Radicalisation of Campuses in Pakistan

By  Farhan Zahid, RSIS

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses

Volume 9, Issue 11 | November 2017

Radicalisation of youth at various university  campuses in Pakistan and the participation of a select few in militancy are a serious concern. This trend has generally been associated with the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group although it was pioneered by Al-Qaeda. While youth radicalisation is also not entirely new, it is a continuation of a historical trend that has existed since the 1990s. In this regard, the case study of youth radicalisation at the International Islamic University (IIUI) is instructive. Though IIUI is not the only university that

faces the problem of youth radicalisation, it presents policy-relevant insights into the environment that facilitates radicalisation  and increases youth vulnerability to militant

recruitment. .

Introduction

Involvement of educated youth in terrorism is not a new phenomenon. During the Cold War, a number of left-leaning terrorist groups comprising educated individuals carried out terrorist attacks in South America (e.g. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, Shining Path and others) and Western Europe (e.g. the Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Communist Combatant Cells). The case of Islamist militancy is no different in this connection. A number of leaders of prominent jihadist groups are highly educated. For instance, Osama Bin Laden, the founder of Al-Qaeda, had a Bachelors in Civil Engineering from King Abdul Aziz

University. His successor, Ayman Al-Zawahiri also has a Masters in Surgery from Cairo University. Similarly, the head of IS Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, likewise has a PhD in Islamic theology from Baghdad University. Similarly, Anwar Al-Awlaki of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was a Civil Engineering graduate from Colorado State University and had a Masters in agricultural economics from New Mexico State University. Following the September 2001 attacks in the US and the ensuing War on Terror, a number of Pakistani jihadist groups formerly involved in Kashmir and anti-Shia militancy joined ranks with Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) to wage „jihad‟ against the Pakistani state and its security institutions. This gave birth to a new breed of militant leadership in Pakistan that comprises local Pakistani radicalised youth, expatriate Pakistanis such as Omar Saeed Shaikh and Dr. Aafia Siddiquie as well as Al-Qaeda-linked foreign jihadists. In the last three years, a number of selfradicalised cells and „lone-wolf‟ individuals affiliated with the Islamic State of Khurasan (ISK), IS‟s Afghanistan-Pakistan chapter or Wilayat Khurasan, have been neutralised in Pakistani major cities such as Lahore, Karachi, Sialkot, Peshawar and Quetta. Most of these cells comprised of university and college-educated youth, leading to speculation that a new breed of educated jihadists is emerging in Pakistan under the IS

banner. However, this is factually incorrect: IS is not the only global militant organisation that has galvanised support from radicalised, educated youth in Pakistan nor is this trend entirely new. It is the continuation of a historical trend that started with the fascination of young Islamists with Al-Qaeda's open challenge to the US and its allies.

In Pakistan, jihadist cells linked with various militant organisations have been busted in reputed institutions such as the Karachi University, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), NED University of Engineering and Technology, Punjab University, and Mehran University of Engineering and Technology. For instance, two Al-Qaeda cells were neutralised in the hostels of Punjab University in 2015. Similarly, the arrest of the Saad Aziz led militant cell involved in the Saffora Goth massacre of 43 Ismaili-Shias in 2014 in Karachi is another case in point. More recently, another Al-Qaeda linked militant cell, Jamaat Ansar Al-Shriah, was neutralised in Karachi. The militants studied at NED, Sir Syed and Karachi universities. Given the above, the larger issue that warrants introspection is youth radicalisation on university campuses in Pakistan and how this is linked with the country‟s jihadist landscape. While it would not be right to single out any one university and make a case out of it, it is also true that some university campuses in Pakistan appear to be more prone to radicalisation as compared to others. The case of the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) is an instructive case study in this regard. This article studies the case of IIUI with respect to youth radicalisation, and the susceptibility of some students to jihadist recruitment.

Historical Context

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the subsequent anti- Soviet Jihad (1979-89) had not only devastated Afghan society but also adversely affected Pakistan‟s social fabric. It resulted in growing intolerance, religious conservatism and the spread of jihadi concepts. It can be argued that the 9/11 attacks and subsequent „war on terror‟ were just the triggering factors for jihad against the Pakistani state. The involvement of jihadists of Pakistani origins in global jihad predates the 9/11 attacks. For instance, both Ramzi Yousaf, an Afghan War veteran who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and Khalid Shaikh Mohammad (KSM), the main architect of the abortive Operation Bojinka in Manila, are Pakistani nationals. (KSM was later named the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.) During this period, former President General Zia-ul-Haq (1978- 1988) took various steps towards the Islamisation of Pakistani state and society. A number of new laws such as the Hudood Laws 1979, Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 1980 and amendments to Blasphemy Laws 1986 were introduced.

Many seminaries linked to jihad in Afghanistan were opened. The educational curriculums were Islamised and many Islamists were appointed to key government and administrative positions. The period also witnessed the active promotion of Wahhabism, a puritanical version of Salafi Islam, in Pakistan through funding of various madrassas and organisations from the Middle East. Much has been written on the mushrooming of radical madrassas with links to jihadist groups, such as Jamia Haqqanis (which is the Alma Mater of several jihadist

leaders including the founder leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Muhammad Umar), Jamia Binoria in Karachi and the Lal (Red) Mosque in Islamabad, in Pakistan. However, very few studies have analysed the Islamisisation of higher education institutions in Pakistan. The IIUI was established in the same period (1980).

Jihadist Ideologues in Campus

IIUI had several faculty members who were jihadist ideologues. One of them was Abdullah Yousaf Azzam, the founder of Maktab ul Khidmat al Mujaheeden wal Arabiya (MAK, Al-Qaeda‟s predecessor organization) who was part of the IIUI faculty until his death in a bomb blast in Peshawar in 1989.2 A Palestinian by descent, Azzam had established a base in Peshawar to provide logistic support to arriving Arab Mujahedeen. Azzam secured a teaching position at the IIUI in 1984. He taught Islamic Sharia law and jurisprudence for a number of years and was instrumental in revising and institutionalising the curricula of other Islamic faculty courses.To date, Azzam‟s Fatwas and writings remain as the standard text material for jihadists all over the world. He provided seed money to create at least three jihadist terrorist organisations, namely Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Al-Qaeda. Another important jihadi ideologue who taught at the IIUI was Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad (aka Mullah Krekar), an Iraqi Kurd who later founded Ansar al-Islam, an Al- Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. Besides his teaching experience at the IIUI, Krekar also worked as an ideologue for jihadists.5 In 2001, Krekar established Ansar al-Islam in his native Iraq

and later moved to Norway where he was granted asylum and later naturalised. In 2014, he pledged allegiance to IS.

Islamist ideologues such as the blind Shaikh Omar Abdul Rehman (later convicted for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Ahmad Khdr, the Egyptian-Canadian Islamist killed in a US drone strike in in 2009, have taught at the IIUI. For years, Abdul Basit

Abdul Karim (aka Ramzi Yousaf) remained the most notorious IIUI student due to his involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing, and the abortive Bojinka plot which included the

assassination plot against Pope John Paul in Manila and plans to blow up 11 US-bound planes from Asia.7 (Yousaf was convicted and imprisoned for life in the US.) In 2013, a former IIUI lecturer, Irtyaz Gilani from the faculty of engineering, was arrested from the suburbs of Islamabad for being part of an Al-Qaeda cell planning to attack key installations and government buildings in Islamabad. Besides recovering arms and ammunitions, the police also recovered a small drone from his house.

Links with Jihadism

The more ominous development was the emergence of an Al-Qaeda cell in Islamabad in 2013 comprising of IIUI students. During the post-arrest investigation, it was discovered that the cell had carried out attacks in collusion with Al-Qaeda since 2007. The cell was headed by Abdullah Omar, 24, a student of Islamic Sharia law at IIUI, and son of a former military officer Colonel Abbasi. He was assisted by another IIUI student of Sharia law Hammad Adil.

Other members of the cell also include Haris Khan and two brothers Saad and Fahd and Tanveer.The father of the ring leader, Omar Abdullah has a history of strong links with Al-Qaeda. His father Colonel Abbasi had been convicted for facilitating the stay of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad in an upscale neighborhood of Rawalpindi, a garrison town that houses Pakistan army‟s headquarters. On a tip off from the US, Pakistani intelligence arrested Abbasi, who was later court martialed and sentenced to six months‟ prison. During the investigation following his arrest, Abdullah revealed his father‟s jihadist connections, his association with JI and his education at the IIUI that contributed to his recruitment in Al-Qaeda. Abdullah was part of the Al-Qaeda‟s network in Rawalpindi that attacked the Friday prayer gathering at the Parade Lane Mosque in 2010. It was frequented by retired and serving military officers, and the attack left forty officers dead, including one Major General and one Brigadier.Two brothers, Hammad Adil and Adnan Adil,who were IIUI students of Sharia law, were also part of the Al-Qaeda Islamabad cell. The Adil brothers received training at a joining training camp of Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan and later moved back to Islamabad on the orders of Al-Qaeda. They were in charge of the logistics of the cell. Until its elimination in 2013, the Islamabad cell was involved in the targeted assassinations of Federal Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti, prosecutor of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Choudhry Zulfiqar Ali, former President General Pervez Musharraf (2012), suicide bombing of the Danish Embassy, and burning of NATO convoys at two different terminals in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The cell members also planned to assassinate the chief of Pakistan‟s premier intelligence agency using a suicide bomber but the plan could not be executed. Al-Qaeda‟s longstanding links with IIUI

students hit the headlines once again when the deputy head of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Qaeda‟s South Asian affiliate, Ustaz Ahmed Farooq was killed in a US drone strike in North Waziristan in April 2015. Farooq was a graduate of IIUI who later moved to tribal areas to join Al-Qaeda, where he was eliminated along with fifty other militants during a US drone attack.The authorities took firmer actions after the

discovery of Al-Qaeda‟s Islamabad Cell consisting of IIUI students. In May 2015, The Express Tribune reported that an intelligence agency had several concerns regarding activities in IIUI. In a letter to IIUI, the agency stated that “[The IIUI] intentionally promotes sectarian doctrine at its campus….[and] that the administration and faculty of IIUI is intentionally promoting Salafi, Takfiri and lkhwani doctrines, whereas Pakistan is fighting the demon of terrorism, incubated and abetted by the same doctrines.” 

Conclusion

The case study of IIUI illustrates the growing problem of youth radicalization at universities, colleges and other higher education institutions in Pakistan. For instance, the killing of Mashal Khan, a student of Abdul Wali Khan University, on fake blasphemy charges by a raging mob of university students in 2016, and the more recent arrests of Jamaat Ansar Al-Shariah, an Al-Qaeda linked militant outfit, operatives from the NED and Karachi universities, among others, underscore the need for immediate course correction. In this respect, the implementation of the country‟s first Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) policy formulated by the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is highly welcome development. Likewise, a revision of the current educational curricula and a broader involvement of both the Higher Education Commission and the Ministry of Education in the affairs of universities, are equally important.

About the author

Farhan Zahid has a PhD in Terrorism Studies from the University of Brussels, Belgium. Zahid is author of three books and eight research papers and articles His most recent book “The Al-Qaeda Network in Pakistan” was published in 2015 by Narratives, Pakistan. His other two books “Roots of Islamic Violent Activism in South Asia” and “From Jihad to al-Qaeda to Islamic State” have been published by Narratives in 2014 and Center for Research and Security Studies in 2015, respectively.

Muslim World League calls for awareness among youth about evils of extremism

By WordForPeace.com

Young people must be fully aware of the true meanings of Islamic texts and understand their purposes, to protect youths and counter the suspicions, allegations and corrupt interpretations of Islam that have been promoted by extremists for a long time in a number of countries in the region.

The call came from Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa, the secretary-general of the Muslim World League, in a speech during the presentation of the Abdullah bin Bader Al-Swaidan Award for Excellence in the Eastern Province.

Al-Issa said that the award is considered a pioneering model for safeguarding young people and promoting religious and national awareness of extremism.

He said: “Saudi Arabia has identified and removed more than 800 harmful intellectual materials launched by Daesh through thousands of messages on social networking sites.

“It is not enough to totally reject extremism and warn against it, because it thrives through the spreading of ideas that prey on and promote a negative type of religious sentiment devoid of the necessary level of awareness that can defeat the fallacies of extremism.

The Swaidan Award is the largest award in the Kingdom. More than 115,000 young men and women took part in the most recent edition, a record number of students in general education.

Reference:

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1283901/saudi-arabia

Refuting the Jihadist Interpretation of Surah Nisa-Verse: 89

By Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Siddiqui

www.WordForPeace.com

One of the verses the extremists quote for calling their ideological followers to fight against the ‘disbelievers’ including the non-Wahhabi Muslims is the verse 89 of Surah Al-Nisa. However by doing so, they are greatly violating the Quran. Let’s see and behold!

Allah Almighty says, “They (the hypocrites) wish that you reject faith as they have rejected (faith) and thus you all become equal (like one another). So do not make friends with (any of) them until they emigrate in the way of Allah. Then, if they turn back (violate their peace treaty and launch aggression against you), seize them and kill them wherever you find them (during the war), and take not (any of) them either for a friend or for a helper.” (4:89)

This verse refers to the hypocrites who rejected their faith and wanted the believers to reject their faith and become equal like one another. They were hidden traitors who wanted to commit treason against the believers. Therefore this verse asked the believers not to make them their friends “until they emigrate in the way of Allah” in order to prove their sincerity and truthfulness. Until now the first half part of the verse did not ask the believers to seize or kill these hypocrites. But if they turn back by not migrating and by violating their peace-treaty and launching aggression against the believers, it is in that sense the second half of the verse asks the believers “to seize them and kill them” wherever they find them during the war, as the command of this verse can’t be applied outside the war.

Its succeeding verse (4:90) clarifies that this verse 4:89 can’t be applied to those who have made a peace-treaty, no matter whether they are hypocrites or any group of disbelievers. Let us read now the verse 4:90!

“But (do not fight) those who have allied with a people that between you and them there is a (peace) treaty, or who (losing heart) come to you in such a state that their breasts are afflicted (with this obsession) whether they should fight you or their own people. If Allah had so willed, He (strengthening their hearts) would have given them supremacy over you. Then they would certainly have fought you. So if they keep away from you and do not fight you and send you (a message) for peace, then (in the interest of peace) Allah has left no way open for you (to launch any aggression) against them.” (4:90)

Having read the afore-mentioned two verses of the Quran, the Islamic nature of war becomes very clear. The war-related verses can’t be applied to the areas or countries where the Muslims and non-Muslims live peacefully under any sort of mutually agreed law or any sort of peace-treaty or constitution. This argument was completely followed and juristically encouraged by the great classical jurists. I am quoting only some of them, as follows;

Violation of Treaty is Not Permissible

“If a peaceful treaty is concluded with the stipulation that there will be no war between parties for one year or so, it should not be violated. It is unlawful to come to war within the stipulated time by breaking the agreement” (Majmaul-anhar, Bahare Shariat, vol: 9, p.137)

There is another Quranic verse 8:72 which significantly teaches the believers to maintain treaty or agreement. That Muslims should keep the promise of treaty in all cases is a universal message. If today’s Muslims have agreed to abide by any constitution, they shall have to keep their promise. Allah Almighty says, “Fulfil the covenant [promise]. Verily the covenant will be questioned about” (17:34).

Injunction of Peaceful Treaty                 

“It is permissible for the Muslims to conclude a peaceful treaty, provided that it is in their favour. If there be a need, the treaty can be concluded even by giving out some wealth. As a matter of expedient measure, it can be broken. But the enemies should be informed of it and fighting should not be begun; just after informing them of the breaking of agreement. There should be an interval sufficient enough for them to make their allies aware of it. This injunction is applicable only when the agreement is broken before the expiry of the stipulated length of time.” (Durre-e-Mukhtar, Raddul Muhtar, Bahare Shariat Vol:9, p.138)

Injunction on Offering Protection to Polytheists

“If a free Muslim man or woman gives shelter to one or a group of polytheists or to the polytheists of a particular town, it is his or her duty to protect his or their life. It is not lawful to kill them, even if the person who gives the shelter is a transgressor, blind or an aged man”. (Durr-e-Mukhtar, Alamgiri, Bahare Shariat)

Injunction on offering Protection to the weak even during War-times

It is also important to note that the collateral damage is not allowed even during war-times. Islam says, it is strictly forbidden to kill women, children, mad, aged, blind, crippled, and lame men, priests, monks, retiring in the worship houses and those whose right hands are either chopped off or affected by rickets, provided that they do not come to avail the enemies. (Durre Mukhtar, Bahare Shariat, Vol:9, p.137). Such views of the Islamic jurists are based on the following ahadith;

(1)      “Do not kill any child, any woman, or any elder or sick person.” (Sunan Abu Dawud)

(2)      “Do not practice treachery or mutilation. (Muwatta Malik)

(3)      “Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle.” (Sahih Bukhari; Sunan Abu Dawud)

(4)      “Do not kill the monks in monasteries, and do not kill those sitting in places of worship. (Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hanbal)

(5)      “Do not uproot or burn palms or cut down fruitful trees.(Al-Muwatta)

(6)      “Do not wish for an encounter with the enemy; pray to Allah to grant you security; but when you [are forced to] encounter them, exercise patience.” (Sahih Muslim)

(7)      “No one may punish with fire except the Lord of Fire.” (Sunan Abu Dawud).

To sum up, we can say that the war-related verses are limited to war-times only. Only the state or a government of a country can execute the rulings and laws of war. Individuals or citizens are not allowed to wage war against any group or take laws in hands. Moreover, the war-related verses can’t be applied to the countries where Muslims and non-Muslims are living under their mutual agreement or any sort of peace-treaty or constitution. Therefore, the extremists can’t quote the verse 4:89 to justify their acts in any way. Similarly it would be a great crime, on the part of their followers, to support the call of the extremists. 

Reference:

http://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-and-jihad/ghulam-ghaus-siddiqi,-new-age-islam/refuting-the-jihadist-interpretation-of-surah-nisa—verse-89/d/114936

No Religious Sanctity On the War Cry of ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ In Kashmir: Giving terrorism a veneer of religion is self-deception

By  By Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi

www.wordforpeace.com

Eisa Fazili, the slain ISIS sympathizer in Kashmir-young gullible student of the B Tech (IT) who joined militant ranks-warned the Ulema:“One day they have to show their faces to Allah who will punish them for failing in their duties to give a call for Jihad fi Sabilillah (armed struggle in the path of Allah)”.

But what Fazili and his likes of the radicalized Kashmiri youths fail to do is reason with themselves: when the Ulema— of any sect (Maslak) or any school of jurisprudence (Mazhab)—have not issued any decree or fatwa for jihad in Kashmir, why these half-educated youths are hell-bent on calling for the self-declared ‘jihad-e-Kashmir’? Have they become self-imposed Ulema or muftis (Islamic jurists) by themselves to declare Jihad or Qital, something that, according to the established Islamic scholars, only state can declare? Don’t they look up to the authoritative Ulema and authentic Islamic scholars as their religious mentors anymore? When Ulema and Islamic clergy don’t ask them to participate in any kind of jihad, then who are forcing them to go berserk and play havoc across the valley in the name of jihad and Khilafah? Clearly, the present-day extremist jihadists in Kashmir are deceiving themselves and are working on the behest of the foreign interests. They are simply puppets of the foreign political ambitions and are, knowingly or unconsciously, serving the ulterior motives and designs of the anti-India elements. Therefore, it is indispensable to rescue the misguided Muslim youths in Kashmir from the false Islamic jihad bred by the outside interests. Eisa Fazili argued with the Ulema that one day they have to show their faces to Allah who will punish them for ‘failing in their duties to call for Jihad’. But he could not reason with himself as to how he would show his own face to Allah while he has failed to spend his God-gifted precious life in the righteous path of Allah (fi sabeel lilah). Will Allah not ask him why he wasted his sacred life in the so-called jihad which was neither commanded by God nor declared by state, nor endorsed by even a single authentic Islamic scholar?

Let alone the established Islamic scholars in India, even the Pakistani ulema have refuted the legitimacy of any such self-declared jihad. This came in a recent Anti-terror Fatwa popularly known as “Paigham-e-Pakistan” signed by 1,800 Ulama of almost every Islamic school of thought. It has categorically stated two important things: (1) that ‘only the state can announce a jihad’ and (2) that any decree (fatwa) or move to enforce the Sharia’h law cannot be legitimized without the legal statutes. It reads:

“According to Islamic jurists, no activity leading to war can be initiated without the consent of the state ruler or his appointed commanders. A soldier cannot attack the enemy in his personal capacity without the permission of his commander….Islamic jurists also pronounce that war cannot be waged without the permission of the government. Moreover, it cannot be started just to overcome the enemy. It is right of the government to allow fighting or waging war which is further subject to the vulnerable security situation of the state. The Holy Qur’an states: “And if they (the enemy, combatant or hostile people) incline towards peace and reconciliation, you also incline to it and put your trust in Allah. Surely, He alone is All-Hearing, All-Knowing.”(Surah Anfal: 8:61, Holy Qur’an)

Based on several verses of the Qur’an like the above, authoritative ulema and muftis (Islamic jurists)—both in India and Pakistan—have delegitimized any kind of self-declared jihad or armed struggle. They have specifically decreed against waging war against the state. Thus, what the militants in Kashmir are doing is Fasad (mischief), not Jihad. Their untenable theological justifications and farfetched religious arguments cannot be the Islamic basis of support for their acts of terror and violence.

According to the reports, the slain Kashmiri militant also made a plea for the armed struggle or jihad against what he called the reign of Kufr (Dar al-Kufr). In his war-cry, his argument was that it is the religious duty of every Muslim to fight against the Darul Kufr and Kafirs. Thus, he sought to legitimize the terror attacks not just against the Indian government but also against those in power within Kashmir.

However, the extremists’ theological justification for combat against the non-Muslim majority countries calling them ‘Darul Kufr’ (land of disbelief) is completely erroneous and untenable. They are twisting the early Islamic terms and concepts which the ulema have mentioned in a historical background. But the present-day fanatics misperceive them and consider every country where the Islamic Shariah is not enforced as Darul Kufr or Darul Harb (land of war). Thus, jihadist extremists believe that the people of these countries may be fought by an Islamic expedition (Ghazwa) in order to conquer their territories.

But this jihadist argument has been refuted by the fact that the classification of territories made by early Islamic jurists was not intended to justify a wanton war against the non-Muslim lands. Rather, it served as a basis upon which certain jurisprudential (fiqhi) rulings were implemented on Muslims. It was just like the classification of the globe into political territories today.

The collective consensus (Ijma’a) of the mainstream Ulema today is on the authentic Islamic position that if Muslims peacefully coexist with other people enjoying safety of life and security of the religious freedom anywhere in the world, any such territory or country can be termed as Darul Mua’ahda (abode of peace treaty) or Darul Sulah (abode of reconciliation) in the purely Islamic jurisprudential (Fiqhi) terms. Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani, an established Islamic cleric who popularized the concept of Darul Mua’ahda in India, motivated Muslims towards the territorial nationalism rather than creating a nation based on religious considerations. In 1937, Maulana addressed a political meeting in Delhi and made this clear: “Today a nation is made on the basis of the country. If there are different religions in the country, the nation does not become different”.

As for the medieval Islamic terms like Dar ul-Islam, Dar ul-Kufr and Dar ul-Harb, they are null and void today; abrogated by the new world order, constitution, international covenants, peace treaties and international relations. They might have been relevant during the third and fourth Islamic centuries. Even then, they did not serve as the basis for wanton killing of the non-Muslims or Muslims. Imam al-Kasani (r.a)—the 6th century renowned Islamic jurist who authored one of the most colossal reference works on the Hanafi law “al-Bada’e al-Sana’e”, wrote in his classical work:

“What is meant by designating the word “Dar” (abode) with Islam and Kufr (disbelief) is not Islam and disbelief per se, but the state of security or insecurity. Moreover, the relative juristic rulings are not based on Islam itself or Kufr (in this case), but on the security or insecurity.”

This position was reinforced by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah revered as an important Imam in the Sunni Islamic tradition. He clearly stated in support of the above traditional Islamic position: “This is the opinion held by the majority of scholars [Ulema]. It is crystal clear that Muslims jurists made their opinions according to Fiqh al-Ma’alat (the Islamic law which takes into consideration the outcomes of actions).” [Ibn Qayyem Al-Jawziyyah, Ahkam Ahl Al-Dhimmah 2/873].

As an eminent medieval Islamic jurist of the Hanbali School of jurisprudence, the decrees on the religious rights of non-Muslims in the writings of Imam Ibn al-Qayyim compiled in “Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimmah” are noteworthy. They indicate that the early Islamic jurists applied Maslahah (public interest) as the basis of the Shariah rulings on the contemporary issues. As a result, the religious rights of non-Muslims were guaranteed in the authoritative views based on the rightly guided Islamic principles, rather than the misguiding opinions of the political theologians who served the ulterior motives and imperialist designs of the different Muslim dynasties.

Since the security and peace treaty are fully guaranteed in the constitution of the nation states, the rulings of Darul Islam or Darul Kufr are no longer of any Islamic application today. Zakir Musa’s open threat to behead ‘those who talk in terms of nation state’ is only a symptomatic of his sheer lack of knowledge about the Qur’anic law and canonical Islamic texts. Of course, his war cry of ‘Ghazwatul Hind’ threatens the status quo of the security paradigm in the valley, but he has no substantial support from the established Islamic scholarship in India.

In fact, the entire extremist jihadist rhetoric in Kashmir which is underfoot to agitate Muslims on social media and YouTube videos is run of the mill and has no substance or support from any of the four established Islamic thought resources—Qur’an, Hadith, Ijm’a (consensus) or Qiyas (analogy). Those who are critical of the Indian Alims and Fazils accusing them of ‘siding with the government’ and refusing to issue the ‘jihad decree on Kashmir’ should worry as to how they would show their faces to Allah in the hereafter (Akhirah). In fact, Allah will punish them for failing in their duties to pay heed to this clear commandment of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him):

“Whosoever kills a person who has a truce with the Muslims will never smell the fragrance of Paradise”. (Reported by Sahih Muslim)

The non-Muslims, not only Muslims, enjoyed the protective status, safety of life and security of faith in the Madina state where the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) announced:

“Beware! Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, or curtails their rights, or burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment”. (Reported by Abu Dawud)

Reference:

http://www.newageislam.com/radical-islamism-and-jihad/ghulam-rasool-dehlvi,-new-age-islam/rejoinder-to-the-rhetoric-of-jihad-in-kashmir–no-religious-sanctity-on-the-terror-designs-to-trigger-the-militants-for-‘holy-war’-in-the-valley/d/114882

Islam and Suicide Terrorism: Separating Fact from Fiction

By Reid Hutchins, RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and AnalysesVolume 9, Issue 11 | November 2017

Introduction

A voice message by Osama Bin Laden, stating „We love death as you love life‟ in the aftermath of 9/11, set the tone for radicalisation and spurred the use of suicide terrorism as a predominant tactic employed by Al-Qaeda and presently, the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group as well. As such, Bin Laden‟s death slogan for Al-Qaeda has also become a rallying cry for other radical Islamist terrorists to kill and die. In recent times, a diverse range of terrorist and militant organizations with nationalist, separatist and religious inclinations, have

adopted suicide terrorism as a tactic of psychological warfare and violent resistance.

These included the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Hezbollah during the civil

wars in Sri Lanka and Lebanon respectively. The LTTE has been credited with using suicide belts and incorporating female suicide squads. Yet, commentators and policy-makers have generally stereotyped suicide bombers as young, religiously radicalised religiously radicalised males with violent tendencies and a fanatical devotion to Islam. In this regard, the most important characteristic of this suicide bomber is the willingness to kill civilians, security forces and government personnel and die. The media has created an inaccurate link between Islam and terrorism. „Martyrdom‟ and „jihad‟ (struggle) are terms regularly associated with suicide terrorism with a lack of discussion on their true meaning and significance within the Islamic tradition. 

This link has existed because terrorist organisations such as IS and Al-Qaeda profess strict adherence to their perverse understanding of Islamic doctrine and falsely claim that suicide bombings (described as „martyrdom‟ operations) in pursuit of strategic goals are permissible. An analysis of the Islamic concept of sacrifice, martyrdom and jihad demonstrates how terrorist organisations have misconstrued and exploited the intended usages and true meanings of these Islamic concepts for recruitment purposes. Their erroneous claims and propaganda have misled their followers into believing that suicide terrorism is morally permitted and justified.

Martyrdom and Suicide Terrorism

The willingness of a terrorist to die for the group‟s cause is a common characteristic of IS recruits. IS recruits believe that suicide attacks represent the highest form of sacrifice to achieve the group‟s political goals and enforce its religious ideology.1 Suicide has become a basic yet lethally effective strategy among radical jihadists to inflict maximum casualties and damage to increase the shock value. Radical jihadists wrongly believe that they adhere to a moral logic grounded in religion. This belief has religious significance as sacred values and practices have been a basis for Islam that radical jihadists feel morally obliged to protect. „Martyrdom‟ is driven by this wrongly perceived moral obligation to defend the sanctity of Islam, which supersedes basic self-interests, such as protecting one‟s life.

Given that the Quran forbids suicide, terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and IS reframe suicide as „martyrdom‟. These groups conflate martyrdom with jihad to create a violent narrative of suffering, struggle and redemption. In addition, these groups have hijacked sacred moral practices in Islam by distorting them to create „real enemies‟ such  as US occupying forces and „existential enemies‟ such as Western values. The „us‟ (jihadists) against „them‟ (kafir) narrative has also facilitated followers of extremist ideologies to kill oneself, other Muslims and non-Muslims under the pretext of religious adherence.

There has been a significant rise in suicide terrorism as a response to the increase in violent civil and military conflict in the post-9/11 world. There is little surprise that victims or refugees of conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria facing war-torn realities are lured by terrorist promises of divine reward. In such a situation when one is facing a constant threat of death, religiously justifying suicide for the sake of one‟s community could become the most desirable or the only option to die with a sense of meaning.3 Suicide operations undertaken by IS terrorists have been a lethal defensive tactic during IS‟ insurgency in Iraq.

Extremists‟ willingness to become suicide bombers can be attributed to their status as powerless individuals and the empowered feeling derived from challenging their oppressors. Terrorist organisations distort Islamic teachings under the guise of religious authority to construct human life as an expendable resource. Suicide terrorists, particularly those living in conflict zones, are more vulnerable to promises made to change their communities‟ political and social circumstances. It may also help the „martyr‟ attain recognition in their community and elevate the social status of his or her family.

A study of „self-martyrs‟ who failed in their respective suicide attacks in Palestine showed that they depicted „sub-clinical suicidal tendencies‟ and also suffered from depression.4 Other studies on suicide terrorism have found that the personal lives of these individuals were often unstable. Suicide attackers tend to have histories of recent divorces, financial troubles, emotional breakdowns, health issues and social or cultural isolation.5 Some of these factors, including social isolation, depression, hopelessness, guilt and shame, were also seen in 9/11 hijacker and pilot, Mohamed Atta.

While the goals of terrorist organisations include strategic, ideological or territorial considerations, the motivations of suicide terrorists can be based on strong emotive reasons.6 Another critical factor that acts as a motivation is the view that Western aggression and oppression of Muslims are directly responsible for the social and cultural degradation of Islamic values and communities.

Sacrifice and Violence 

To understand the motivations of suicide terrorists from jihadist terror organisations, there needs to be an understanding of how  Violent self-sacrifice as an act propagated by terrorist groups has multiple, overlapping motivations. At the basic level, suicide terrorism is voluntary death intended to kill and maim others for a religious or political goal. Suicide terrorists can come from diverse socio-economic backgrounds and can include individuals who are educated, uneducated, and rich or poor. But they are united by a shared sense of humiliation.. The humiliation suffered by Muslims due to Western „occupation‟ and „domination‟ within the Middle East provides a fertile ground for terrorist recruitment in areas such as Syria, Iraq, Gaza, Yemen and Lebanon.

In politically and economically fractured societies, which are suffering under conditions of social trauma and humiliation, sacrificing one‟s life for the community has a heroic appeal. In Palestine for instance, the first and second intifadas (1985-2005) were viewed heroically within local Palestinian communities, despite the resulting violence and destruction from frequent suicide bombings.

Detangling Islamic Jihad

„Sacrifice‟ is used in the Quran to mean „giving up‟ one‟s immoral desires, but not „giving up‟ oneself. Allah requires Muslims to demonstrate submission, but does not require the destruction of oneself or others.However, the term ‟sacrifice‟ is inseparable from jihad, which has a long and complicated history with divergent meanings. The mainstream practice of jihad in Islam is nonviolent. One interpretation is that it is a practice in selflessness. This implies the charitable nature of jihad by imploring Muslims to have greater social responsibility towards others and work towards the greater good. Jihad involves the „struggle against one‟s self‟, an „internal struggle‟ undertaken individually by Muslims to overcome selfish desires and temptations.

The extremists however give emphasis on „jihad of the sword‟. Violent jihad has come to define the overall concept of jihad, as radical Islamist terrorists use it in a reductionist way. The relationship between jihad and violence is difficult to discern. But the Quran does not command or condone illegitimate violence and terrorism.Various sections of the Quran provide an account on conduct during war. Violence, according to the Quran, must be proportional and defensive in nature as it states: 2:194: […] whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you. 2:190: Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.

However, interpretations vary regarding what is justifiable and permissible violence. The interpretive range within Islamic theology on the use of violence is lengthy and has evolved across time and space. These various understandings are based on historical and contemporary accounts of early Arabic conquests, foreign invasions, colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East.19 Although the changing impacts of these events on the Middle East remain contested, there is greater certainty that they led to significant political and social changes in the region. These modern political and social changes in the Middle East have strained relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, and violent jihad has thrived.

In Iraq alone, more successful suicide terrorist attacks have been carried out since 2003 compared to other countries with a U.S military presence in the last 25 years. Although exact figures remain unclear, a February 2017 report suggests 140 IS attacks in 29 countries outside of Iraq and Syria has so far killed 2,043 people since 2014. Recent terrorist attacks in Paris and London have also contributed to a shift from localised suicide attacks in the Middle East, to globalised terrorist attacks in Europe.

In this regard, the IS brand of terrorism linked to militant fanaticism is a continuing cause for

serious concern. IS members and supporters, especially home-grown terrorists born and raised in the West, are at odds with their societies. They believe these societies exist in total ignorance of a true, higher divinity in service of God. A societal ignorance and rejection of Islam, paired with Western military campaigns in the Middle East, have exacerbated animosities against the non-believers and spurred a cultish devotion to the caliphate. This devotion partly accounts for the rise in foreign terrorist fighters joining IS in Syria and Iraq in 2014-2016 and a subsequent involvement in suicide bombings. The rejection of the West,with its real and imagined antitheses to Islam, is a retreat from modernity, as the IS jihadist yearns to reinstate the ideal „Islamic community‟ based on a radical interpretation of Islamic doctrine.

Conclusion

It is evident that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic that has provided several tactical benefits to terrorist organisations. Despite the various personal motivations for suicide terrorists to engage in self-sacrifice, it is used as a tool to achieve strategic aims at an organisational level. In the case of IS, its tactics of establishing a caliphate remains persistent and dangerous. Although IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria,including its de facto capital Raqqa, and thousands of its combatants have surrendered or escaped, the threat remains. Besides the small pockets of territories in the Levant and wilayats (outside Iraq and Syria), the rhetoric of suicide terrorism and self sacrifice still persists. In this regard, groups such as IS among others, primarily resort to social media as a medium of communication with supporters and for recruitment efforts. Thus, even though the terrorist groups might be on the defensive on the ground, virtually they still manage to spread their ideology and instill fear through their supporters perpetrating minor and major attacks.Thus, it is evident that efforts should be dedicated towards debunking IS manipulation of religious doctrines to justify suicide terrorism and armed jihad and the exploitation of technology to sustain itself in the virtual

world.

About the author

Reid Hutchins holds a B.A (Hons) in International Relations and Masters of Strategic Studies degree. He works for state government in Australia