Pathways to Jihad: A Thematic Analysis of 310 Cases

By Kacper Rekawek, Viktor Szucs,Martina Babikova and Katsiaryna Lozka

Counter Extremist Project, GLOBSEC Policy Institute

For the last year and a half, GLOBSEC has been studying the phenomenon of a crime-terror nexus in Europe.1 Its research team has built up a dataset of 348 individuals arrested for terrorism off ences, expelled for alleged terrorist connections, or who died while staging terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015, the peak year of European jihadism. The dataset covers the 11 European countries, all within the EU, who reported the highest number of terrorism arrestees to EUROPOL (European Police Office).

The work has been geared towards establishing whether the nexus exists and if so, then researching its nature and strength.3 The researchers deployed 11 experienced national teams who worked on available data (open source, offi cial documents, personal interviews with stakeholders) to map out the European crime-terror nexus. The main research tool is a 120+ variable code book deployed to analyse each case of a terrorist included in our dataset.

As a result, the research team was able to establish that out of the 310 jihadists  included in

the database, 95, or 31%, had a previous criminal past, indicated by a pre-2015 arrest for any off ence, with the French subset recording the most criminals (44 of the individuals, or 46%, have a criminal past preceding their terrorist involvement). Data show it is a male phenomenon, comprising 264, or 88%, of the individuals in our database. The European jihadists are not youngsters, as their average age is 34 (average male: 29; average female: 34; average “criminal turned terrorist”: 34), nor are they very well educated (the research team only knows of 72 who “had some high school” experience, and hardly any attended university). More than 53% had been unemployed in 2015 (with this fi gure rising up to 70% in the “criminals turned terrorists” subset).

Reference:

https://www.globsec.org/news/pathways-of-radicalization-of-european-jihadis/

Time To Recall and Refute the Tahrik-e-Balakot, the First Jihadist Movement in the Indian Subcontinent

New Age Islam 

28 February 2019

New Age Islam has reproduced timely pieces on the Balakot-based jihadist movements which can be traced back to 1831 when the two Indian Sunni-origin Wahhabi clerics, Syed Ahmed Rai Barelvi Maulana Ismail Dehlawi were killed in a battle with the army of the Sikh emperor Ranjit Singh. In his article, Uday Mahurkar rightly points out that “Balakot’s symbolic and sentimental value for terror outfits, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), has been there for almost two centuries now”.

Even the prominent Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal wrote in her book “Partisans of Allah” that Balakot has been a site of great veneration not only for the Pak nationalists but also for the jihadists. At Balakot, Syed Ahmed Rai Barelvi and his 1300 hundred jihadist followers were slain to pieces. Part of the reason is that it houses the grave of the foremost jihadist ideologue in the Indian subcontinent: Syed Ahmed Rai-Barelwi.

The reason why Syed Ahmad who is greatly venerated as ‘shaheed’ (Islamic martyr) is that he went all the way from Rae Bareli of Uttar Pradesh (India) to Balakot through Balochistan and Afghanistan was to urge the Pashtuns to battle against the Sikh rulers whom they considered kafirs.

But when we closely look at Maulvi Syed Ahmad 'Shaheed' Rai Barelvi’s movement of jihad originally known as the ‘Tahrik-e-Balakot’, as several historians and contemporary scholars have noted, Rai Barelvi was not a freedom fighter. He was actually the chief exponent of the imported Wahhabism in India, an avid adherent of combatant and physical jihadism in place of spiritual jihad which the Sufis called jihad al-nafs or the struggle against the baser instincts and carnal desires. Even Rai Barelvi’s himself, in his earlier days, drew inspiration from the Sufi orders (silsilahs) like Naqshbandiyah, Chishtiyah and Qadriyah. But after he met the Wahhabi patrons in Saudi Arabia during his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1821, he was impressed by the Wahhabi clerics of the Arab peninsula. This dramatic conversion from Sufism to Wahhabism is evidenced in his famed book “Sirat e Mustaqeem” (straight path) in which he devoted an entire chapter to purge Sufism of the ‘cultural confluences’ and replace it with the same doctrines that were laid out in Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab's “Kitab al-Tawheed” (The Book of Monotheism). Similarly, his lieutenant cleric, Ismail Dehlwi wrote the book “Taqwiyat-ul-Iman” (Strengthening of the Faith) in order to castigate the Indianisation of Islam which was happening through the confluence of Sufism with the practices of India’s non-Muslims. Both the above books are taught today in not only the Salafi curriculums of the Ahle Hadis but also in most madrasas affiliated to Darul Uloom Deoband for at least 150 years.

Both Rai-Barelwi and Islami ‘Shaheed’ declared all mystically inclined Indian Muslims ‘polytheists’ (mushrik) with their beliefs and practices as antithetical to the pristine Islam. But deplorably, let alone the Wahhabised Indian madrasas, even the Islamic studies departments of a great many central and state universities in India portray Rai Barelvi and Ismail ‘Shaheed’ as the ‘leading figures of Islam in India’. This is being taught in their text books and the syllabi under the subjects of “Islamic movements” (Islami Tahrikaat) and “Islamic doctrines” (Islami Aqaid). For instance, the department of Islamic studies in Jamia Millia Islamia, a central university recommends the book written by Sheikh Muhammad Ikram, himself inspired by Rai-Barelvi, “Mauj-e-Kausar, Musalmanon Ki Mazhabi Aur Ilmi Tarikh Ka Daur-e-Jadid' (a history text book also included in many Wahhabi-Deobandi madrassas) as classical reference for India’s Islamic history. This book includes the texts written in glorification of the two jihadist ideologues— Syed Ahmed Rai Barelvi Maulana Ismail Dehlawi.

Beside the systematic bid to purge Indian Muslims of the inclusive, pluralistic and composite ethos, Rai-Barelwi the most conspicuous job in his ‘Mujahidin movement’ against the Sikhs of Punjab. Sheikh Muhammad Ikram writes about the tahrik-e-jihad launched by Rai-Barelvi under the sub-title in his book “Jihad”, in a detailed and descriptive manner. He notes: “Having reached his hometown, he [Rai Barelvi] began his full preparation for the jihad against the Sikh community and sent Maulana Ismail Shaheed and Maulana Abdul Hayy across the country to preach the cause of this jihad”… “On 17th January (1826), Maulana left Rai Bareli for his trip to Jihad. At that time, he had 5-7 thousand Indians with him, who were fully prepared for the jihad for the religious freedom of the Muslims in Punjab. They were well-determined to lay down their lives for this cause. Passing through Gawaliyar, Tonk, Ajmer, Marwar, Hyderabad, Sindh, Shikar Pur and Qandhar, the Maulana reached Kabul, from where he ventured into Peshawar via Khaibar”. (Mauj-e-Kausar, by Sheikh Muhammad Ikram, pp. 24-25, published by Adabi Duniya, Matia Mahal, Delhi).

Throughout his entire life, Rai-Barelwi remained active in his call for the religious puritanism in the entire subcontinent of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In fact, he is an apt example of how many Sufi Sunni scholars, who were at some time essentially inclusive because of their adherence to the Sufi orders, drastically changed their worldview and espoused exclusivist religious ideas. More astonishingly, this group of Islamist scholars in India left more active, impacting and prevailing ideology in the subcontinent than even the inclusivist Sufis who had originally introduced Islam to its people. Their adherents are far more energetic and practical than those who make tall claims to uphold the all-embracing cause of Indian Sufi saints.

Apparently, Syed Ahmad’s Mujahidin movement is now an age-old history for Indian Muslims, but many still get influenced by his religious exhortations for jihad as “an act of worship greater than spiritual prayer in merit and rewards”. Therefore, a movement of revival of Rai Barelvi’s Mujahidin movement is on the rails in the subcontinent as proclaimed by a number of extremist jihadist outfits.

For instance, in February 2011, the emir of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S) party Maulvi Samiul Haq stressed ‘the need for revival of the Mujahidin movement of Syed Ahmed Shaheed Rai Barelvi’ against a religious minority in Pakistan, the Sikh community. Maulvi Samiul Haq argued that “the objectives of the jihad launched by our Islamic leader Syed Ahmed Shaheed against the British rule and the Sikhs in the 19th century have yet to be achieved”.

Today, the biggest irony is that the common perception among the Islamic studies students is that Rai-Barelwi was a freedom fighter. But the irrefutable historical accounts state that Rai Barelvi fought against the Sikhs rather than the British. In fact, Rai Barelvi’s armed disciples did not even declare Jihad against the British. The ‘Mujahidin movement’ was not the struggle against British imperialism. It was rather a religiously and politically motivated militancy against the Indian Sikh rulers.But with a willful ignorance of the ideological implications of the Mujahidin movement in the Islamic studies curriculums, students are not asked to study it in an objective and critical manner and, therefore, they end up glorifying the so-called “Shaheed” scholar of Islam.

Only a few Islamic scholars did a critical analysis of this first jihadist movement in India. A remarkable research work in this direction was produced by a contemporary classical Islamic scholar, Maulana Dr. Khushtar Noorani who authored a highly cited research work titled, “Tahreek-e-Jihad Aur British Government: Ek Tahqeeqi Mutala” (The jihad movement and the British government: A research study). This book came up with an entirely different perspective on the Mujahidin movement of Rai-Barelvi. Much against the sweeping statements and writings of the Wahhabi-Deobandi historians, he arrives at the conclusion that Rai Barelvi’s movement was not aimed at challenging the British imperialism; rather it was an armed militancy against the Sikh community of Punjab. He clearly states in this book that Syed Ahmad or his jihadi faction did not contribute to the freedom movement of India at all.

According to the Pakistani Studies text book which is taught in Class Nine, Rai Barelvi’s Mujahidin movement was started against the Sikh community. He came to Sindh in 1826 and sought to help Syed Sibghatullah Shah who sent a strong contingent of staunch followers called “Hurs”.The book continues: “Syed Ahmed Shaheed left his family under the protection of Pir Pagara and proceeded towards Jihad without any worry about his family. He reached Nowshehra after passing through Afghanistan, the Khyber Pass and Peshawar in December 1826 and made it his headquarter. The first battle against the Sikhs was fought on December 21, 1826 near Akora. The Sikhs were defeated. The second battle was fought at Hazro. It was also won by the Muslims. These victories inspired a number of Pathan tribes to join Jihad Movement. The number of Mujahideen rose to 80,000. Syed Ahmed Shaheed Barelvi was given the status of 'Amir-ul-Momineen'. Islamic laws were enforced in the area which was controlled by Syed Ahmed Shaheed Rai Barelvi”.

The epithet of "Rai-Barelvi" denotes that Ismail Ahmad belonged to the northern Indian town of Rai Bareilly, not to be confused with the current headquarters of the Barelvi school of thought propounded by Maulana Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi, also known as Ala Hazrat(1856-1921).

Reference:

http://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-and-jihad/new-age-islam-special-correspondent/time-to-recall-and-refute-the-tahrik-e-balakot,-the-first-jihadist-movement-in-the-indian-subcontinent/d/117882

Radicalised Jihadists Have Done Untold Damage to Islam’s Image

The Economist

Feb 14th 2019

No place in Europe has done more to nurture Europe’s jihadists than the quaint neighbourhood of Molenbeek in Brussels. Some of its youth planned the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the suicide-bombings in Brussels five months later. Molenbeek is now quiet, but Johan Leman, a veteran social worker who knew one of the bombers, finds the lull almost more unnerving than the attacks. Since the jihadists first appeared in the 1990s, he twice thought they had gone, but they struck again years later and more violently than before. “They are incubating again,” he says.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims is law-abiding and has no truck with Islamic State (is). Of the 30m of those who live in the West, just 7,000 joined the terrorist organisation’s battles abroad. Even fewer perpetrated violence in Europe. Yet militant groups like is have a disproportionate influence on how the West sees Muslims. An opinion poll by Pew in 2017 found that is caused more concern in the West than any other international issue, above climate change and the global economy. A tiny radicalised fringe group is tarring Islam in the West with an undeserved brush.

Jihadism has its origins in the liberation struggles against Western colonialism in the Middle East. Religious leaders in Algeria, Libya and Palestine waged jihads against their French, Italian and British overlords in the 19th and 20th centuries. Defence of Islam was just one of the reasons militants picked up arms to push out the West. Once the foreign armies had gone, those hostilities faded. From the 1950s onwards Western governments and Islamists had a common foe: the pro-Soviet nationalist regimes that took power in the Middle East. In the 1980s they joined forces to remove the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Back then Abdullah Azzam, the founder of al-Qaeda, an army of predominantly Arab Islamist volunteers in Afghanistan, got an American visa to tour America’s mosques to raise funds for jihad. After Osama bin Laden took the helm, many of his henchmen found asylum in Europe. But the relationship soured. Soon after the Soviets had left, American forces moved into Saudi Arabia to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Allies became enemies again, culminating in the attacks of September 11th 2001 when al-Qaeda used hijacked planes to fell the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon in Washington, dc. America declared war on terror, invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and attracted a fresh generation of recruits to confront them. Al-Qaeda spread underground.

In 2014 is swept the heartlands of the Middle East, mesmerising Muslims and non-Muslims alike with the speed and barbarity of its victories. Al-Qaeda had been focused on getting the West out of Muslim lands and ending its support for Arab dictators it deemed apostates and stooges. is tried to carve a “caliphate” out of the Middle East’s failed states as a base and prepared for global expansion. Its view of the world, rooted in classical texts, was beguilingly simple. Those it had conquered were dar al-Islam (the territory of Islam). Those yet to be conquered were dar al-harb (the territory of war). Through multiple channels, from pulpits to social media, it launched a worldwide call for support.

This ideological shift triggered a clear change in recruitment. Al-Qaeda had aspired to create an intellectual elite and its disciples were almost all Arabs. is appealed to all Muslims. Their first task was to cement the caliphate. Those who could should make the hijra, or flight to the new state, emulating the followers of the Prophet Muhammad who left pagan-ruled Mecca for a new Islamic state in Medina. Those who were unable to make the journey should fight behind enemy lines.

The Romance of Radicalism

For a small, radicalised segment of the Muslim population, ISIS had a magnetic appeal. A disproportionately large number of this group came from the West. Muslims in Western Europe account for only 1.5% of the world’s total Muslim population of 1.8bn, but made up more than a sixth of the 30,000 foreign fighters who joined is after its declaration of the caliphate in 2014. Terrorism experts estimate that one-third of the total have been killed, one-third are still at large and, worryingly, one-third have returned to their home countries. Still, the vast majority of is attacks in Europe and America were carried out by Muslims who had never been to Syria or Iraq but chose to fight from home. Of 455 jihadist terrorists, 70% were citizens of the countries where they perpetrated the attacks, and half were native-born.

Earlier jihads, in Algeria and Bosnia in the 1990s, had taken place on Europe’s doorstep. The number of supporters they attracted were smaller, but for some young Muslims they promised adventure and heroism, akin to the Spanish civil war which drew European romantics in the 1930s. “I don’t see myself as an extremist,” says Ismail Royer, an American who converted to Islam and went to fight in Bosnia and Kashmir. “I see myself as having been naive, romantic, a Don Quixote kind of guy.” He renounced violence while in jail in America and now works for a Washington-based NGO promoting religious freedom.

Mr Royer had been radicalised by jihadist preachers who were born in America but had grown up in the Middle East and later returned with a new ideology. Others were swayed by Arab veterans of the Afghan war who won asylum in the West in the 1990s. France also unwittingly played a part in disseminating the ideology. It feared that the Algerian civil war then in progress might spread to Muslims with Algerian roots in France. After two jihadist attacks, including one in Paris in 1994, it arrested many of its barbus, or beards, causing an exodus to Belgium, Germany and Britain.

Although al-Qaeda had little interest in Western Muslims, other Islamist groups courted them. Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Liberation Party, was born in Palestine in the 1950s, but acquired a mass following in Britain and Denmark with its call to restore a global caliphate. An offshoot, al-Muhajiroun, more openly espoused violence. Its charismatic preachers packed London’s 8,000-seat Wembley Arena, urging followers to boycott Western democracies and eschew secular lifestyles as a manifestation of Kufr (unbelief). Other conservative schools, such as the Salafists, were less political and mostly rejected violence, but advocated keeping away from non-Muslims. Some Salafist scholars spread hate of non-Muslims of all kinds.

In some parts of Europe such teaching dovetailed with an already divided society. But it had broader reach, too. Unlike the foreign-run mosques of the first generation, it packaged Islam in the vernacular. On the pretext of recovering the pristine faith of the Prophet, Salafists purged the first generation’s traditional customs that second-generation Muslims, and converts raised in the West, found so alienating.

“They offered Islam for those who had no tradition,” says Azhar Majothi, a British Muslim scholar of Salafism at Nottingham University. Kubra Gumusay, a German Muslim writer, concurs. “Religious identity was often used by native-born Muslims as a tool to dissociate themselves from the ethnic identities of their parents,” she notes. In particular, it liberated girls constrained by their parents’ traditions. Many teenage girls were driven to is’s caliphate abroad by dreams of female activism, as well as the desire to escape arranged marriages. Some 17% of Europe’s foreign fighters were women.

An assertive Islamic identity particularly appealed to second-generation Muslims who did not feel quite at home with Western ways. “They were rebelling against both their parents and society,” says M’hammed Henniche, a communal leader in Saint Denis, a suburb of Paris.

Not many preachers openly advocated violence in the West, and many Salafists opposed breaking the law. But when is surfaced, it found a constituency whose ear could be tuned to their message. Second-generation migrants had already perpetrated several attacks. In 2004 Mohammad Bouyeri, a Dutch-born Berber Islamist, killed Theo van Gogh, a film-maker who produced documentaries criticising Islam. The note left on his body read, “Europe, you’re next.” In 2005 three second-generation British Muslims and a convert blew themselves up on London’s public-transport system, killing 52.

Half of the jihadists who carried out attacks in the West since 9/11 were radicalised online, according to New America, a think-tank based in Washington, dc. Some preachers streamed self-erasing lectures on Snapchat. Their messages were particularly lethal in America, given the ready availability of weapons. Since 2013, 87 people have been killed in terrorist attacks there. “We’re bigger than ever,” insists a Danish organiser of Hizb ut-Tahrir. “You just can’t see us.” Germany’s spy agency agrees. It estimates that the number of Salafists providing a pool of recruits for jihadists has increased from under 4,000 in 2013 to more than 10,000 today.

Preachers ousted from their pulpits whispered invitations to meet privately to worshippers at Friday prayers. And increasingly gyms and schools became recruitment centres. Friends plotted their Hijrahfrom gritty estates and stifling parental control in the schoolyard. A dozen left one summer holiday from Campus de Brug high school in a Brussels suburb. In Dinslaken, a working-class town in Germany’s Rhineland, Lamya Kaddor, a high-school teacher of Islamic studies, discovered one day that her pupils had gone. “They knew nothing about Islam,” she says. “They took drugs, went to parties, had girlfriends.”

Europe’s prisons provided another source of recruits. They contained large numbers of Muslim inmates convicted for criminal offences who were already well-versed in skills like smuggling and gun-running. Two-thirds of foreign fighters in Germany and the Netherlands had a criminal record. Jihadism and petty crime were so intertwined that some used the term “gangster Islam”. Muslim chaplains found themselves being turned away when they tried to visit prisoners of their faith.

The suspension of Saudi funding, under Western pressure, also encouraged some Salafist groups to find less legitimate sources of finance. is had a particular knack for penetrating the underworld and giving criminals a cause. Infidel assets, explained is’s leader in Germany, were Ghanima, or spoils of war. Khalid Zerkani, an is recruiter from Morocco, followed the hashish trail from farms deep in the country’s Rif mountains to the way stations in Europe where many of the Rif’s Berbers lived, and eventually settled in Belgium’s Molenbeek. “He was a father figure,” says a local social worker. “He would ask about your future and explain how you could find a better job, a better salary and a just society under the Sharia. And your sins would be forgiven.” Mr Zerkani was arrested in 2014.

One of his recruits, Ibrahim Abdeslam, owned Les Béguines, a gay bar in Molenbeek that was repeatedly raided for drugs. He sold it six weeks before donning a suicide-vest and blowing himself up in a bar during the Paris attacks in November 2015 that killed 130. When his brother, Salah, who planned the getaway, was eventually captured in March 2016, his friends retaliated four days later with attacks on the Brussels metro and airport, killing 32.

Les Béguines was shut down soon after the Brussels attack, but would-be jihadists can easily find other places to meet. For some, the gangsters still carry street-cred. At L’Epicerie, a Molenbeek warehouse turned into a theatre by locals of Moroccan origin, teenagers offer their rendition of a parents’ evening. “You’ve been playing truant. Why?” asks the teacher in the play. “I went to Afghanistan,” shrugs the boy. The audience laughs.

For most Western Muslims the appeal of Jihadism reassuringly tails off after two generations. Only 7% of attacks in the West were perpetrated by grandchildren of immigrants. But police fear a new wave of violence when the current crop of radicalised prisoners are released. If places like Molenbeek are to break the cycle of jihad, young Muslims will need to feel properly at home in the West.

Reference:

economist.com/special-report/2019/02/14/radicalised-jihadists-have-done-untold-damage-to-islams-image

http://www.newageislam.com/radical-islamism-and-jihad/the-economist/radicalised-jihadists-have-done-untold-damage-to-islam%E2%80%99s-image-appeal/d/117765

2018: The Year in Jihadism

By Lorenzo Vidino,

www.lawfareblog.com

Dated:December 31, 2018

2018 represented a sharp departure from previous years in terms of the sheer number of jihadist attacks in the West. Though attacks in Western Europe and North America were on a steady rise prior to this year, in 2018 they plunged, and jihadist attacks in the West in 2018 were fairly unsophisticated and significantly less lethal. Meanwhile, declines in other indicators traditionally used to assess the strength of the jihadist movement—numbers of arrests and individuals departing for conflict zones to fight alongside jihadist groups—point to an overall stagnation in jihadist activities in Western Europe and North America.

That is not to say that the threat is gone. Officials in most Western countries continue to monitor large pockets of support for the Islamic State and, more broadly, jihadist ideology. From the perspective of European and American law enforcement, many of these pockets, which range from isolated fanboys to structured networks, could be potentially ready to activate themselves and carry out attacks. And, despite efforts by major social media providers, jihadism still thrives online and as a subculture among some disenfranchised Western Muslims.

Nonetheless, the territorial collapse of the Islamic State had a major impact on jihadist activities in the West. This decline—paired with a relative surge in right wing extremism in many Western countries—is leading authorities to partially refocus resources from jihadism to other security challenges, such as different forms of extremism, cyber security and information warfare. But any reassessment of how best to tackle terrorism in 2019 after the relative lull of 2018 should include a consideration of what lessons have been learned in terms of countering and understanding extremism over the last few years. In particular, it is worth revisiting the pre-2011 environment to understand what may be in store. To some degree, the current situation is reminiscent of 2011, when the death of Osama bin Laden, a lull in terrorist attacks in the West, optimism about the early days of the Arab Spring and the general fatigue after a decade of War on Terror led many to think that the jihadist threat was on the decline, if not completely evaporated, in the West.

This assessment, fairly widespread in 2011, proved dramatically incorrect in the following years, as the Islamic State and other jihadist groups fighting in the Syrian civil war attracted some 6,000 Western foreign fighters and inspired an even larger number of sympathizers. Many Western policymakers initially failed to see the long-term security implications of the jihadist mobilization to Syria. In some cases, officials held the view that travel to Syria by foreign fighters was preferable, buying into the axiom that “if they fight over there, they don’t kill us here.” It became dramatically clear in the following years that the presence of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq triggered various problematic dynamics. Not only, in fact, did foreign fighters exacerbate the conflict, but many of them planned, instigated and executed dozens of terrorist attacks in Europe and North America. The recognition that conflicts provide fuel to the fire of radicalization—particularly those that have a high symbolic value and are relatively easy for foreign fighters to join—should guide policymakers in the coming years. The lesson may prove particularly important in light of the forthcoming withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria and from other conflict zones in the region as well.

Similarly, in 2011 collective knowledge on the process of radicalization was extremely limited.  Over the last few years, terrorism scholars and practitioners alike have devoted enormous attention to trying to understand why individuals radicalize. The results of these efforts are admittedly modest. Most agree that radicalization is a complex and highly individualized process and that there is no common profile of a “radicalized” individuals. Beyond these points, there is little consensus. But the flurry of radicalization theories demonstrates the importance of a multidisciplinary approach, suggesting that a better understanding of radicalization is crucial to prevent and reverse it. While those in the field no longer place as much value on traditional models based exclusively on socio-economic analyses, theories based in psychology and social networks have gained ground.

This research and the corresponding multidisciplinary approach, though it represents a greatly expanded body of knowledge, is still in its early stages. Despite the lull in attacks and decreased attention paid to jihadism, it should be expanded to improve radicalization prevention and de-radicalization efforts in coming years. Moreover, many of the lessons learned with jihadist radicalization are likely to prove useful when dealing with other ideologies.

 The last seven years also show that, without effective management, prisons can be potential incubators of radicalization. Among militants aligned with the Islamic State, high percentages (in some European countries, more than 60 percent) possessed a criminal background. For many of these individuals, the redemptive conversion from street thug to holy warrior took place behind bars. This trend is not entirely new: Since the 1990s, in fact, authorities in most Western countries have struggled with the phenomenon of charismatic inmates radicalizing fellow prisoners. But in some countries, the challenge may metastasize in the immediate future: the large numbers of arrests related to the Islamic State in recent years have led to the incarceration of an unprecedented number of radicalized individuals throughout Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States. Resources and expertise are needed to prevent the “ideological contagion” of the larger prison population and to attempt, when possible, to deradicalize those detained for terrorism.      

During the Islamic State-related mobilization, a great deal of popular reporting focused on the role of online propaganda and networks in facilitating radicalization. While it would be highly incorrect to think that most people radicalize solely online—or, similarly, that the Islamic State attracted tens of thousands of supporters in the West only because of its slick social media presence—it is undeniable that digital communications played an unprecedented role in the latest mobilization. Since 2011, there have been major developments in contrasting online jihadism. Governments and internet companies have at times held divergent positions, and the desire to protect free speech has often clashed with security concerns. Nonetheless, increased (though highly imperfect) government-industry cooperation has succeeded in marginalizing extremist material, pushing content and accounts that promulgate such material from major platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube onto lesser-known online platforms. While these smaller platforms do not enjoy the same audience as their better-known counterparts, the downside is that some utilize encryption and are more difficult for law enforcement to monitor. Eliminating online terrorist content is a chimera—but the ongoing effort to marginalize it must adapt and continue into the future.

Across the board, it is imperative that legal systems are up to speed in countering new developments of the threat. Many challenges from the last few years stem from the fact that most Western countries’ terrorism laws were unprepared to cope with the quantitative increase and qualitative shifts in radicalization—a deficiency whose side effects will linger for years to come. For example, at the outset of the recent mobilization, many European countries did not have laws criminalizing participation in a terrorist organization abroad. Even in those countries in which such laws existed, prosecuting terrorism financing and bringing evidence from a battlefield to a civilian court are often difficult. As a result, of the over 1,000 foreign fighters from EU member states who returned to their native countries, only a small percentage have been prosecuted. Moreover, though national and transnational cooperation mechanisms have improved significantly, the last few years clearly demonstrated that inadequate legal tools constitute a major challenge to effective counterterrorism. 

Many unpredictable factors will shape the next phase of jihadism in the West. It is unclear whether there will be another conflict as attractive as Syria was in the early 2010s, what the future will hold for the Islamic State and whether al-Qaeda or other groups will emerge or re-emerge as leaders of the global jihadist movement. These events are largely beyond the control of Western policymakers and counter-terrorism apparatuses. But Western countries can and should learn from the experiences of the last few years to adapt to the current threat and preemptively prepare for future challenges.

About the Author:

Dr. Lorenzo Vidino is the Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. An expert on Islamism in Europe and North America, his research over the past 15 years has focused on the mobilization dynamics of jihadist networks in the West, governmental counter-radicalization policies, and the activities of Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organizations in the West. The author of several books and numerous articles, Dr. Vidino’s most prominent work is "The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West," a book published in 2010 by Columbia University Press, with an Arabic edition released the following year by the Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center.

Reference:

https://www.lawfareblog.com/2018-year-jihadism

Don’t Shut Down the Internet’s Biggest Jihadist Archive

By Graeme Wood

www.theatlantic.com

December 10, 2018

If you discover that your neighbor—a decent guy and a known history buff—maintains a small collection of Nazi memorabilia, you might not think less of him, especially if his record of tolerance and anti-fascism is beyond reproach. Now imagine that he maintains not a small collection but the largest in the world, in private or public hands. He lets anyone examine it, including actual Nazis, without asking for a name or a reason. How big does the collection have to get before you start murmuring with the neighbors, and stop inviting him to cookouts and seders?

Last month, the British government expressed official concern about the contemporary equivalent of such a collection, a website devoted to archiving every scrap of propaganda published by a jihadist group of significant size. Jihadology.net, still live as of this writing, is a multiyear effort by Aaron Y. Zelin, an expert in global jihadism. The site makes Der Stürmer look genteel. It is one thing to publish a cartoon that calls for the extinction of one’s fellow citizens, and another to publish a video that shows one of those citizens retching in the gas chamber at the moment of her death. Many of the videos are from the Islamic State, and some contain scenes considerably more nauseating than even this. Critics believe it serves terrorists; jihadists circulate links to the site’s videos long after YouTube and Facebook have deleted them.

YouTube and Facebook, as private companies, are of course free to censor their sites however they wish, and I do not blame them at all for refusing to be a clubhouse for religious monsters. The U.K. has asked Zelin to password-protect his archive, which is already blocked or criminalized in other jurisdictions.

But I believe that Jihadology is different and should remain open to all. It enjoys moral safe-harbor, first of all, because unlike YouTube or Facebook it accepts no advertising and earns no click-based revenue. (Zelin offers translation services for a fee, but access to his archive is gratis.) No one profits from his collection. Second, he presents the specimens without endorsement or, indeed, explicit disapproval; unlike YouTube, it does not “recommend” videos, and unlike Facebook, it doesn’t favor certain pieces over others based on their popularity or clicks. The website is as close as one can have to a bare, unadorned catalog, coded only by source (Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, etc.) and date.

Even if Zelin took a salary, he would be earning it. These videos are valuable. Other than the traumatized pros who watch the videos for a living, few understand how much the propaganda can teach us about its makers and their intended audience. For the past four years, I have consumed many of these videos, sometimes peeking through my fingers to do so, and I can attest to their worth.

Do you remember the grainy beheading videos from the early 2000s, when al-Qaeda began its series of snuff films, starring foreigners caught in its web in Iraq and Pakistan? Let me spare you from searching: They showed little of interest. The executioners’ faces were always well hidden, and the mise-en-scène usually obscured all details that might indicate the time of day or even the type of building in which they were filmed. The vibe in these videos is of an underground organization, safe only in its ratholes.

The Islamic State’s international success, and perhaps later failure, derived from its willingness to emerge into the daylight and show itself to the world. It was not clandestine. In practice, that means most of its videos take place in identifiable, and often identified, locations, and many feature subjects and spokesmen without masks, committing atrocities with pride and impunity in a world where they are heroes.

This world, available to us largely through the videos Zelin has curated, is a fantasyland stage-managed by isis. On that basis alone, some might dismiss the videos as worse than useless. But remember that the fantasy, not the reality, is what motivated tens of thousands of men, women, and children to migrate to Syria and Iraq. These videos, along with private messages from friends, lured people over in defiance of all sense, rationality, decency, and instinct for self-preservation. The notion that we know too much about this fantasy, rather than too little, strikes me as incurious at best. Those preparing to fight the next terrorist movement need to understand what inspired the last one.

Finally, this collection is useful for intelligence gathering. Over the years, analysts in media and government have spotted details, small and large, exploitable for investigation. A video of a public execution allows you to see not just the victim but also the audience of civilians. Do they have mobile phones? Are their pant legs rolled up to mid-shin, in the Salafi style, or are the morality police getting lax and letting that rule slide? Once I saw an open-air restaurant in the background of an execution. The prices on the menu board told me what currency was being used and, by comparison with earlier prices, the rate of inflation. Is the executioner’s accent Syrian? Iraqi? Sudanese? French? Still more valuable are the faces. Foreigners rarely appear in the videos, except intentionally. But now and then a video provides proof that a hunted man is alive and in Syria, rather than dead or on a mission elsewhere.

Zelin could password-protect his site or force users to register. (I’d like to see the “Click to accept” boilerplate. “Taking pleasure in these videos is a violation of Jihadology.net’s Terms of Service and grounds for account termination.”) But there’s a cost to restricting this content only to those willing to prove that they are academics, journalists, or law enforcement. Swarms of hobbyists and amateurs on social media have provided valuable scrutiny of the images coming out of Syria. These outsiders would, I believe, fear that registration is a prelude to suspicion, surveillance, and arrest. (In some countries, proposed legislation would make viewing this material a crime in itself.) We need many eyes, not few.

Jihadist propaganda has been all but extinguished from YouTube, and that’s beneficial both practically (fewer persuaded to fight for isis) and morally (no one deserves to have his execution viewed for entertainment). But a side effect of the hunt-and-delete process is that it makes propaganda more forbidden, more titillating, more cool. Jihadology, with its spareness and objectivity, handles this problem too: Nothing dulls the pleasure of a fetish more reliably than its total and unstigmatized availability. The continued operation of Jihadology is a boon for researchers and only modestly useful to our enemies. In the unlikely event that I, a non-Jew, hold a seder, Zelin is welcome.  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is not.

About the Author:

Graeme Wood s a staff writer for The Atlantic and the author of The Way of the Strangers: Encounters With the Islamic State.

Reference:

https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/577630/?__twitter_impression=true

Global Islamism, jihadism and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, my defence lawyer

By Tufail Ahmed, Firstpost

Dated: October   29, 2016

Recently, I have been ridiculed and dismissed as a 'sanghi', as a Zionist and as an Islamophobe for arguing in my writings that Islamic clerics and Urdu journalists engender Islamist ideas and trap innocent Muslim youths in the web of jihadism. So, to defend me in the court of public opinion, I hereby present my advocate Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), the 20th century's foremost Islamic scholar who was born in Mecca as a citizen of the Ottoman Caliphate and went on to become the free India's first education minister.

But first, let's meet Abdul Hakim whose son Hafesuddin is among two dozen Keralite youths who left India to join the Islamic State (IS) in Syria this year. "My own son called me a kafir(infidel). Radicalism changed my son completely," Hakim told a TV channel on 11 July. One day, the son texted: "(I will) get the jannat (heaven), here no tax, here Shari'a law only, nobody here catching me, very good place." Hakim said: "He does not like me anymore. I don't know why he doesn't like me anymore."

The radicalisation of Hakim's son is rooted in the practice of Islamic teachings.

On 27 October, 1914, addressing a large Muslim gathering in Kolkata, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the internationally known cleric of his era, reflected on what should be the relationship between a jihadi son and his family members.

There are two points here: One, in Islam, only a member of the Quraishi clan can become a caliph – a theological point based on which the Islamic State rejected Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar as the caliph of Muslims and Indian Islamic scholar Mualana Salman Al-Husaini Al-Nadwi of Lucknow accepted IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as the caliph in 2014. Two, Maulana Azad was speaking at a time when the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate was in sight and his was a well-prepared, well-considered speech in support of global Islamism that led to thousands of Muslims leaving India to wage jihad in Turkey during the Khilafat Movement.

Maulana Azad was a fiery speaker and an editor par excellence. His speech gives a detailed insight into how Islamic clerics radicalise Muslims through sermons in mosques and speeches in jalsas (religious congregations). Outlining a view of global Islamism, which he explicitly endorsed, Maulana Azad told the audience: "If even a grain of the soul of Islam is alive among its followers, then I should say that if a thorn gets stuck in a Turk's sole in the battlefield of war, then I swear by the God of Islam, no Muslim of India can be a Muslim until he feels that prick in his heart instead of sole because the Millat-e-Islam (the global Muslim community) is a single body."

To inculcate the idea of global Islamism, Maulana Azad quoted Prophet Muhammad as saying: "One momin for another momin is like one brick assisting another brick in a wall." The word momin means "faithful Muslim" but is sociologically understood in the Indian Subcontinent as an Islamic superman (Mard-e-Momin), popularised by the Islamist poet Muhammad Iqbal who stole the idea of superman from German thinker Friedrich Nietzsche. Then Maulana Azad quoted the Verse 29 of the Quran's Chapter Al-Fatah which urges Muslims to be friendly between themselves and hard against kafirs (infidels). Maulana Azad translated the verse in following words: "[Be] extremely hard against kafirs but extremely sympathetic and kind among ourselves."

Maulana Azad accused Europe of inventing the bogus phrases like "the Eastern Problem" and "Pan Islamism" as "an extreme Satanic strategy" to divide the Muslim world, and lamented that Muslims were responding to it more like a scared "murder convict."

It is often argued by moderates that Islam did not spread by sword. Nevertheless, the idea of the sword has been integral to clerics' teachings. Pointing to the Ottomans who were waging jihad against Europe-backed Muslims in the Middle East, Maulana Azad said: "The last human sword of Islamic life is only in the hands of the Turks." Quoting articles from European newspapers such as the Budapest Herald and the Times of London, he said: "Europe considers it the 20th century's biggest service to civilisation to terminate 40 crore human souls, followers of Islam from anything called culture and civilisation." Although he said that "Pan Islamism" did not exist outside the mental world of Europe, in the same breath he added: "Alas, there existed pan Islamism among Muslims today! A pan Islamism for which there is no need for some secret committee of Muslims of Turkey and England to give birth to but that which we have been invited to (by Islam) from day one."

It appears that a debate was underway at the time to upgrade the MAO College into a full-fledged Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), which happened ultimately in 1920. Speaking about the need for the "Muslim University," Maulana Azad rejected territorial nationalism among Indian Muslims saying: "Remember, today, for Islam, for Muslims, any national or local movement cannot be fruitful." He rejected nationalist movements of Egypt, Turkey, Algeria and India, saying: "In my beliefs, all of this is an act of magic by the presager-Satan who makes those asleep because it does not like those sleeping [ie Muslims] to rise up." "The most important matter is that we have to build a university in Aligarh, have to collect Rs 30 lakh for this," he said and described it as a kaaba of Aligarh. More importantly, he said: "The day the university is established, wahi (revelation, of Quranic verse 5:3) … will land on the roof of the Strachey Hall (of AMU)." In verse 5:3, Allah says: "This day I have perfected for you your religion…"

Then, Maulana Azad made an astounding declaration before the Muslims of Kolkata, arguing that peace is useless and war is life. "Oh! dear brothers, remember that however rosy the idea of peace, compromise and rejection of murder and plunder in the world may be, but due to the bad luck of the world thus far the real power is the power of sword; and the source of life, the water of life is in the fountains and rivers of blood," the religious scholar declared. He was clearer: "Today, if it is asked, where to search for life of nations and evidence of life, then its answer will not come from universities of education and arts, and ancient libraries… Rather, it will be found in the metalled (war) ships which line up the coast…"

The word "peace" is frequently used by jihadi groups, but in their parlance it means the peace of Islam, which protects non-Muslims if they agree to live under that peace in lieu of jizya (tax on non-Muslims). Maulana Azad added: "That hand is pious in which the flag of compromise flutters, but only that hand can be alive which has the blood-soaked sword in its grip. This is the source of the life of (the global Muslim) nation, means of the establishment of justice…" He asked Muslims to bear in mind that at the time there was "only one sword in the defence of the religion of Allah" and that was in the hands of the falling Ottoman Caliph. He also criticised liberal Muslims who did not side with him in support of the Caliphate, saying that time has come to "discriminate between faith and kufr (non-belief)" and cited the Quranic verse 2:14: "These munafiqeen (hypocrites among Muslims), when they meet Muslims they say, we are Muslims. But when they visit alone their Satans (non-Muslims), then they say, we are with you by heart…"In the early 20th century when Maulana Azad was speaking, about 18,000 Muslims from India went to Turkey to wage jihad and women sent their jewelleries so that the Turks could continue jihad. We are much in a better shape today than a century ago.

Towards the end of his speech, Maulana Azad was conscious of the gravity of the announcement he was about to make for jihad. "Oh! dear brothers, the matter whose announcement I do not fear, it's strange if you would be scared of listening to it." And then he declared: "I say that, on every momin who believes in Allah, his messenger (Prophet Muhammad) and his book (Quran), it is obligatory that he rise up today for jihad fi sabeelillah(jihad in the path of Allah)." And then Maulana Azad added: "The first jihad for it is the financial jihad and after it if there be any need is the jihad of body and life..." He argued that "Islam is a sale and purchase (between God and followers)" and added: "The day we accepted that we are Muslims, the same day we accepted that our lives stood sold for Islam. The meaning of Islam is to surrender our heads before the only God, and then it is upon him whether he puts it in the lap of friends or under the sword of enemies."

Maulana Azad justified the sacrifice of human lives for jihad by the citing the tradition of Prophet Abraham, who offered his son for sacrifice, an occasion marked every year by Muslims as Eid Al-Azha (the feast of sacrifice) by sacrificing animals. Like today's jihadis, Maulana Azad asked Indian Muslims to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate "in their hearts as a pure religious relationship, to consider any government of the world that is its enemy as the enemy of Islam and the ones that were its friend as the friend of Islam because friendship and enmity were not for human purposes but only for the religion of Allah."

If you have been perplexed during past three years as to why Muslims from India and other nations are radicalised in favour of the Islamic State, Maulana Azad's speech gives a clear insight into the historical Muslim mind. And he was not a 'sanghi', or a Zionist, or even an Islamophobe. Today, an estimated 30 Indian Muslims are fighting alongside the IS in Syria and more than 250 youths are under surveillance in India, while some Indians are also based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the early 20th century when Maulana Azad was speaking, about 18,000 Muslims from India went to Turkey to wage jihad and women sent their jewelleries so that the Turks could continue jihad. We are much in a better shape today than a century ago.

Author's Note: 

Excerpts from Maulana Azad's 1914 speech used in this article are translated from Urdu book Khutbat-e-Azad (Speeches of Azad), published in 2010 by Maktaba-e-Jamal, Lahore. The book is available in India.)

About the author:

Former BBC journalist Tufail Ahmad is a contributing editor at Firstpost, and executive director of the Open Source Institute, New Delhi. 

The Demographics of Southeast Asian Jihadism

By Daveed Gartenstein,Valens Global

War on the Rocks

September 05, 2018

Shortly after sunrise on July 31, soldiers at a military checkpoint outside Lamitan City in the Philippines’ Basilan province were hailed over to inspect a white 10-seat van suspected of bearing an improvised explosive device. Moments later, the bomb in the vehicle detonated, killing at least 10 people. Among the dead were four civilians, including women and a child.

The brief interactions between the van’s driver and soldiers prior to the blast suggested that the driver was a foreigner, incapable of responding to the soldiers’ questions in the local dialect. The Islamic State soon claimed responsibility for the attack through its Amaq News Agency, stating that a Moroccan national had carried out the “martyrdom operation.” As Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted, the attack represented the first time that the Islamic State had “claimed a foreign fighter was involved in an attack in the Philippines in official statements.” Among other things, the attack spotlights the question of what kind of person might be responsible for terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.

There is little research to date elucidating the demographics of typical members of Southeast Asian jihadist groups who may carry out or support attacks like the Lamitan City bombing. This article is designed to advance the state of knowledge about Southeast Asian jihadism by drawing on original research into the demographic characteristics of 242 Southeast Asia-based jihadists. While there are limitations to the representativeness of demographic information derived from open sources, which will be discussed subsequently, having a larger amount of data on the phenomenon can aid in better assessing the plausibility of existing hypotheses about jihadism in the region. This article first describes the methodology that we employed in gathering data about Southeast Asian jihadists, then turns to our major findings about the militants’ sex and age, nationality and place of activity, kinship ties, propensity for prison radicalization, and place of origin.

Methodology

For more than two years, we — along with other team members at Valens Global — have compiled extensive data mapping the demographics of jihadists throughout the globe. For this article, we supplemented our pre-existing research with additional open-source materials to identify Southeast Asian jihadists whose profiles have come to light since our first compilation of data. In conducting this research, we emphasized information that could be found in regional media sources. Our data set includes 242 individuals involved in jihadist activity in Southeast Asia. Our goal in compiling this data is to be as comprehensive as possible. A significant amount of our research time was devoted to the 2017–18 period, for which we assess that we have been able to compile information on over 80 percent of active Southeast Asian jihadists with sufficient information in the open-source literature describing their demographic profile. The percentage of jihadists included in our data declines in the preceding periods, but we do not consider that problematic for the purposes of this article, which is primarily designed to provide a current demographic snapshot of Southeast Asian jihadists.

It should be acknowledged that there are limits to how representative any sample of jihadist demographics obtained through open-source analysis can be. After all, militant groups are by nature clandestine, so the very fact that an individual is known well enough in open sources to form a demographic profile of him or her makes that person in some ways exceptional in the world of jihadism. Despite this challenge, a competent data-driven analysis can nonetheless help to illuminate the demographics of regional jihadism by painting a fuller picture than existed previously, so long as researchers do not over-interpret their results, and are aware of this representativeness problem.

For all individuals in the data set, we endeavored to collect data on their nationality, country of primary activity, age, sex, kinship ties, education, military history, place of origin, and history of prison radicalization. Though efforts were made to gather all such data for each individual, it was often impossible to find all this information in open-source materials. It is likely that a number of jihadists in this data set also exhibit additional demographic characteristics that could not be ascertained in our research; some of the trends outlined may be even more pronounced than is reflected in our conclusions.

If an individual was noted as participating in jihadist activity in that person’s country of origin, but no other demographic information was available, that person was not included in our data. Individuals were included only if available research indicated at least one demographic characteristic other than nationality and place of primary activity, assuming the place of primary activity was the same as the individual’s country of origin. We created an exception to this rule for women, as female participation in Southeast Asian jihadist activity has historically been rare, and thus warrants inclusion even without other demographic information. Our research was carefully tailored to minimize the risk of double-counting.

Average ages in this study were based on the jihadists’ age at the time of their most recently publicized activity (attack, arrest, death, etc.). When a jihadist’s age was not identified, but another characteristic associated with age was noted (such as the year of graduation from a school), the age was estimated. Though there is some imprecision to such estimates, they were included because otherwise the presence of younger militants might remain invisible to readers, and we assess it as an important trend. Regarding kinship ties, individuals were assessed as related to other jihadists by marriage if the two individuals themselves were married, or if they had a legal familial relationship through a spouse (e.g., brother-in-law, father-in-law).

Results

Sex and Age

Likely the most consequential demographic development in regional jihadism has been the growing role played by women. This development is evident even in the absence of statistical data, as a casual analysis of recent plots and jihadist groups’ shifting strategies reveals the greater female role.

For example, an Indonesian woman, Dian Yulia Novi, plotted in late 2016 to blow herself up in front of the Indonesian presidential palace. Having been radicalized during her time as a domestic worker in Singapore, Novi’s plot represented the first time a woman spearheaded an intended attack in Indonesia. The increase in the number of jihadist women in Indonesia is likely attributable to the 2009 decision of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) to begin training women due to insufficient numbers of male fighters in the group’s ranks. Though MIT’s decision was rendered almost a decade ago, the first attacks in the country actually planned and carried out by women did not occur until Novi’s aforementioned 2016 plot.

Indonesian women have since been increasingly active in violent activities, while Filipino and Malaysian women in our data set tended to act in supporting roles, such as providing financial support. Our data suggests that greater female involvement in jihadism is most clearly evident in Indonesia of the three countries of focus. 58 percent of women in our data set were of Indonesian nationality, while 50 percent of included women were active in Indonesia. Of the 242 individuals in the data, 85 percent were male and 15 percent female.

The average age of Southeast Asian jihadists in our data set was around 31 years, calculated from the ages of the 111 individuals with information available. 20 percent of those individuals were under the age of 20, while two jihadists were over 60. The average age held true even when very young and old outliers were excluded. The average age of radicalized women was between 27 and 28. The average age of the overall population in both Indonesia and Malaysia hovers around 28, while in the Philippines the median age is only 24.

Nationality and Place of Activity 

Scholars studying Southeast Asia generally see the Philippines as critical to regional jihadist efforts. After all, there have been longstanding jihadist campaigns in that country, culminating in the five-month-long Marawi siege in 2017. In that siege, militants took over the city for an extended period before it was liberated by Philippine forces. Further, the Islamic State has called for Southeast Asians who were unable to travel to Syria to instead fight in the Philippines. A number of Islamic State-affiliated groups in the Philippines have been able to draw fighters to the country from abroad. Indonesian jihadists also have a history of traveling to the Philippine region of Mindanao, which has served as a training ground, transit point, and sanctuary for jihadists.

Our data tends to support the notion of the country’s centrality to regional militancy. Of the 242 individuals in our data, 51 percent were recently active in jihadist ventures in the Philippines, with 25 percent active in Indonesia and 15 percent active in Malaysia. In comparison, Indonesia’s overall population dwarfs that of the other two countries, with nearly 264 million individuals in 2017, while the Philippines and Malaysia have populations of around 105 million and 32 million, respectively.

Kinship Ties

Studies examining Southeast Asian jihadist groups find that these organizations have long relied on kinship ties, and our data tends to reinforce this conclusion. A study by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) that examined the pull of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front — a group that was previously jihadist in orientation but now largely acts as a political party — in the Mindanao region showed that the influence of family members was one of the top two factors affecting one’s membership. Of the 242 individuals in our data, 74 had documented familial connections with other members of jihadist groups.

Among the most common kinship ties in jihadist organizations are connections through marriage. Groups like Jemaah Islamiyah have long been strengthened by marriages, which can be a tool for forging strategic ties with other militant organizations. The power of kinship ties is reflected in the background of one person touted late last year as the likely new emir of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, the Malaysian Amin Baco. (Since then, there have been conflicting reports about whether Baco is deceased.) Baco rose to prominence in part because he was the son-in-law of Isnilon Hapilon, the group’s emir in the Philippines until his death in October 2017. Baco likely married Hapilon’s daughter after he joined the Abu Sayyaf Group. Of the kinship ties in our study’s data, 51 percent were via marriage, whether directly as a spouse or indirectly through in-laws.

39 percent of individuals with familial connections had a parent-child relationship. Another 23 percent of individuals with familial connections had siblings in jihadist groups (a figure that excludes young siblings in parent-directed plots). Familial connections are easily seen in organizations like Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group, where the leadership includes many members of the same extended family. These groups recognize the benefits of kinship ties, such as loyalty.

While familial connections within and between jihadist organizations have long been important in Southeast Asia, terrorist attacks carried out by nuclear family units are a more recent concern. The May 2018 Surabaya bombings in Indonesia came as a shock to many not only due to their brutality, but also because three families perpetrated the attacks, involving children as young as seven in suicide bombings. The acts of violence were entirely planned and carried out within small family units. While no similar family plots were recorded in this study, there were multiple instances of very young children being brought into jihadist groups by older siblings, while parents were at times offered money and a monthly salary for their children’s membership in jihadist groups.

Prison Radicalization

One concern expressed by Southeast Asian counter-terrorism officials is the possibility of radicalization of previously non-jihadist prison inmates. In both Indonesian and Philippine prisons, convicted terrorists and radicalized individuals are frequently housed alongside low-level criminals. Influential jihadists like Abu Bakar Bashir and Aman Abdurrahman have been able to radicalize other inmates, and even plan and direct attacks from prison.

While we would like to gather more data on the regional prison radicalization phenomenon, our data provides some support for the idea that there is reason for concern. At least seven individuals (2.9 percent) in this study were recruited or radicalized in prisons, with three instances in Indonesia and another four in Malaysia. In the three countries of focus in the study, the average incarceration rate is 0.08 percent, and Malaysia has the highest rate at 0.16 percent. A number of individuals in this study who were recruited or radicalized in prison were initially imprisoned for offenses they committed as low-level drug dealers.

Education

The regional phenomenon related to education that analysts have most frequently remarked upon is the potential for certain primary or secondary schools to serve as hot spots for extremist ideology, as studies have concluded that attendance of Southeast Asian schools with extremist ideologies increases the likelihood of involvement in jihadist activity. Our data tends to reinforce this concern. Nine individuals in our study (3.7 percent) attended primary or secondary schools known to espouse extremist viewpoints. A number attended schools connected to or founded by prominent Indonesian jihadist Abu Bakar Bashir.

The first Indonesian jihadist known to have died fighting in Syria, Riza Fardi, graduated in 2006 from the Al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki founded by Bashir, then taught at the school for a year before beginning his higher education. He was likely influenced by the jihadist teachings known to be prominent at Al-Mukmin.

There were no clearly discernible trends with respect to higher education. 9.5 percent of individuals in this study were known to have completed at least some higher education at the university level, or the religious equivalent. The average participation rate in higher education in the three countries of study is around 31 percent, according to the most recent UNESCO figures. Malaysia has the highest participation rate in tertiary education at 44 percent, while Indonesia has the lowest at 28 percent. In our data set, participation in higher education was more common among more senior members of militant groups. This fact, in turn, gives rise to the possibility that the seeming under-representation of individuals with university-level education may be a statistical illusion, as the educational background of less prominent jihadists may not be readily discernible in open sources.

Place of Origin

The place of origin of most individuals in this study could not be discerned. Of the 17 Indonesians with known places of origin (either a birthplace or where a good deal of their childhood was spent), 16 were from the region of Java, where over half of the greater Indonesian population lives.

A region of the Philippines that is frequently mentioned in scholarly study of Southeast Asian jihadism is the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Of the eight Filipinos with known places of origin, 100 percent were from Mindanao, with five individuals originating in the ARMM. A significant number of other Filipino jihadists also attended university in this region or had long been active in it, but we could not verify if they actually grew up there. Mindanao has long been plagued by conflict and discontent, dating back to the period of Spanish colonization. The region has a high proportion of Muslims in an otherwise overwhelmingly Catholic country. Mindanao and the ARMM in particular are some of the poorest regions in the Philippines. The World Bank reports that while the national poverty rate is around 16.5 percent, the poverty rate in ARMM is drastically higher at 48.2 percent. 14.4 percent of youth are out of school in ARMM, compared to 10.6 percent nationally.

Foreign fighters in Southeast Asia have been the subject of growing focus, and raised particular concern in the 2017 siege of Marawi, where significant numbers of Indonesians and Malaysians were reported to have fought alongside Filipino militants. There were also reports of participation by Arabs, Chechens, Indians, and other non-Southeast Asian foreign nationals. Claims regarding the presence of these fighters have proven difficult to verify. Even when verification of a certain nationality’s presence is possible, information regarding these fighters’ individual identities has proven hard to obtain and confirm via open sources. Because an individual’s inclusion in this data set was contingent on identity characteristics other than nationality, it is probable that foreign fighters are underrepresented in our sample.

Conclusion

As noted, the data we have gathered represents a biased sample — an unfortunate consequence of any attempt to understand clandestine organizations exclusively through open sources. But, in combination with other sources, our data does provide some insight into the membership of Southeast Asian jihadist groups. Militant groups tend to be learning organizations, and one of the adaptations that they make involves who is involved in their activities, as can be seen in growing female involvement in the region. In addition, globalizing trends — both within and also apart from the jihadist movement — hold out the prospect of a diversifying base of militants, with greater involvement from jihadists outside their countries of origin. It is worth continuing to pay close attention to the evolving demographics of Southeast Asian jihadism.

 About the author:

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global. Vivian Hagerty is the deputy research manager at Valens Global. Madeline Dement, a research intern at Valens Global, is currently finishing an academic degree at University of Maryland, Baltimore County.

Reference:

https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-demographics-of-southeast-asian-jihadism/