Jihadi Revisionism: Will It Save the World?

  

By Khalil Al-Anani

Crown Centre for Middle East Studies,

Brandeis University, Massachusetts

No. 35, April 2009

It is remarkable that even as al-Qaeda is stepping up violence and terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, a process of revisionism—of rethinking jihadi doctrine and philosophy—is gaining steam, presided over by leaders of formerly violent extremist groups who now profess the error of the thought and ideology that have guided them for the past two decades. The various revisionist efforts reinterpret religious texts and fatwas related to jihad with the objective of minimizing extremist or militant understandings of sacred texts, so as to make these texts more grounded in reality and more suitable for practical application. Revisionism has taken hold in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, bringing to light rifts between jihadi movements and among their members. Yet, disagreement continues regarding the potential of the revisionist movement to put out the flame of jihad in the Islamic world; to stop—or at least reduce— jihadi violence; and to influence new generations of jihadis. This Brief examines one instance of jihadi revisionism—Sayyid Imam al-Sharif’s 2007 renunciation of his own influential jihadi manifesto—and the response of the jihadis, especially that of Ayman al-Zawahiri, to this effort.

The Story of Jihadi Revisionism

The network of organizations constituting the jihadi movement developed in Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s after the hanging of Sayyid Qutb in 1966. He, more than any other single person, inspired the Muslim world to take up jihadi doctrine. His influential work, Milestones, reverberates throughout Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj’s The Absent Obligation. This interpretation of jihadi philosophy in turn was adopted by jihadists even after the gurus of jihad were arrested and Qutb and Faraj were executed—in 1966 and 1982, respectively.In 1980, the group Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization), also known as al-Jihad, was temporarily formed from a merger of various Islamist groups, including al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), also known as al-Jama‘a and which was led by Faraj at the time. This combined organization assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981. Following Sadat’s assassination, hundreds of activists were jailed, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was released in 1985 and left for Afghanistan. During the 1980s and 1990s, the violent Islamic movement in Egypt was principally led by two groups: al-Jama‘a, headed by the blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman and al-Jihad, which having split from al-Jama‘a, was now under the leadership of al-Zawahiri. In February 1998, al-Jihad formally merged with al-Qaeda and formed a unified organization, declaring “jihad against Jews and Crusaders.”Prior to this, al-Jama‘a had been responsible for several acts of violence in Egypt—most importantly the assassination in October 1990 of Rif‘at al-Mahgub, the speaker of the Egyptian parliament and in 1993 the assassination attempts on former prime minister ‘Atif al-Sidqi, former interior minister Hasan al-Alfi, and former minister of information Safwat al-Sharif. The first step toward revisionism was taken in Egypt by al-Jama‘a in July 1997. In what it called “the nonviolence initiative,” the group declared an end to all acts of violence in Egypt and abroad. Its last act of violence occurred in November 1997 with the massacre at Luxor, during which fifty-eight tourists were killed and which is widely believed to have been an attempt to sabotage the “nonviolence initiative” by splinter groups within al-Jama‘a. The group went public with its non-violence initiative in 2002.

For more than a decade, al-Jama‘a has issued some twenty-five books and documents proclaiming the group’s complete abandonment of its jihadi ideological heritage. It has also issued several fatwas banning the use of violence and condemning the violent practices of other jihadi groups, such as al-Qaeda. Many Jama‘a leaders have addressed al-Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri directly, asking them to desist from violence and condemning jihad as fruitless. The al-Jama‘a has engaged in no acts of violence in Egypt or abroad since 1997, transforming itself into a religious group focused on outreach while intellectually engaging public issues of political or religious controversy in Egyptian society. Jihadi revisionism came about against the backdrop of the Egyptian security establishment’s desire to close the file on local jihadi groups and to release the five thousand prisoners who had been detained over the past twenty years. (Roughly 15 thousand prisoners associated with al-Jama‘a had already been released between 1997 and 2007 following that group’s revisionist initiative.) It was within this context that the most significant moment in jihadi revisionism took place in Cairo in November 2007. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl and ‘Abd al-Qadir Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, issued from prison a 111-page document entitled “Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World.” This document rejects his own influential jihadi manifestos from 1988. Al-Sharif wrote the document in late 2006 and showed it to the imprisoned leaders of al-Jihad for approval in addition to presenting it to the Islamic Research Academy at al-Azhar, which approved it and recommended that it be published.6 According to al-Sharif, he wrote it to help put a stop to al-Qaeda’s violence and terrorism—which, he believed, had distorted the meaning of jihad. Al-Sharif’s revisionist initiative provoked a lengthy response from Ayman al-Zawahiri, who condemned it as “a call to a new American religion.”

Sayyid Imam al-Sharif’s reassessment was extremely important—more so than similar initiatives undertaken by al-Jama‘a and by other groups in Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya—for three interrelated reasons. First, al-Sharif’s biography places him at the center of jihadi activity in the 1980s and 1990s. Born in August 1950 in the city of Beni Suef in the northern part of Upper Egypt, he went to a traditional school (kuttab) and had memorized the Quran at a young age. He began writing in his youth, and after his high school matriculation he enrolled as a medical student at Cairo University, specializing in general surgery. He graduated in 1974 with honors and was appointed to the surgery department of the Qasr al-‘Ayni Faculty of Medicine. An introvert, he joined the thirteen-member Maadi Group formed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, considered to be the first kernel of al-Jihad.

Al-Sharif was tried and acquitted in absentia in 1981 for the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He left Egypt in 1982 and worked for a short time in the United Arab Emirates. He then decided to offer his medical expertise to the Afghan jihad, which he did in Pakistan from 1983 until 1993. When Pakistan ejected the Arab mujahidin, he moved to Sudan for several months and then to Yemen in 1994. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in absentia in the so-called Returnees from Albania trial, conducted in 1999 in Egypt. After the September 11 attacks, he was arrested in Yemen where he was working as a surgeon. Yemen turned him over to the Egyptian authorities on February 20, 2004, and since then he has been serving a life sentence in an Egyptian prison.

Second, Al-Sharif Second, was widely known as the most significant deologue and legal philosopher of international jihad, and his two major works had a substantial impact on young jihadis in Afghanistan. His al-‘Umda fi ‘idad al-‘idda (The Faithful Guide for Preparation) is a jihadi manifesto; published in 1988; this 500-plus-page tome lays out the legal nd operational parameters of jihadism. In al-Jami‘ fi talab al-‘ilm al-sharif (The Compendium in Pursuit of Noble Knowledge), a 1,100-page opus released in 1993, al-Sharif elaborates the most significant legal judgments pertaining to jihad, rebellion against one’s rulers, democracy, and the application of Islamic law.

Finally, al-Sharif is significant due to the evolution of his revisionist thought. The initial ideological rupture between him and al-Zawahiri occurred in 1993, when al-Sharif left his command of al-Jihad to protest the killings carried out by the group in Egypt. Consequently al-Zawahiri assumed the position of commander. Al-Sharif’s revisionism continued to develop following the September 11 attacks and a spate of terrorist attacks around the world, from London and Madrid to Saudi Arabia and Morocco. These attacks reflect the transformations in the international jihadi movement propelled by Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Al-Sharif’s revisionist initiative stresses the error of using violence to achieve political objectives and the need to pursue political reform through peaceful means. It thus constitutes a repudiation of violent jihadi ideology, which rejects engaging in political action according to the rules of democracy.

The Content of Jihadi Revisionism

In four main sections and fifteen articles, “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” discusses the status of, and legitimate conditions for, jihad under Islamic law; rebelling against one’s rulers; labeling other Muslims infidels; the use of violence; the murder of foreigners in their countries; and relations with non-Muslims. Al-Sharif also asks in the document that his book al-‘Umda be confiscated, since it had been invoked by jihadi groups around the world as a charter and constitution for their jihad against local rulers and foreigners. Renouncing the murder of civilians of any nationality, he insists that jihadi groups have misunderstood his book and that it was never intended as an invitation to kill civilians. The most significant issues raised in al-Sharif’s revisionist document are as follows.

Engaging in Jihad

Al-Sharif believes that the meaning of jihad has been distorted and perverted and notes that the acts of jihadis have harmed individual Muslims as well as Islam itself. Jihadis have misunderstood Islamic texts, harmed themselves, struck blows against their societies, and led the West to put pressure on Muslim émigrés and residents. He observes that they have also contributed to the destruction of Afghanistan and Iraq and continue to cause much pain and destruction in Muslim lands.

“Rationalizing Jihadist Action” lays out conditions that must prevail for legitimate jihad, in the absence of which jihad is no longer a duty. Among other conditions, before setting out on jihad, a person must receive permission from his parents and creditors. Muslim women and their families must also be protected from the consequences of jihad. One must have the means to engage in jihad—meaning both that there are sufficient financial and physical resources and that appropriate external circumstances are obtained: in particular, parity between the two parties to the clash. These conditions do not exist at the present time, the document states, and the harm jihad would entail far outweighs any potential benefit. Therefore, jihad should not be waged.

Rebellion against Rulers

In contrast to other jihadi writings, which allow rebellion against one’s rulers and thus encourage the emergence of jihadi movements, al-Sharif does not allow rebellion which will lead to further evils, even if the unbelief of the rulers or the regime is unquestionable. “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” asserts that clashes with the authorities in Muslim countries in the name of jihad are not the proper means for achieving the implementation of Islamic law. Rebellion against local rulers is therefore impermissible. Significantly, al-Sharif here reverses his own previous writings, which had advocated the overthrow of domestic regimes in the Islamic world.

Attacks on Western Countries and Killing Innocent Civilians

“Rationalizing Jihadist Action” rejects any offensive actions undertaken inside Western countries for two reasons. First, there is the possibility that Muslims themselves may be victims. (With this argument, al-Sharif undermines one of the primary principles invoked by violent jihadi groups: that of tatarrus, which allows the killing of Muslims who live among non-Muslims.) Second, al-Sharif argues that attacks on foreigners in their own countries are a form of treachery. These attacks constitute a betrayal of the contract of safe passage under which Muslims are allowed to enter the countries of non-Muslims. The document notes that if a Muslim enters an infidel country, the local residents respect the integrity of his life and property; if he is attacked, they prosecute the aggressor and compensate the Muslim.Accordingly, “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” prohibits betraying foreigners, attacking their property or women, or blowing up their planes, trains, or hotels. In particular, it condemns the September 11 attacks, claiming that they were not jihad but a type of treachery or betrayal perpetrated by al-Qaeda against the United States. The document also states that it is impermissible to harm public or private property or defraud foreigners of their wealth. This includes defrauding insurance companies, evading rent, or refusing to pay telephone bills on the grounds that the defrauded parties are unbelievers. “This is all forbidden and not permissible under Islamic law,” the document asserts, “for it is treachery.”

Attacks on Foreign Tourists

“Rationalizing Jihadist Action” condemns all offensives carried out by extremist groups in Arab countries such as Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. In particular, it rejects any attacks on foreign tourists visiting Muslim countries, identifying a number of grounds for this ruling. First, there is the possibility that Muslims could be victims in any assault on foreign tourists. Second, such attacks constitute intimidation and a betrayal of innocent citizens—and innocent foreign women and children might, in fact, be killed. Innocent citizens, the document asserts, should not pay the price for their governments’ errors. In addition, the principle of like treatment is operative, meaning that as long as Muslims are given safety in foreign countries, foreigners must likewise enjoy safety in Islamic countries. Finally, the document notes, tourists have not come to Muslim countries with the purpose of fighting Muslims, but to visit in peace. Thus, they should be protected until they return safely to their home countries.

Takfir and the Treatment of Copts

Takfir (labeling other Muslims infidels) is a cornerstone of the philosophy of militant groups. The idea originated with Sayyid Qutb in his aforementioned work, Milestones, written in the 1960s. All violent groups have adopted this principle over the last three decades, and it has been invoked as the major justification for acts of murder and terror: Since the rulers of Arab and Muslim societies have all been considered infidels, it was deemed permissible to rebel against them and change their societies by force. In “Rationalizing Jihadist Action,” al-Sharif establishes strict limitations on the practice of takfir, noting that it is difficult to declare any individual an infidel without a thorough examination. Regarding the treatment of Christians in Islamic countries, “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” asserts that citizens cannot be discriminated against on the basis of religion; the operative principle should be citizenship, which affords all citizens equal rights and obligations. This represents a qualitative transformation in jihadi thought regarding relationships with the domestic or internal “other.” “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” forbids killing Jews and Christians and allows trade with them and taking non-Muslims as wives

Responses to “Rationalizing Jihadist Action”

Sayyid Imam al-Sharif’s document prompted vigorous reaction and sparked a media war among jihadis. Most al-Jihad members detained in Egyptian prisons endorsed the content of “Rationalizing Jihadist Action.” Al-Sharif himself notes that in February 2007 he toured various prisons where al-Jihad leaders and members were detained. Two months later, a conference was held in the Fayyum Prison during which the document was presented to hundreds of al-Jihad members and received their support. Additionally, both moderates and former jihadis, such as those from al-Jama‘a in Egypt, welcomed “Rationalizing Jihadist Action,” seeing the initiative as an important step on the road to stopping violence in the Islamic world and abroad. Nagih Ibrahim, a leader of al-Jama‘a who was at the forefront of the Jama‘a initiative in 1997, welcomed the document, seeing it as a rectification of ideas propagated by al-Qaeda and al-Jihad. Ahmad Yusuf, a former member of al-Jihad’s Consultative Council, maintained that al-Sharif’s initiative represented a “tsunami” in jihadi thought that would influence generations of youth who hoped to join al-Qaeda and might stop them from engaging in violence. ‘Asim ‘Abd al-Magid, another leader of al-Jama‘a, remarked that jihadi revisionism would have an impact on the violence in Egypt and abroad—and, as well, on al-Qaeda.

Al-Magid believed that owing to al-Sharif’s standing among the first-generation ranks in al-Qaeda, revisionism would further rifts and schisms within the organization. These disagreements were reported in the Arab press and the Egyptian authorities, in order to prevent any open conflict among former jihadists, isolated some thirty al-Jihad leaders who rejected al-Sharif’s revisionism. Among the most prominent jihadis isolated were Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri and the former commander of al-Jihad’s military wing, as well as Magdi Salim and Ahmad Salam Mabruk, who had been detained after President Sadat’s assassination. Still some al-Jihad members living abroad were disturbed by al-Sharif’s document—such as Hani al-Siba‘i, a former member currently living in London, who launched a strident attack on al-Sharif, contending that “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” was produced under psychological duress as a result of torture in Egyptian prisons and is therefore invalid.Al-Qaeda also rejected al-Sharif’s revisionism, and Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” as a fabrication by the Egyptian security establishment and “a desperate, American-sponsored attempt to stop the fierce wave of the jihadi awakening.” He argued that al-Sharif’s initiative amounted to a regression from or abandonment of jihadi principles that thereby served American interests. He further criticized the suspension of jihadi operations in Egypt. Additionally, al-Zawahiri argued that since al-Sharif was a prisoner and did not possess freedom of expression, his document could not be trusted, in keeping with the Islamic religious principle that prisoners have no authority.

In response to al-Sharif, al-Zawahiri issued al-Tabri’a (The Exoneration), a work of some 200 pages that was published on several fundamentalist websites. Al-Zawahiri devoted one chapter to each of the original’s sections, citing refutations from leading jihadi ideologues such as ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, the Palestinian Abu Qatada, and the Syrian Abu Mus‘ab. He considered court proceedings in connection with cases of religious violence in Egypt as constituting a refutation of al-Sharif’s work, and he minimized the document’s impact among jihadis, belittling al-Sharif’s influence and importance.

The Real Impact of Revisionist Thought

Al-Zawahiri’s response can be seen as a predictable one. The initiatives to stop jihadi violence and integrate militant Islamist groups into normative Arab sociopolitical life strike a blow at al-Qaeda’s strategy of diffusion, whereby it creates a network of local agents in various Muslim countries that declare their affiliation with the group. In assessing the real impact of revisionist thought on future jihadi action, two questions need to be answered. First, can revisionist initiatives from former jihadis stop jihadi violence? For that matter, are there any guarantees that revisionist jihadis themselves will not turn to armed action in the future?

With respect to the first question, there is much disagreement about the real impact of “Rationalizing Jihadist Action” on al-Qaeda, and on jihadi action in the world at large. Some observers believe that the document represents the first real challenge to jihadi groups like al-Qaeda. Taking note of the author’s intellectual standing, they also point out that a great many jihadi leaders in Egypt approved the document, giving it more weight as an expression of consensus. They further argue that the document will influence the disciples of al-Sharif who currently lead jihad, among them Abu Mus‘ab. In contrast, others believe that the jihadi revisionist initiative will have little impact on global jihad or on al-Qaeda. This position has several merits. They argue, first, that al-Qaeda’s central leadership in Afghanistan has been dispersed, and the organization no longer has a unified central leadership. They contend that al-Qaeda has become more of an ideological movement than a cohesive organization because of U.S. military action— and despite al-Sharif’s personal standing, he has no influence over the younger generation of jihadis, particularly those who emerged after September 11, 2001.

The critics maintain that new ideologues and Islamic legal scholars have replaced Sayyid Imam al-Sharif and enjoy greater standing among the new generations in al-Qaeda. These include Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (‘Isam al-Barqawi), a Jordanian national who has written more than fifty works of jurisprudence, along with essays elaborating jihadi thought in much narrower and more literal terms than do al-Sharif’s works. Al-Maqdisi’s most important works are al-‘Aqida al-Maqdisiyya (The Maqdisi Creed) and Thamarat al jihad (The Fruits of Jihad), and his website continues to receive new visitors and supporters every day. There is also Abu Qatada (‘Umar Mahmud ‘Uthman), a Jordanian of Palestinian origin whose fatwas have fostered jihadi violence in Algeria. Among his most important works are al-Jihad wal ijtihad (Jihad and Interpretation) and Aliyat al-taghyir bayn al-wahm wal haqiqa (Mechanisms for Change between Fiction and Fact). Finally, there is a long list of new jihadi ideologues in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, whose electronic books and articles are widely circulated in Arab countries and who have played a substantial role in disseminating jihadi Salafi thought.

                This new generation of jihadis reveals the extent to which the world is currently confronting a jihadism and an operational and intellectual system that is completely different from that addressed by the revisionism—and this gap severely limits the likelihood of an effective revisionist movement. New jihadists are not that familiar with the thought of the old jihadists, and they were not affected by the revisionism literature of al-Jama‘a in Egypt. In addition, the new jihadi theorists are still aiming to mobilize Muslim youth to fight against the West, and they are abetted by two conditions. First, the inflammatory socioeconomic conditions in the Muslim world—such as high unemployment rates and failed development projects in many Arab countries—play a vital role in heating up the political atmosphere that produces hundreds of frustrated and disappointed youth. These youth collectively serve as a jihadi time bomb. Second, the current regional and international polarization, which encourages violent tendencies and the rise of militant thought in the region and justifies the adoption of the jihadi enterprise in the minds of many Muslims.

It would be naïve, then, to expect these revisionist jihadi tracts to substantially effect al-Qaeda cells and their followers, with whom the latter maintain merely a spiritual relationship. The ideological and spiritual connection between al-Sharif and the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq jihadi generations seems very weak—not only on account of the lack of direct interaction between them, but also because the old sheikhs have been supplanted by new ones who have monopolized the philosophical discourse influencing new al-Qaeda members.The answer to the second question seems simpler. While there is no guarantee, empirical evidence has shown that most of those who were part of the revisionist movement have not returned to violence. Al-Jama‘a, as mentioned earlier, has not engaged in acts of violence since 1997, and has even condemned all killings by al-Qaeda. In Egypt, al-Jihad has mounted no violent operations since 1995, and its members have not joined any violent organizations in Egypt for the last decade.

Conclusion: The Future of Jihadi Violence

The principal significance of jihadi revisionism is that it insists on the failure of violent means to solve political problems. It teaches militant movements that hope to attack Arab and non-Arab governments and regimes that they are destined to fail. Revisionist thinking can also help correct several erroneous assumptions about jihad, especially regarding the use of violence and the murder of innocent civilians. The treatment of these issues in jihadist philosophy is often vague, thereby providing fertile ground for violent groups seeking religious justification for their terrorism. Revisionist thought may have a greater impact on new generations of jihadis if the political and cultural conditions that produced jihadist thinking also change. For that to happen, the United States must reconsider its regional and global policies. It, too, needs to engage in reassessment—in this case, of the so-called War on Terror, because it has only stoked tensions and polarization between the Islamic world and the West, giving jihadis an excuse for their acts of vengeance.

Introduction to the Fatwa on Suicide Bombing and Terrorism

By Shaykh ul Islam Dr. Muhammad Tahir ul Qadri

Minhaj-ul-Quran International (UK), Published in 2010

Summary of Fatwa

The horrendous onslaught of terrorist activity that has continued unabated for the last many years has brought the Muslim Umma, and Pakistan in particular, into disrepute. There is no denying the fact that the vast majority of Muslims oppose and condemn terrorism in unequivocal terms and are not ready to accept it as even remotely related to Islam in any manner. However, a negligible minority amongst them seems to give terrorism tacit approval. Instead of openly opposing and condemning terrorism, these people confuse the entire subject by resorting to misleading and perplexing discussions. It may be true that among the fundamental local, national and international factors underpinning terrorism on a global level include: the injustices being currently meted out to the Muslims in certain matters, the apparent double standards displayed by the main powers, and their open-ended and long-term military engagements in a number of countries under the pretext of eliminating terror. But the terrorists' recourse to violent and indiscriminate killings have become a routine affair, taking the form of suicide bombings against innocent and peaceful people, bomb blasts on mosques, shrines, educational institutions, bazaars, governmental buildings, trade centres, markets, security installations, and other public places: heinous, anti-human and barbarous acts in their very essence.

 These people justify their actions of human destruction and mass killing of innocent people in the name of Jihad (holy struggle against evil) and thus distort, twist and confuse the entire Islamic concept of Jihad. This situation is causing Muslims, the young in particular, to fall prey to doubts and reservations, muddling their minds in respect of Jihad, because those perpetrating these atrocities are from amongst the Muslims. The perpetrators practice Islamic rituals, perform acts of worship and put on outward forms set down in Sharia. This has put not only the common Muslims into a dilemma, but also a significant number of religious scholars and intellectuals, who are disconcerted and curious to know truly the exact and precise Islamic injunctions underpinning the workings, methods and measures these individuals and groups have adopted to cause their havoc.

Furthermore, the Western media is wont of over-reporting incidents of terrorism and extremism around the Muslim world, and does not at all highlight the positive and constructive aspects of Islam, its peaceful teachings and philanthropic philosophy and orientation. Moreover, it does not report the abhorrence, condemnation and opposition prevalent within Muslim communities towards extremists, militants and terrorists. Bracketing both Islam and terrorism together has led only to negative consequences. The western mind conjures up images of terrorism and extremism at the merest mention of the word 'Islam', leaving Western-bred and educated Muslim youth in a most difficult position, and leaving them ever more puzzled. In fact, the present generation of young Muslims all over the Islamic world is falling victim to intellectual confusion, as well as deterioration in the practical fields and in the domain of beliefs and religious tenets.

Because of this situation, two kinds of negative response and destructive attitude are developing: one in the form of damage to Islam and the Muslim world, and the other a threat to humanity, and the Western world in particular. The damage to Islam and the Muslim world is that Muslim youth, not completely and comprehensively aware of Islamic teachings, and under the influence of the media, regard terrorism and extremism as emanating from religious teachings and attitudes of religious people. This misplaced thinking is alienated them from religion, leading them to atheism, and posing a serious danger to the Muslim Umma in future. On the other hand, the danger threatening the Western world and humanity is of the above-mentioned policies and stereotyping of Muslims provoking a negative response among some of the Muslim youth, who regard these attacks against Islam as an organised conspiracy from certain influential circles in the western world. By way of reaction, they are gradually becoming extreme and militant in their outlook, departing moderation and a poised outlook on life, and, charged with hatred and revenge, ultimately becoming terrorists, or at the very least being groomed into the extremists’ designs. Thus, Western policies are instrumental in producing and inducting potential terrorist recruits and supporters, with no end in sight. In consequence, both the Muslim Umma, as well as humanity, is heading towards catastrophe.

Moreover, these circumstances are heightening tension, and creating an increasingly large deficit of trust between the Islamic and the Western worlds. The upsurge in terrorism is paving the way for greater foreign interference in and pressure on the Muslim states. This widening gulf is not only pushing humanity towards inter-faith antagonism at the global level but also reducing totally the possibilities of peace, tolerance and mutual coexistence among the different human societies of the world. We thought it necessary, under these circumstances, to place the Islamic stance on terrorism precisely in its proper perspective before the Western and Islamic worlds, in the light of the Holy Qur’an, Prophetic traditions and Books of Jurisprudence and Belief. We want to put across this point of view before all the significant institutions, important think tanks and influential opinion-making organisations in the world so that both the Muslims and non-Muslims , entertaining doubts and reservations about Islam, are enabled to understand Islam’s standpoint on terrorism more clearly and unambiguously. The contents of this research work are summarized here briefly.

The first chapter of this document, explaining and elaborating the meaning of Islam, discusses its three categories i.e. Islam (peace), Iman (faith) and Ihsan (spiritual excellence). These three words, literally and metaphorically, collectively represent peace, safety, mercy, tolerance, forbearance, love, kindness, benevolence and respect for humanity. It has been proven in the second chapter of this document through dozens of Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions that the killing of Muslims and the perpetration of terrorism are not only unlawful and forbidden in Islam but also represent the rejection of faith. Through reference to the expositions and opinions of jurists and experts of exegeses and Hadith, it has been established that all the learned authorities have held the same opinion about terrorism in the 1400 year history of Islam. The third chapter of this work describes the rights of non-Muslim citizens quite comprehensively. The opinions of all the leading jurists in this regard have also been listed in the light of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions.

In addition to all this, the most important point this research study has undertaken to make revolves around the thought, ideology and mindset, which pits a Muslim against another and finally leads him to massacre innocent humans. Such a mindset not only regards the killing of women shopping in markets and schoolgirls permissible but also a means of earning rewards and spiritual benefits. What power or conviction rouses him to kill people gathered in the mosque, and earn Paradise through carnage? Why does a terrorist decide to end his own life, the greatest blessing of Allah Almighty, with his own hands through suicide bombings? How does he come to believe that by killing innocent people through suicide bombing he would become a martyr and enter Paradise? These are the questions that spring to the mind of every person possessing common sense. While furnishing befitting answers to these questions, we have relied on historical facts, besides scholarly arguments, which the Holy Prophet (blessings and peace be upon him) himself predicted. By undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the signs, beliefs and ideologies of the Khawarij through the Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions and jurisprudential opinions of jurists, we have established that the terrorists are the Khawarij of contemporary times.

After declaring terrorism as forbidden, and an act of rebellion and brutality, and indeed of infidelity, we have drawn the attention of all the responsible powers and stakeholders to the topic "Call to Reflect and Reform", to the need for eliminating all the factors that cause people to entertain doubts, and reinforce the hidden hands actively engaged in spreading the plague of terrorism. A notable theme under discussion these days is that since foreign powers are causing unwarranted and unjustified interference in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, the so-called Jihadi groups have thwarted them by launching the offensive, inflicting upon them devastating blows and that their actions, though not right and justifiable, should not be reviled and condemned because their intention is to defend Islam. In our view, this is an awful syllogism and a most deplorable stance. To remove this misconception, we have specified a brief portion of the treatise, in the beginning, to this subject, bringing to the fore the fact that, in the light of the Qur’an and Hadith, evil cannot become good under any circumstances, nor can oppression transform itself into virtuous deed due to goodness of intention.

After these explanatory submissions, we also regard it our fundamental duty to let everyone know without any grain of doubt that we are going ahead with the publication of this research work solely for the sake of the respect and dignity of Islam and in the service of humanity. We do not mean to condone or approve the unpopular and unwise policies of global powers through this edict, nor do we aim to justify the wrong policies of any government, including that of Pakistan. We neither seek the pleasure of any government, nor tribute or appreciation from any international power or organisation. As always, we have taken the initiative to perform this task as a part of our religious obligation. Our objective in doing so is to wash off the stain of terrorism from the fair face of Islam, to familiarise the Muslims with the real teachings of the Holy Qur’an and Sunna and attempt to rid humanity suffering from the raging fire of terrorism. May Almighty Allah bless this endeavour with His benevolent acceptance through the holy means of His Beloved Messenger (blessings and peace be upon him).

The Questions that spring to mind and their brief answers

The heartbreakingly gory scenes of terrorism will no doubt disturb the minds of all eminent and common people of the world with some perplexing questions that demand satisfactory answers. We have attempted to supply detailed, logical and matter-of-fact replies to these inquiries. Brief answers to these questions are appended here in sequence, while their details have been presented in the same order in subsequent chapters of this research work.

1. Q: The first question in this connection that concerns all relates to use of force to spread beliefs: is it lawful for a group or organisation to use force to promote and put into effect their own creed and beliefs in the name of reforming others’ beliefs and ideologies, presuming themselves to be on the right path? Does Islam allow, somehow, the killing of people because of ideological differences, looting their wealth and properties and destroying mosques, religious places and shrines?

A: Islam is a religion of peace and safety that champions love and harmony in society. According to Islamic teachings, only such a person will be called a Muslim at whose hands the lives and properties of all innocent Muslims and non-Muslims remain safe and unhurt. The sanctity of human life and its protection occupies a fundamental place in Islamic law. Taking anyone's life for nothing is an act that is forbidden and unlawful. Rather, in some cases, it amounts to infidelity. These days, the terrorists, in a vain attempt to impose their own ideas and beliefs and eliminate their opponents from the face of the earth, killing innocent people ruthlessly and indiscriminately everywhere in mosques, bazaars, governmental offices and other public places are in fact committing clear infidelity. They are warned of humiliating torment in this world and in the hereafter. Terrorism, in its very essence, is an act that symbolises infidelity and rejection of what Islam stands for. When the forbidden element of suicide is added to it, its severity and gravity becomes even greater. Scores of Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions have proved that the massacre of Muslims and terrorism is unlawful in Islam; rather, they are blasphemous acts. This has always been the opinion unanimously held by all the scholars that have passed in the 1400 years of Islamic history, including all the eminent Imams of Tafseer and Hadith and authorities on logic and jurisprudence. Islam has kept the door of negotiation and discussion open to convince by reasoning, instead of the taking up of arms to declare the standpoint of others as wrong, and enforcing one’s own opinion. Only the victims of ignorance, jealousy and malice go for militancy. Islam declares them rebels. They will abide in Hell.

2. Q: The second question in this regard is: what are the rights of the non-Muslim citizens in a Muslim state?

A: Islam not only guarantees the protection of life, honour and property of Muslim citizens of an Islamic state, but also assures the equal protection of life, honour and property of non-Muslim citizens and of those people too with whom it has entered into a peace treaty. The rights of non-Muslim citizens enjoy the same sanctity as those of Muslim citizens in an Islamic state. There is no difference between them as human beings. That is why Islamic law metes out equal treatment to both Muslims and non-Muslims in the matters of blood money and Qisas. Non-Muslims have complete personal and religious freedom in a Muslim society. Their properties and places of worship also enjoy complete protection. Besides non-Muslim citizens, even the ambassadors of non-Muslim countries and others working on diplomatic assignments have been guaranteed complete protection. Likewise, the protection of life and property of non-Muslim traders is the responsibility of the Islamic state. Islam does not allow and advocate the use of violence against and killing of peaceful and non-combatant citizens under any circumstances. Those indulging in attacks on peaceful non-Muslim citizens, kidnapping them for ransom, and torturing them mentally or physically, or keeping them under unlawful custody, are in fact committing serious violations of Islamic teachings.

3. Q: The third question arises: does Islam offer clear commands on the sanctity of human life? Is it lawful to kidnap and assassinate foreign delegates and innocent and peaceful non-Muslim citizens to avenge the injustices and disruption of the non-Muslim global powers?

A: The importance Islam lays on the sanctity and dignity of human life can be gauged from the fact that Islam does not allow indiscriminate killing even when Muslim armies are engaged in war against enemy troops. The killing of children, women, the old, infirm, religious leaders and traders is strictly prohibited. Nor can those who surrender their arms, confine themselves to their homes and seek shelter of anyone be killed. The public cannot be massacred. Likewise, places of worship, buildings, crops and even trees cannot be destroyed. On the one hand, there is a clear set of Islamic laws based on extreme discretion, and on the other, there are people who invoke the name of Islam to justify the indiscriminate killing of people, children, and women everywhere, without any distinction of religion or identity. It is a pity that such barbaric people still refer to their activities as Jihad. There can be no bigger discrepancy than this to be seen on earth. It can in no way be permissible to keep foreign delegates under unlawful custody and murder them and other peaceful non-Muslim citizens in retaliation for the interference, unjust activities and aggressive advances of their countries. The one who does has no relation to Islam and the Holy Prophet (blessings and peace be upon him).

4. Q: The fourth and very significant question concerns rebellion: is armed struggle permissible against Muslim rulers to remove their governments because of their non-Islamic policies, or for the acceptance of demands, to bring them to the right path, or get them to give up their impious activities? Is rebellion permissible against the constitutional government, its writ and governance? What should be the legitimate way to change the rulers or make them mend their ways?

A: Islam is not merely a religion. It is a complete Deen, a code of life. Providing a complete set of principles for every walk of life, it has also made arrangements for the protection of the collectivity of society. The rights and duties of state institutions have manifestly and clearly been spelled out. All citizens of the Muslim state have been placed under obligation to abide by state laws, rules and regulations. One of these principles is that a Muslim state and society should be a paragon of peace and mutual coexistence. That is why Islam strictly prohibits the taking up of arms against a Muslim state, to challenge its authority and writ, and declare war against it. Islamic law holds such an action as rebellion. God forbid if such conditions are created, then it is the primary responsibility of an Islamic state to take urgent measures to eliminate rebellion with an iron hand and exterminate terrorism so that no individual or group can dare destroy the social harmony of society, ruin peace and shed innocent blood. Islam holds the peace and tranquillity of society in general, and of a Muslim state in particular, so dear that it does not allow people to raise the banner of revolt in the name of tackling injustice, oppression and other vices of the ruling elite. In the light of Prophetic traditions, the banner of rebellion against a Muslim state cannot be raised unless the rulers commit explicit, declared and absolute infidelity, and prevent the performance of religious rituals like prayer through the use of force.

The conditions leading to the forbiddance of rebellion in the light of the Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions and expositions of the jurists are evident. Referring to the holy Companions, their successors, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam Shafai, Imam Ahmad Bin Hanbal and other leading jurists, the fact has been brought to light that absolute consensus exists among all the leading jurists on the total forbiddance of rebellion against the Muslim state, and there is no difference of opinion between any schools of thought. Such a rebellion as challenges the writ of the state, and has been launched without the collective approval and sanction of society, is but a civil war, blatant terrorism and a clear act of strife. It can never be called Jihad under any circumstances. As for the struggle to reform some impious Muslim ruler or state, that is not at all prohibited or disallowed. The forbiddance of rebellion and armed struggle should not mean at all that an evil should not be called an evil and no effort be made to stop its spread, or the obligation of faith to bid good and forbid evil be abandoned. Certification of truth and rejection of falsehood is binding upon Muslims. Likewise, seeking to reform society and fight off evil forces is one of the religious obligations. The adoption of all constitutional, legal, political and democratic ways to reform the rulers and the system of governance, and stop them from the violation of human rights is not only lawful but also binding upon Muslims. Making efforts at the individual and collective levels to establish truth, and ending the reign of terror and oppression and restoration of a system of justice through appropriate means form part of the obligations of faith.

5. Q: The sect of the Khawarij is etched into the history of terrorism. The question arises: who were the Khawarij? What does the Islamic law ordain about them? Are the present day terrorists a continuation of the Khawarij?

A: The Khawarij were rebels and apostates of Islam. Their advent took place during the period of the Prophet Muhammad (blessings and peace be upon him). Their intellectual growth and organised emergence took place during the Caliphates of Usman (ra) and Ali (ra). The Khawarij were so punctual and regular in the performance of religious rituals and acts of worship that they would appear more pious than the holy Companions would at times. However, in keeping with the clear command of the Holy Prophet (blessings and peace be upon him), they were absolutely out of the fold of Islam. The Khawarij would regard the killing of Muslims as lawful, reject the Companions for their disagreement with them, and, raising the slogan 'there is no Command but Allah's', consider the launch of armed struggle against and the killing of Hazrat Ali (ra) as lawful. They would continue in perpetrating these heinous actions. The Khawarij were in fact the first terrorist and rebellious group that challenged the writ of the state and raised the banner of armed struggle against a Muslim state. The texts of Hadith clearly establish that such elements would continue to be born in every age. The term Khawarij is not meant merely to denote the group which took up arms against the rightly guided Caliphs, but it encompasses all those groups and individuals bearing such attributes, ideologies and terrorist ways of action who will continue to rear their head and perpetrate terrorism in the name of Jihad till the Day of Judgment. Despite being almost perfectionist in the performance of outward religious rituals, they would be considered as being out of the fold of Islam for their mistaken and misplaced ideology. A Muslim state cannot be allowed to give them any concession in the name of dialogue or stop military action without their complete elimination according to the explicit instructions of the Holy Prophet (blessings and peace be upon him). The only exception as to when they can be spared is that they lay down their arms, repent of their actions and vow to honour the state laws and writ of the Muslim state.

6. Q: What are the measures that the government and the ruling classes should take to put an end to mischief-mongering, terrorist activities and armed strife?

A: The government and the law enforcing agencies should, at the outset, remove all factors and stimuli that contribute to making the common man a

victim of doubt. Due to these factors, the ringleaders and the chieftains of terrorism are able to snare impressionable young people into changing their track and lead them to militancy. Exploiting their sentiments, they are able to prepare them for terrorist activities without much difficulty. The policies, events and circumstances the terrorist elements use as fuel for their evil agenda need to be remedied and set right as a priority. This will certainly help eradicate the root causes of the spread of this plague. Similarly, as long as the world powers, along with the Pakistani agencies, continue to neglect attending to the real hardships of people, removing their complaints and abandoning their deceptive policies, the restoration of real peace will remain merely a dream.

7. Q: Another important question under inquiry in various circles of society refers to a dilemma: can we justify as lawful the atrocities of terrorism if they are done with the intention of promoting Islam and to secure the rights of the Muslims?

A: The Khawarij, even today, invoke Islam and raise slogans to establish the Divine Order, but all of their actions and steps constitute a clear violation of Islamic teachings. When their supporters do not have any legal argument to defend the actions of the Khawarij, they draw the attention of people to the vices of the ruling elites and the oppression by foreign forces as a justification for their killing. They are content in the belief that although the terrorists are doing wrong, their intention is good beyond any doubt. This is a major intellectual faux pas and many people, both educated and uneducated, suffer from this doubt. An evil act remains evil in all its forms and content; whatever we may interpret as injustice, this principle remains the same. Therefore, no forbidden action can ever become a virtuous and lawful deed due to goodness of intention. Law in Islam applies to an action. The massacre of humanity, perpetration of oppression and cruelty, terrorism, violence and bloodshed on earth and armed rebellion and strife cannot become pardonable actions due to any good intention or pious conviction. Nor is there any place for deviation from this fundamental principle. Thus, this argument of the terrorists and their well-wishers is also false in the sight of Islamic law. Therefore, we begin our arguments with the clarification of the same issue that an evil deed cannot change into a pious deed due to any pious intention it supposedly arises from.

Good Intention can never change a vice into virtue

If a good intention gives rise to bloodshed and massacre, the question arises whether such tyranny and barbarism can be declared lawful on this basis. Some people think that although suicide explosions are atrociously evil, and that killing innocent people too is a monstrous crime, and spreading mischief and strife in the country is, again, a heinous act, while the destruction of educational, training, industrial, commercial and welfare centres and institutions is still a greater sin, the suicide bombers are doing this with good intention and pious motive. Therefore, they are justified. They are retaliating against foreign aggression against Muslims. They are carrying out a Jihad, and so, they cannot be given any blame. In this brief discussion, we shall analyse this thought in the light of the Qur’an and Sunna. The Qur’an rejected as disbelief the idol-worship that was carried out with the intention of attaining the nearness of Allah. We find a detailed account of this matter in the Qur’an and Sunna. Some of the holy verses are produced here to facilitate comprehension of the issue.

The Qur’an says:

“(Say to the people:) ‘Listen, sincere obedience and worship is only Allāh’s due. And those (disbelievers) who have taken (idols as) helpers other than Allāh (say in false justification of their idol-worship:) ‘We worship them only that they may bring us near to Allāh.’ Surely, Allāh will judge between them concerning the matter in which they differ. Certainly Allāh does not give him guidance who is a liar, very ungrateful.”

                                                                                                                 (Al-Qur’an, 2:39-3)

When the idolaters of Makka were asked the reason for idol-worship, they said the idols would bring them into Allah’s proximity. The intention to attain Allah’s nearness is good, but idol-worship is blasphemy and disbelief. Idolatry, therefore, cannot be justified because of good intention. Similarly, the terrorists’ claim of reformation too cannot be accepted because, through their actions, they demonstrate bloodshed and violence instead of constructive work and reformation. Allah Most High says:

“And among people there is also someone whose conversation seems to you pleasing in the life of the world and who calls Allāh to witness that which is in his heart, but in truth he is most quarrelsome. And when he turns away (from you), he runs about in the land to do (everything possible) to rouse mischief and destroy crops and life. And Allāh does not like mischief and violence. And when it is said to him (on account of this tyranny and violence): ‘Fear Allāh,’ his arrogance stimulates him for more sins. Hell is, therefore, sufficient for him. And that is indeed an evil abode.”

                                                                                                            (Al-Qur’an, 2:204-206)

These verses too describe that many people will make conversation, appearing pleasant in the arena of superficial arguments. They will swear on their good intentions, and declare Allah witness to their noble objectives and pious aims. Despite their assertions and testimonial claims, however, Allah has declared them miscreants and evil-mongers to face the torment of Hell. So their swearing on their intentions has been refuted because they are committing sheer acts of violence, strife and terrorism. Their crimes, therefore, cannot be forgiven due to their ‘good’ intentions and noble designs declared on oath. This is the basic principle drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic Law. These Qur’anic verses explain the same point:

“When it is said to them: ‘Do not spread disorder in the land,’ they say: ‘It is we who reform.’ Beware! (Truly) it is they who spread disorder, but they do not have any sense (of it) at all.”

                                                                                                              (Al-Qur’an, 2:11-12)

Here again the mischievous and criminal mentality has been described, and that the offenders never regard their activity as disruption, violence and strife; rather, they may call it Jihad and deeds of reconstruction and reformation. They presume that the tyrannous activities they perpetrate are aimed at the greater good of society. Today’s tragedy is that terrorists, murderers, mischief-mongers and rioters try to prove their criminal, rebellious, tyrannous, brutal and blasphemous activities as a right and a justified reaction to foreign aggression under the garb of the defence of Islam and national interests. They should know that, as good intention can never prove an unlawful act justified, pious designs can never prove blasphemy as righteousness, and virtuous objectives can never prove an impure act wholesome; that the intention to perform Jihad, in the same way, can never prove violence and terrorism lawful and permissible. The intention to protect Islam, to erect a defence against foreign aggression and avenge the wrongs and excesses inflicted upon the Muslim Umma is one thing, but the brutal mass murder of innocent citizens, destruction of civil property, ruthless target killings and the destruction of mosques and markets and businesses is altogether a different debacle. The former can never prove the latter lawful. The one has nothing to do with the other; there is no relevance and congruity between the two. Terrorism, carnage and mass destruction can never be justified in the name of any intention of enforcing Islamic commands and its judicial system. Nor can these reprehensible activities be any exception to the rule, or be overlooked, or forgiven. An in-depth study of the Qur’an and Hadith makes one resolutely establish that Islam declares the realisation of lawful objectives conditional upon lawful means only, the attainment of noble targets only through permissible ways and reaching sacred objectives by treading only the righteous paths. A sacred goal can never be achieved by following an evil and criminal path. Constructing a mosque, for example, is a pious act, but it cannot be proved lawful to do so by looting a bank. The objectives of mercy cannot be achieved through cruelty and oppression. The designs of an exalted and pious person cannot be materialised by adopting blasphemous methodology. In sum, good cannot be earned by evil means. Fair is fair and foul is foul. It is Satan who says, ‘fair is foul and foul is fair.’ This is the majesty and purity of the Deen (religion of Islam) that it has purified and reformed both the destination and its path. It has made both objective and method pure and upright.

The people who base their argument on the Hadith, ‘actions are judged according to intentions,’ in order to justify their brutal ways and cursed means, make false and heretic claims. They cannot set a wrong thing right. This Hadith signifies only those actions that are proven pious, permissible and lawful. Their acceptability has been based on trueness of intention. If the intention is pure, they will be accepted, or else they will be rejected. If the intention is not good, or the coveted intention does not exist, the actions will not be considered acts of worship, despite their apparent righteous value. They will be rejected or discredited. But the actions that are forbidden, unjust, unlawful and blasphemous cannot be made permissible or lawful or just and creditable by even extremely good intentions joined together. This is such a crucial Islamic principle and legal formula that not one of the Companions, pious predecessors, Imams, and authorities of Hadith and exegeses has departed from to date. Some scholars have also interpreted the Hadith, ‘actions are judged according to intentions,’ as pointing to the expression of deeds according to intentions, that the actions take shape according to the intentions. So a terrorist’s actions speak of his intentions. His killings and destructive activities refer to his foul intention and condemnable ideas and beliefs. His heinous actions cannot stem from pious intentions and beliefs. The bloodshed he causes refers only to a cruel man inside him and not any kind and merciful soul. It is, therefore, evident that whatever false implications and foul justifications these rebels, criminals, evil-mongers, tyrannous brutes may put forth to prove their atrocities as acts of Jihad, they have nothing to do with the teachings of Islam.

The Holy Qur’an has vividly described them in this verse:

“It is those whose entire struggle is wasted in worldly life, but they presume they are doing very good works.”

                                                                                                                   (Al-Qur’an, 18:104)

A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document

By Mohammed Ali Musawi, Quilliam, 2009

 (www.quilliamfoundation.org)

A NOTE ON TRANSLATION:

A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document is a translation of passages from the preface and introduction of the ‘Corrective Studies’ document which explain the authors’ intentions in writing the document and gives it much needed context. It also contains a translation of the authors’ summaries, which appear in the original Arabic at the end of each chapter to summarize the main points of the chapter, which we have included in full. Further, we have added footnotes where appropriate to explain religious concepts and ideas and comment on the salient themes of the passages. Finally, It is important to note that the authors have written the summaries in the form of short passages which we have not changed.

Translator’s Introduction:

In September 2009, the imprisoned leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a prominent jihadist group allied with al-Qaeda wrote and released a revision document over 400 pages long, in which they renounce the ‘use of violence to change political situations’. The revisions are the result of a reported two years of consultations with the Libyan government represented by the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation and headed by Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi.1 These consultations have facilitated the release of the document named Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Accountability and the Judgment of People, which is comprised of nine chapters dealing with varying issues including jihad, religious extremism and the judgment of people’s beliefs. The authors of the revisions are six of the most senior members of the LIFG in jail, namely: ‘Abd al-7akim Bal8aj a.k.a Abū ‘Abd Allah al-9ādiq (Emir of the LIFG), Abū al-Mundher al-Sā’īdī (Spiritual leader of the LIFG), ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Qāyed (The elder brother of Abū Ya8yā al-Lībī a leading member of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Khālid al-Sharif, Miftā8 al-Dūwdī and Mu:;afā Qanaifid. Their revisions are potentially important because the LIFG has not only been a key regional ally for al-Qaeda but also because of the strong organizational ties between the two groups and the direct connections some of the revisions’ authors have to al-Qaeda’s leadership. For example, Abū al-Mundher al-Sā’īdī has been praised on several occasions by Ayman al-`awāhirī, most recently in a recording released in August 2009 while another senior LIFG member, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Qāyed, is the elder brother of Abū Ya\yā al-Lībī, the public face of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and one of al-Qaeda’s most active ideologues. Previously, the most notable such revisions by a former jihadist was written by Dr. Fa[l, a former leading member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who launched a highly-personal attack on Ayman al-`awāhirī in 2007. However al-`awāhirī responded to this by accusing Fa[l of jumping “directly on the alleged mistakes in jihad without explaining the circumstances surrounding these mistakes” and using “an unscientific approach” in “presenting Islamic jurisprudence” among other criticisms about the personal nature of the attacks made by Dr. Fa[l. However, it seems that the LIFG leadership have taken `awāhirī’s criticism into account while writing their own revisions, making sure to put their own past actions into the context of ignorance and other circumstances they claim to be the reason for their errors. The LIFG also spent a considerable amount of time and exerted a great deal of effort in producing this highly detailed and methodically sound jurisprudential study which cannot be accused of having “an unscientific approach.” In addition, the LIFG have successfully avoided personalising the issue and do not mention another Jihadist group or personality by name in over 400 pages, making their revision document a considerable advance on Dr. Fa[l’s effort in some respects. However, it has been suggested that the document is “a very sweeping repudiation not just of salafi jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general”. This would seem to be an over-optimistic reading of the document. The LIFG’s refutation singularly fails to address many key theological issues which underpin salafi jihadist methods and tactics. For instance, while it rejects ‘the use of violence in changing political situations’ in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim, the document does not define the key factors, the nawāqidh al-Islam, which negate a person’s Islam and make him a disbeliever. In other words, the LIFG have not definitively tackled the concept of takfir which is the main theological trigger for attacks against other Muslims by salafi-jihadists. For example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recently justified their attempted assassination of Saudi deputy interior minister Prince Mu\ammad Bin Nayef by accusing the Saudi royal family of apostasy for ‘aiding the west and the enemies of Muslims against Muslims.’4 Among the nawāqidh, or signifiers of disbelief, that are typically cited by salafi-jihadists to legitimize such violence against governments in Muslim majority countries are:

• Ruling with something other than what Allah has revealed

• Replacing the sharī’a with other law

• Implementing the rules of ‘kufr’ and obeying the ‘kuffār’ in their legislation

• Taking the ‘kuffār’ as allies against Muslims.

Unfortunately, none of these issues have been mentioned either in the jihad chapter or the chapter dealing with the judgment of people’s beliefs, especially given that salafi-jihadists believe that these issues are grounds for legitimizing jihad against innocents and were the very grounds on which the LIFG was itself formed. Finally, any renouncement of violence by Jihadists and Islamists is a welcome first step, but unless the aforementioned points are answered in future ‘Corrective Studies’, counter terrorism specialists and Muslim communities should view this

revision with some scepticism.

LIFG Recantation Summary

PREFACE:

Allah has sent messengers over the centuries to humanity to preach and to warn, guiding the way and explaining humanity’s existence in this world; that they were not created frivolously and were not left without a guide. Every prophet told his people: “O my people! Worship God alone: you have no deity other than Him” (Q 7:59). Allah guided people through the messengers and others were miserable for their disbelief, and Allah wished to seal his messages to humanity with Mu\ammad bin ‘Abdullah who was sent to the whole of humanity, unlike the prophets and messengers before him who were sent to certain peoples. Thereafter, a clear sharī’a 1was sent to Mu\ammad so that people may be guided by it, and Allah said he would not accept any other religion from people: “Whoso desires another religion than Islam; it shall not be accepted of him” (Q 3:85). It was therefore natural that this religion that Allah revealed as a mercy to humanity would encompass everything that would benefit them in their affairs, in this life and the afterlife. The salaf 2 appreciated and firmly held on to this great religion, and spared no effort in spreading it with mercy and sympathy for people as they saw them lost in the darkness and manipulated by whims. Then the Muslim generations inherited this religion, holding on to it without doubt of its validity in every time and place, and through this religion they were elevated to the highest peaks, and when they carried its weight they became the leaders of people and guides to the world. Muslim progress continued throughout the ages until they changed themselves and neglected the orders of their Lord, so Allah changed their affairs and circumstances. The fate of this ummah  in its latter generations was that they be subject to the plots of their enemies from Christians and Jews and others who discovered the real strength of this ummah, so its lands were occupied and its wealth was plundered and its sacred symbols were desecrated in order for the ummah to remain subject in all its affairs. Further, the enemies of the ummah sowed the seeds of division and denied the ummah the tools to progress and imposed bounds and blockades, however none of these things would have affected the ummah were it firmly holding on to its religion and truly relied on God. But the forts of the Muslims were threatened from within due to ignorance of their religion and neglect of the orders of their Lord, in addition to their disunity and fragmentation therefore it was natural that this be their state today. Muslims today agree that salvation from their weakness will not be possible without the same thing that advanced their forefathers who liberated the hearts of people before liberating countries.

 Every Muslim who observes the weakness and relapse of the ummah will no doubt be weighed down with grief and sorrow and will try to raise his ummah, therefore many people who are zealous and enthusiastic have tried to contribute in one way or another to serve the religion and elevate their ummah, and because their endeavours were human, it was inevitable that they be tainted by error and imperfection. This was for many reasons, most notably a lack of religious guidance and inexperience among other reasons mentioned in this study. As a result, it was imperative upon the individual who discovers those errors and shortcomings either in himself or in others to fix and reform what he can, seeking the pleasure of Allah, and fearing his questioning on the Day of Judgement, and out of concern for the people of the community who might not have realised what he has. And it is for this reason and so that Allah may excuse us, and our desire to advise the ummah based on our personal experiences, we have written these jurisprudential studies that are directed at whoever might benefit from them. We have written it for every zealous Muslim who has been pained by the state of his battered ummah, who has seen how daring other nations have become with the ummah, who has heard the screams of its people as their lands have been plundered and their blood has been spilt in many countries from Palestine to Iraq to Afghanistan. We have written this for every Muslim who sees the disparity between what he recites in the Holy Book of Allah alongside his knowledge of the greats among his ummah, and the disturbing images he sees of some Muslims today. We have written it for every youth who has observed his religion and held on to it and wants to serve it and assist its progression without having the means to do so in the right place or in the most beneficial way for the ummah. We wrote it for every student of religious knowledge or dā’ī [propagator of religion] concerned with the guidance of people. We wrote it to every mujāhid concerned with the progression of his ummah, standing up against the plots of non-Muslims with his pen or tongue or wealth or weapon or prayer. We wrote it for anyone who we might have once had organisational or brotherly ties with and who wants to find out the summary of our experience and our convictions. We wrote it for every fair person who does not follow our religion and hears the distorted descriptions of our ummah and our religion.

INTRODUCTION:

It is no secret that those who have written these studies [Corrective Studies] have themselves previously written, papers and articles opposite in content to what is in the studies today, and that those who yesterday encouraged the taking up of arms to change political situations are today reminding people of its impermissibility and advising whomever takes their advice against it. How could this be possible? It is important that we answer this question for these studies to be understood in their correct context and for the studies to achieve their desired objectives. Change is undoubtedly a human trait, and it could be a sign of power or weakness depending on the nature of the change, its place, and reasons. Can this be the same for the change of religious understanding and conviction? The importance of this question lies in the identities of those who have written these studies (the members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in jail) who were not motivated by personal or material interests when they embarked on their journey. They were never bandits who took up arms for wealth or pleasure, nor did they do what they did out of ambitions of power or dominance, rather their premises were based on religious objectives and convictions reached by their personal ijtihād  believing that their religion had demanded those actions of them. Regardless of whether their beliefs were right or wrong, they firmly believed in them and the need to implement them on the ground, which they did and they sacrificed their time and youth in doing so. They saw the disparity between the state of Muslims today, people and their governments, and the ideal picture of Muslims, people and their governments in the ages of Muslim prosperity and elevation in the time of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. They saw that the nations of the East and the West were assaulting Muslim lands, and the ummah was weak and divided and they realised that this is because the ummah is distant from Allah’s religion, the religion that was the reason for the ummah’s initial progress. 

Further, they believed that there were religious obligations upon them, most importantly to seek to raise the ummah from the darkness of ignorance and the blackness of sin and the bleakness of perversion. And because reality is different to imagination and action is different to theorization, their path took a different direction. Their efforts could have been exerted in calling to Allah with wisdom and good advice, and they could have guided many. That would have been possible if their circumstances were different. However, that was not the case; reality had its role to play. The absence of ‘ulamā’ [scholars of religion] and adequate methods to spread religious knowledge and a scarcity of guides had a role to play in making the wrong choices, as did the lack of opportunities to serve the religion, to the extent that in some cases there was no room to do anything, narrowing down the possibility of choices. It is no surprise that the outcome of those circumstances was what indeed took place, and as for what should have happened; these studies have been written for exactly that. Islamic scholars past and present are agreed that a person should return to the truth whenever it appears to him and that returning to the truth is far better than insisting on falsehood. Given that our previous intentions were to seek the pleasure of Allah even though we might have strayed from the truth, can we now hesitate in holding onto the truth that has appeared to us? We took a path in the past knowing its difficulty and its strangeness in the eyes of people, and we did not listen to the critics and objectors at the time, so now that we see truth in a path other than that which we originally followed, is that path not more worthy of following? A person’s knowledge increases day after day, be it religious knowledge or life experience; a person’s circumstances dramatically change from one day to another and it is known among scholars that religious ijtihād is based on the knowledge of both religion and reality. Through our religious studies in addition to close scrutiny of our experiences over the years as well as our observations of our circumstances, we have reached the convictions which we have placed in these studies. By writing them we wanted to place clear guidelines for anyone who wants to take a path toward serving his religion and ummah. We wrote these studies in the knowledge that the premises our actions were based upon are latent in the hearts and minds of many in the Islamic resurgence today, and the circumstances that led to the actions carried out by us, might exist for them.

The summary of our experience is:

• The people of the resurgence will be in a good position so long as they refer to the trusted ‘ulamā’ in their affairs and actions, especially those matters that relate to the public interest of their country and ummah.

• The path to the ummah’s progression is long and requires a great deal of

patience and perseverance, and time and effort because the ummah did not get to its present retreat overnight, but it was due to many factors which

cannot be solved by hasty solutions or emotional outbursts.

• The ummah has major interests that we must recognise and protect like the unity of Muslims, their prestige, their stability, their security, the reputation of Islam etc. So if protecting these interests conflicts with interests of lesser importance then we should forego the latter.

• There are some religious duties which have the status of ‘objectives’ like the guidance of people and the spread of Islam, and some which have the status of ‘means’ which fulfil the objectives like enjoining good, forbidding evil, and jihad. Therefore we should not make the means objectives in themselves, or give them precedence over the objectives if they conflict.

CHAPTER 1 - THE COVENANT OF ISLAM AND HOW IT IS AFFIRMED

Islam is the final message and the Prophet of Islam, the seal of the prophets, has been sent to all peoples, and his ummah has been ordered to carry this message to others after him. Islam means surrender and compliance and the word is used for two denotations:

a To assign worship for Allah alone; this is the religion of all the prophets.

b The final religion that was brought by our prophet Mu\ammad. Islam is the greatest of Allah’s bounties upon Muslims, and the greatest gratitude

is for Muslims to convey it to others. Some ‘ulamā’ are of the opinion that Islam and īmān [belief] are the same thing, and others are of the opinion that they are different. Further, if one was mentioned the other would be included in its meaning, and the ‘ulamā’ added: the person who commits a major sin leaves īmān and remains within Islam, and does not become an unbeliever as the Kharijites claim.This disagreement about the relationship between Islam and īmān is accepted ijtihād that does not result in major effects, and, with either opinion, a Muslim who wants salvation on the Day of Judgement has to come with both Islam and īmān. Islam is affirmed for whoever has one or more of these three traits:

a To bear witness that there is no god but Allah and that Mu\ammad is the messenger of Allah, or something that takes its place like saying “I have become a Muslim” or “I am Muslim”.

b Denotation: which is every utterance or action or symbol that is specific to Muslims and distinguishes them from others, like prayer especially if a man was leading the prayer, or the athān [the call to prayer] as the abode of Islam is distinguished by it from the abode of polytheism, or the dress that is specific to Muslims and so on.

c Subjection to Muslim parents or one Muslim parent: the principle is that anyone born to two Muslim parents or one Muslim parent is Muslim, or the subjection to the abode of Islam for someone whose situation is unknown. It is incorrect to impose conditions that Allah has not permitted in accepting the Islam of someone who has one of the traits mentioned, like imposing learning the evidences of the mutakallimūn [scholastic theologians], or detailed knowledge in the meanings of taw\īd [the concept of monotheism in Islam], or the requirements of ‘la ilaha illallah’.16 Further, it is not permitted to inspect people’s beliefs and their conditions but we have to accept people at face value and Allah will deal with their intentions. Among the reasons of error in the above is confusing the roles of da’wah [propagation] and the judiciary or iftā’ [issuing religious edicts] and taking jurisprudential rulings from guidance sermons, or propagation articles, as well as the oversight of the fundamental differences between evidence [jurisprudential evidence from Qur’ān and \adīth] and reality, like comparing Muslim societies today to the jāhilī [pre-Islamic] society in Makkah at the advent of Islam. The importance of knowing the traits, which affirm Islam for the person who has them, lies in that knowing them protects a person from squandering the rights of his Muslim brethren. Further, that he does not take any matter relating to their wealth or honour lightly, and not knowing what affirms someone’s Islam might sometimes lead to shedding their blood, these are rights that have been made clear by the Qur’ān and the Prophet.

CHAPTER 2 - KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN THEORISATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Allah has assigned a great status and an elevated rank for knowledge and ‘ulamā’.Religious knowledge like other great matters cannot be attained without effort, hardship and patience and it is for that reason that the ‘ulamā’ used to suffer hardships in order to attain it, and their stories and biographies testify to this, so whoever wants to attain knowledge without pain and tiredness has taken a different path to that of knowledge. Islam has ordered the veneration and respect of ‘ulamā’ and has forbidden their disrespect as they are the bearers of this religion and the conveyers of the religion of God. The reverence and respect of ‘ulamā’ does not mean the belief that they are not prone to error or intolerant to opinions other than theirs, as they themselves do not claim that. The Muslim ummah is unanimous that there is no one who is infallible after the Prophet, and that infallibility is for the entirety of the ummah, as for its individuals, they are prone to err in theory and practice. Reverence of ‘ulamā’ does not mean following them in their errors, as truth is more deserving to be followed, and by following truth alone the religion is protected from error, all the while the ‘ulamā’ preserve their status and rank even if they were to err from time to time. The ‘ulamā’ have agreed to the impermissibility of following an ‘ālim [single of ‘ulamā’] to whomever the error of the ‘ālim becomes evident. Not everyone who thinks that an ‘ālim has erred is to refute what he thinks is an error, and it is only for someone who is qualified, like another ‘ālim to do so.

Numerous have been the things that unlearned people thought were errors of ‘ulamā’ when they were not. Speaking in the name of the religion of God without knowledge is forbidden in sharī’a and is a major sin, and many great tribulations and perversions occur as a result, and Allah has warned against this in His Book and through his Prophet The ‘ulamā’ have placed conditions upon people who speak in the name of religion whether by practising ijtihād or issuing fatwas, and it is not permissible for whoever does not meet the conditions to deduce religious rulings from their sources. The sharī’a has given sincere ‘ulamā’ many attributes which distinguish them from others, so ‘ulamā’ must typify those attributes so that they and their work may have an effect on people. A great duty is upon the ‘ulama’ of the ummah in guiding the people of the ummah and spreading knowledge amongst them and lighting the path for them, and they are required to preserve its identity more than anyone else, much more than its people, and spread virtues and forbid evils and to nurture the ummah to be charitable and pious. We finally say:

The lack of religious knowledge whether it was a result of an absence of ‘ulamā’,or the neglect of people in receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious violations. These violations can be apparent sins which take place due to a lack of knowledge and education or the dominance of desires or the scarcity of guidance and admonition, or they can be religious errors that people commit due to a lack of knowledge, thinking that they are doing things that sharī’a has commanded them to do. So if a split between the ‘ulamā’ and the observant youth, or an exchange of accusations or an absence of reverence for ‘ulamā’ or an error from ‘ulamā’ in embracing the youth occurs, it will only make matters worse.

CHAPTER 3 – da’wah [CALLING TO ALLAH]

Da’wah is the function of messengers and their followers and it is one of the greatest actions which brings proximity to Allah. Da’wah is fard kifāyah  upon the general ummah and it is required of every Muslim according to his circumstances, and it is not specific to a group excluding another or an individual excluding another, and every Muslim is required to convey what he knows to people. The purpose of da’wah is to announce the religion of Allah to people, and establish the proof upon them, and teach them the tenants of their religion and elevate them educationally and spiritually and increase goodness and vitality in the ummah. The means of da’wah are many and sophisticated according to time and place. The means to da’wah are also various, as there are actions that an individual can carry out and those that a group of people carry out like organizations, institutions and bodies and there are those that governments carry out. There are ethics and morals that a dā’ī [propagator who carries out da’wah] to Allah must observe. Aside from the fact that they are among the ethics and morals that Islam has encouraged and commanded that people abide by, they are the means to the acceptance of the da’wah and not avoidance of it. There is a big difference between the function of a dā’ī and that of a mufti or a judge, and not distinguishing between a function and another results in many negative effects. Most of the concepts mentioned are known theoretically, but many errors occur in their implementation, and the flaws occur due to the absence of the precise concepts of the jurisprudence of da’wah, whether in terms of arranging priorities or consideration to the circumstances of people or not gradually educating people about the teaching of Islam or other things.

CHAPTER 4 – JIHAD FOR THE SAKE OF ALLAH

Jihad [the term] when used denotes exertion of capacity in fighting for the sake of Allah directly or indirectly. However, its grades are a lot wider than that, as it has thirteen grades, among which are the jihad of the self and the shay_an [devil] and the non-belivers and the hypocrites, and included in that is the jihad via the word written or spoken. The reduction of jihad to fighting with the sword is an error and shortcoming. Jihad [in all its forms] is the peak of Islam’s summit, and the people of jihad are the most glorious in this life and the afterlife, but that is dependent upon being confined to the rules and ethics of jihad. Jihad is fard kifāyah, and if carried out by a sufficient amount of people, does not remain obligatory on the rest. It is an obligation in certain places for example where non-believers invade a Muslim country then it is upon the people of that country to push back the enemies and expel them from their land, and if they are unable to do so, it is upon the people who neighbour them. Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan are amongst the places of jihad today. It is not permissible to leave for jihad that is fard kifāyah without the permission of the parents and the lender [someone you owe money to], as well as it being impermissible to insult those who have not left for it. There are ethics and morals to jihad, among which are: that the jihad is for the sake of Allah, and the proscription of killing women, children, the elderly, monks, wage earners (employees), messengers (ambassadors), merchants and the like. Also among the ethics and morals of jihad is the proscription of treachery, the obligation to keep promises, the obligation of kindness to prisoners of war, the proscription of the mutilation of the dead and the proscription of hiding spoils from the leader. Adherence to these ethics is what distinguishes the jihad of Muslims from the wars of other nations that do not give any weight to ethics

The opinion of the ‘ulamā’ of Ahlul Sunnah [Sunni] has settled upon the impermissibility of resorting to arms in order to change political situations (khūrūj) after the old disagreement in the matter, once they witnessed its harms and recounted its proscription in the books of jurisprudence and belief. Fighting because of sectarianism or tribalism or social position and fighting for the dunya [worldly matters] or power falls under the fighting of fitna. It is obligatory in every fight that erupts between Muslims in addition to not participating in it to endeavour to mediate between the fighting parties, in application of the verse: ‘Hence, if two groups of believers fall to fighting, make peace between them’ (Q 49:9).

The legitimate alternatives to using violence for reform and change are enjoining good and forbidding evil and da’wah. We note that the fighting that takes place in Muslim lands is of three kinds:

a Fighting the foreign colonialist if he invades one of the Muslim countries.

b The fighting of fitna.

c To fight against the rulers to change political situations or reform, and we have mentioned our opinion in this matter that it is religiously impermissible to use violence for reform or change in Muslim countries, and we explained on many occasions in this study this ruling with its evidences and they can be summarized in:

a The religious texts and evidences that indicate fighting against the governors and rulers to be forbidden, and we have mentioned the statements and interpretations of the salaf.

b The historical examples which Ahlul Sunnah have agreed upon: the impermissibility of fighting rulers and governors, and their agreement that patience and calling to Allah and enjoining good and forbidding evil is the correct way.

c The restrictions on forbidding evil: which we clarified to a larger extent in the (enjoining good) section, in which we mentioned the clear sayings of the scholars which state the proscription of using violence to forbid evil and that it is only for the ruler or whoever he appoints, and it is not permissible for individual citizens.

CHAPTER 5 - fiqh al-khilāf [RULES OF DISAGREEMENT], ITS FORMS AND ādāb [ETHICS]

There is ijmā’ [consensus among ‘ulamā’] that the sharī’a forbids disunion,

conflicts and schisms, and it calls for unity and coalition. Further, the unity of Muslims is one of the general objectives of sharī’a which Muslims must consider. Religious khilāf [disagreement] amongst Muslims is a reality that has existed since the age of the Prophet and will continue to exist as long as Allah wills it. Some of these differences are permitted and others are not. The Islamic sharī’a has laid down precise guidelines to distinguish unacceptable khilāf from permitted khilāf, and it has also laid down guidelines to deal with those who adopt both kinds of khilāf. In matters of ijtihād there is no disapproval of a divergence in opinion, as the sharī’a did not anticipate resolving this type of khilāf, and the ‘ulamā’ continue to disagree on many matters since the time of the Companions [the first generation of Muslims] yet they do not disapprove of one another. Khilāf in ijtihād should not prevent the unity of the hearts and cohesion in the ranks of Muslims, but rather the variance of ijtihād should be a factor of expansion and strength for the Muslims and not weakness and fragmentation. Ignorance of adāb al-khilāf and in distinguishing between when khilāf is permitted and when it is not can cause [the ignorant person] to limit himself and others, lead to arguments and result in distorting the image of da’wah and repel people from it. An absence of this understanding might make a dā’ī or a student to wrong someone or diminish their value whether they be a scholar or someone else, like another dā’ī or student. There is no doubt that oppression and fragmentation are among the greatest reasons for disappointment and lack of tawfīq [success granted by Allah] and it brings the anger of Allah. The salaf did not have a habit of following irregular matters and stirring disagreements. Jurisprudential khilāf was never a reason to stir strife in Muslim communities in the time of the salaf. ‘Ulamā’ (‘ulamā’ of every age) are the ones responsible for the management of every khilāf and they have to guide the lay people. The methods of Ahlul Sunnah in dealing with someone with an opposing opinion should be spread. The objective is to learn how to disagree in all of these cases whilst maintaining affection and unity as the Companions did. An observer of the reality of life for Muslims today does not need lots of reasoning to see the importance of understanding ādāb al-khilāf. The reality of Muslims and their fragmentation is clear and apparent, and there have been many disagreements that originated from a matter of ijtihād that the salaf had the capacity to understand whilst maintaining the spiritual bond between each other. We wrote this section with an eye to the aversion and indifference between uslims that occurs because of an absence of ādāb al-khilāf.

The absence of understanding the ādāb al-khilāf has many adverse effects including:

• Sectarian, ideological, methodical and jurisprudential fanaticism and narrow mindedness in accepting other opinions and accusing others of deviation and error and maybe innovation or debauchery or apostasy.

• The appearance of psychological barriers and sensitivities between dā’īs and their followers and between other lay Muslims.

• The abstinence of youth from acquiring knowledge from ‘ulamā’ due to differing with them in some matters of ijtihād. We will mention a great deal more in detail in the section of extremism in religion. Knowing ādāb al-khilāf in our opinion is a big factor in the cohesion of Muslim societies and a strength in building unity amongst its people, as well as it being a reason for enriching the sphere of jurisprudence with variety, regeneration and development. This makes Islamic jurisprudence encompassing of all developments in any one country or the whole of the ummah, which is the opposite of what happens if the propagators and students of religious knowledge do not accept other opinions and forbid them.

CHAPTER 6 - EXTREMISM IN RELIGION

Extremism in religion is exceeding the permitted limits with the addition or ejection of religious acts and beliefs, and it is reprehensible in sharī’a and contrary to the nature of this religion, which based its rules on ease to alleviate the difficulties of life. Extremism is a reality existing amongst all nations [Muslim and non-Muslim] and is not specific to one nation. Some of the reasons for extremism are: the prevalence of sins in Muslim societies, an absence of a correct understanding of religion and reality, emotional reactions, unqualified people taking the lead and the absence of comprehensive education among others. Some of the manifestations of extremism are severity upon self and others, severity in objecting to taqlīd [emulation which is the opposite of ijtihād], wronging those who have a differing opinion, aversion toward ‘ulamā’ and insulting them amongst others. Curing extremism on an individual level or the general level is easily accomplished because many of those who fall into extremism of a certain kind have a genuine intention and desire for good but have taken a wrong path, the remedy of this is very easy if the correct methods were followed which are looking at the causes and solving them.

CHAPTER 7 - al-ma^āli\ [THE INTERESTS] AND al-mafāsid [CAUSES OF HARM]

The ‘ulamā’ have agreed that the Islamic sharī’a has general objectives that are intended to achieve the best interests of people and to protect them from harm. It is also known that consideration for the objectives of sharī’a, and the ma^āli\ and the mafāsid has a solid connection to the juristic ruling whether it be in the deduction, legislation or application of the ruling. The objectives of sharī’a and the ma^āli\ are not the same, but differ according to scriptural evidence. The sharī’a is dedicated to achieving interests and preventing harm as much as possible, which is why the discipline of balancing the interests and the harms is needed if they conflict. ‘Ulamā’ have laid down many principles that regulate rulings relating to the objectives of sharī’a and the ma^āli\ and mafāsid, the absence of which would result in many violations.

CHAPTER 8 - ENJOINING GOOD AND FORBIDDING EVIL

Enjoining good and forbidding evil is one of the greatest characteristics of this ummah that is blessed with the mercy of Allah, and the reason for it being the best amongst nations, as well as it being the fort that protects the ummah from deviations. Enjoining good and forbidding evil is also the reason this ummah has avoided the anger of Allah, and as long as it enjoins good and forbids evil it is protected from being included in Allah’s punishment. Enjoining good and forbidding evil is fard kifāya upon the ummah. If some undertake it, the obligation is removed from the others except for certain occasions. Renouncing evil with the heart [to hate the evil act] is an obligation upon whoever sees it, as for by word and deed, it is dependent on ability and the benefit that it incurs. The merit of enjoining good and forbidding evil is very great and the reward for the person that undertakes it is great as well, which is why the salaf used to compete in undertaking it. There are conditions and ethics that guide a Muslim who enjoins good and forbids evil, like doing what he orders others to do, being friendly in his orders, and considering the outcomes of his orders. The ‘ulamā’ have placed conditions for evil that should be changed which we have mentioned, the most prominent of which are that there is no renouncement of matters of ijtihād and the evil must be apparent and present to be changed. Enjoining good and forbidding evil is like good food for the body, whenever it is possible to increase it with its conditions it would be good to do so, because it brings about welfare and develops kindness and spreads virtues. Forbidding evil is like a medicine which a person only uses enough to treat the defect and resolve the problem, so what can be treated by the word does not require the intervention of the deed and so on.

Changing evil has many levels, the least of which is renouncement of evil in the heart, which is done when there is no ability to do anything else. A condition to changing evil is that it does not result in a greater evil than the one changed, and a condition to enjoining good is that it does not miss a greater good or else it is not legitimate. It is not obligatory for a Muslim to exert effort to find evils, look for them, and spy on people to know their affairs and whoever does that has committed a sin. However, a Muslim should forbid evil that is apparent to him in accordance with the conditions which we have mentioned in this section. Using violence to change evil under any pretext is forbidden except for the ruler or whom he deputizes to do so, and the statements of ‘ulamā’ are elaborate on this matter, and evils that result from this [violence] are apparent and undeniable whether in the past or present.

CHAPTER 9 - THE JUDGMENT OF PEOPLE’S BELIEFS

The discussion of religious rulings concerning the judgment of people as innovators or depraved or unbelievers is considered very dangerous, which is why many Prophetic \adīths forbid haste in the matter. Further, the ‘ulamā’ clearly warned of hastily issuing judgments due to the great effects it has upon the public and private lives of Muslims, and ignorance of this results in erroneous practices which are far from sharī’a. The judgment of a person as being an apostate is not due to a whim or opinion or reasoning or a result of enmity and so on. It is a religious matter that is subject to controls and conditions, and it is not permitted to make such a judgment with the absence of those conditions. The errors that take place when judging the mukallaf  are many. They are the result of a lack of religious knowledge or of people not qualified to take charge of the affairs of Muslims. Among the reasons for these errors:

• Inference of ruling for some Muslims from what was intended for original

non-believers.

• Not differentiating between minor and major disbelief.

• Not differentiating between the disbelief of a form or genus and the disbelief of a specific individual.

• Ignorance of the conditions and deterrents of issuing judgments and subsequently issuing judgments without consideration of the conditions and

the deterrents.

• Mixing religious roles and not distinguishing between the role of propagators and the roles of judges and scholars

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