in it.
2.
Amplify doctrinal and ideological fissures: Some of the extremist narratives
highlighted earlier reject orthodox schools of classical religion. Therefore,
their claims of religious legitimacy can be easily discredited by highlighting
their doctrinal deviance.
3. The semantics-savvy counter-narrative: It
is important that we do not use the words and terminologies of the extremists
in our literature, let alone counter-narratives. For example, we better not use
the word ‘jihadis’ for Muslim terrorists. On hearing this, the uneducated and
impressionable Muslim believes that the so-called ‘jihadis’ are fighting a
legitimate, religious war. Meanwhile, non-Muslims tend to get the idea that
terrorism and jihad are synonymous and start hating Islam and Muslims. Instead
of calling Muslim terrorists as jihadis, Mahmood Madani, the leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind,
calls them ‘Fasadis’ (seditionists). Similarly, Sheikh Tahirul Qadri calls all
Muslim terrorists as the followers of the ‘Khawarij’, an outcast sect thrown
out of the fold of Islam after its members had assassinated Caliph Ali. By
dissociating the term jihadi from the description of the Muslim terrorist, we
would discredit their campaign which is principally anti-Islamic. Therefore,
the use of semantics is very important
in any counter-radicalisation campaign.
4.
Strategic counter-narratives: In times of extreme stress following a terror
attack or communal violence, carefully prepared messages need to be delivered
to stop large sections of the population and its communities from becoming
polarised and radicalised by the incident.
5.
Ethical counter-narratives: We need to disseminate the message that all
religions are opposed to terrorism and that the Pope, the Great Sankaracharyas
and the Imam of the Holy Kaaba have condemned the actions of all religious
extremist and terrorist organisations.
6.
Specialised religious or ideological counter-narratives: On specialised and controversial legal or
history-related issues, top experts need to devise specific counter-narratives
to be disseminated through various agencies. Some extremists speak against
global economic and political systems and criticise it on scholastic grounds.
Such narratives must be refuted by experts in the subject.
7.
Tactical counter-narratives: Sometimes material that may discredit the
leadership or members of extremist organisation should be used to make such
groups unpopular
8. The
humour and sarcasm narrative: At times, the use of humour and sarcasm to make
fun of extremist leaders, their mannerisms and their speeches could prove an
effective way to bring down their popularity. 9. Subliminal messaging:
Advertising agencies and filmmakers are experts in communicating subliminal
messages to their audience. Their expertise should be used in disseminating
counter-narratives.
India’s efforts at developing appropriate Counter-radicalisation measures
Although India has confronted insurgencies and
terrorist campaigns by various radicalised regional and religious organisations
in several parts of the country for decades, a comprehensive policy for
combating such problems at the ideological and operational levels has not been
developed, possibly as the causes of such threats have largely been
socio-political in nature, and not driven by purely religious or ideological
motivations. With the rise of militant Islamism, which seeks to project its own
version of Islam as a revolutionary socio-economic and political antithesis to the modern geopolitical global world, the
threat of radicalisation has gained utmost importance. In this respect, India
is ‘working out a cohesive strategy to counter attempts at radicalization and
recruitment’, suitable in the Indian context. Various measures like counselling
of ‘vulnerable and radicalized’ youths as well as their families and
propagating ‘moderate’ interpretations of Islam to counter the Islamic State
(IS) ideology of violent extremism are being developed. Various measures like
an ‘extremist counseling hotline’, set up recently by Austria, has reportedly
drawn the interest of Indian authorities.
The viability of the US’ counter-radicalisation
programmes focused on community outreach and the UK’s Prevent and Channel
programmes in the Indian context is being considered. It seems Indian
authorities have been wary of introducing highly intrusive and controversial
forms of surveillance and de-radicalisation measures, as they have recently
proven quite controversial in countries like
the UK. At present, if the law enforcement agencies in India find an
individual to be a highly radicalised person, they determine whether the person
can be referred for de-radicalisation. The person receives counselling either
by the police or scholars of the ideological or religious affiliation to which
the individual belongs. The person’s activities are monitored to prevent
recidivism. These measures are currently in place in the states of Maharashtra
and Telangana.84 Currently, the centre and state governments in India are
building their own set of counsellors and religious experts, community leaders
and elders, as well as civil society members to be engaged in the deradicalisation
process. Community outreach programmes by security agencies reaching out to
schools and colleges, as well as the setting up of helplines, are being
developed.
Conclusion
Based on the study, this article recommends
the following contours for an effective and comprehensive
counter-radicalisation programme for Indian administrative authorities:
1. The
role of civil society can prove crucial in fighting the growing threat of
radicalisation in India. The wider reach and informal approach of its
programmes can prove more effective and garner greater trust among vulnerable
communities than government sponsored programmes. Civil society’s role in
countering radicalisation can foster a sense of belonging and shared identity
and reduce real and perceived isolation among members of vulnerable communities
and bridge internal community divisions. Thus, its role is vital in law
enforcement, citizenship teaching, interfaith dialogue, cohesion activities,
language tuition, anti-discrimination projects, myth busting, housing and
integration policies, improving educational attainment, mentoring and
developing role models.
2. There is a need to empower the moderate
voice among all communities in order to separate radicals from the general
population through effective home-grown community outreach programmes.
Even-handedness in taking strict action against extremist organisations of all
denominations is the need of the hour, even if they do not overtly engage in
violent activities. Such organisations often function as fronts or breeding
grounds for raising radical cadres.
3.
Again, the singling out of any community for counterradicalisation or
de-radicalisation referrals would only prove counterproductive as it would lead
to greater divisiveness and
radicalisation, something the programmes are supposed to confront in the
first place. Extremism often feeds itself off on both sides of the spectrum and
gradually squeezes out the moderate voice in an escalating standoff. Therefore,
counter-radicalisation strategies should encompass all vulnerable communities
in the country, unlike some aforementioned programmes in the West that have
become highly controversial.
4.
There is also the need to track down the channels for the funding of certain
religious organisations that may be spreading the poison of radicalisation and
the use of other forms of legal measures to curtail their actions aimed at
fomenting communal discord or facilitating acts of violent extremism and
terrorism.
5. At
the administrative level, there is a need to check growing politicisation of
religion across the political spectrum by stringent implementation of existing
laws and strict compliance of the code of conduct during elections.
6.
Instances of communal violence should not be taken lightly or dismissed as
incidents typical to a united but dysfunctional family. India already has a
highly radicalised population divided along communal and casteist lines.
Serious thought must be given to preventing violent outbreaks, in times when
foreign non-state actors are increasing their seditious activities in the
country.
7.
Public perception across various communities regarding fairness and
impartiality of security agencies and the judicial system in times of communal
violence needs to improve. When members of any community start losing faith in
the country’s law enforcement agencies, the community becomes more radicalised and
some of its members start attacking state institutions itself and join foreign
extremist groups.
8. In
addressing the problems faced by the minority communities, one cannot neglect
the legitimate concerns and problems faced by the so-called majority community.
Political parties should thus be wary of giving precedence to national interest
before indulging in so-called minority appeasement or majoritarian populism.
9. Anti-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation
and de-radicalisation programmes should be developed based on the country’s
sociocultural conditions and requirements. In this respect, more specialised
wings in think tanks and relevant government departments have to be developed
and competent personnel and facilities have to be groomed for implementing the
programmes in our prisons, religious seminaries, schools, colleges, etc., as
far as possible.
10. There is a need to introduce religious
studies as a secular academic discipline in our universities, so that the false
religious indoctrination of foreign extremist groups through the Internet can
be countered and authorities may not have to depend on biased, opinionated and
quack religious scholars to frame the country’s counter-narratives and
de-radicalisation policies.
11.
The importance of developing a strong counter-radicalisation presence in the
cyberworld cannot be understated, particularly in the country’s regional
languages in which ISIS and Al-Qaeda are gradually spreading their message.
12.
Smart, non-controversial policies to reverse the process of communal
segregation in our cities and towns are in order. Again, community elders and leaders
need to be involved for purposes of monitoring, surveillance and guidance of
the young and impressionable members from falling into the trap of extremism.
13. There is a need to incorporate the subject
of ethics in our school syllabi, which could teach universal values, such as
respect for people of different religions or ways of life, the respect for
women in society, the avoidance of indecent language and conduct (which is now
becoming all too common in our social and political discourse), the importance
of honesty against the evil of corruption and obviously, the dangers and
horrors of violence and destruction. The problem is that there are too many
socially challenged information technology nerds, engineering geeks and
outright criminals joining the ranks of extremists these days, which perhaps
needed proper ethical schooling to begin with.
14. At
a general level, the country seems to be struggling to come up with a new
national vision, a modern syncretism and cultural renaissance, a new composite
identity that could define its character in the twenty-first century and
beyond. As the materialistic angst caused by the modern world is forcing people
to seek intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual solace, they are increasingly
falling into the trap of fake god-men and terrorists. In the face of cultural
challenges, incidents of extreme violence and bestiality are increasing, a
problem that the British poet W.H. Auden put succinctly: ‘When words lose their
meaning, physical forces take over.’87 As the threat of home-grown
radicalisation in India increases, the country should remain prepared with
carefully calibrated counter radicalisation policy and programmes. The
development of a carefully and comprehensively charted blueprint for an
overarching counter radicalisation policy—with the involvement of all central
and state governments, important think tanks and experts related to the field,
as well as influential leaders of all communities—specifically suited in the
context of Indian socio-political and cultural realities would help in warding
off a growing and intractable threat to India’s national security interests.
About the author
Dr
Adil Rasheed is an independent West Asia analyst. He was formerly Researcher at
the Abu Dhabi-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, and has
authored the book ISIS: Race to Armageddon (2015). He was also Senior Research
Fellow at the United Services Institution (USI) in 2014–15.
Reference:
http://idsa.in/jds/jds_10_2_2016_countering-the-threat-of-radicalisation
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