House of Islam’ under siege: brave but flawed book

By Talmiz Amad

National Herald

Dated: October 14, 2018

Ed Husain came to world attention in 2007 with his book, The Islamist. This book provided a glimpse of how a South Asian Muslim immigrant in London was allured towards extremism and was indoctrinated in jihad. That book had then described the increasing disillusionment of its protagonist with jihadi doctrine and his return home to London.Ed Husain’s new book, The House of Islam, is an attempt to correct the ignorance and half-truths pertaining to Islam and Muslims, set out the dilemmas, doctrinal, and socio-political, that Muslims confront, and what should be done to address the conflicts that define contemporary scenarios in the Muslim world. Husain asserts that “there is a global battle underway for the soul of Islam”, mainly because Islam is “being politicised by political anger”. Its wellsprings emerge from pervasive authoritarian rule across West Asia as also Western policies of both buttressing these rulers and initiating violent military interventions against specific potentates to suit short-term interests. These factors have engendered deep emotions of “betrayal, hurt, injustice and humiliation” that have created two deep divides: between the rulers and their people and between the West and the world of Islam. Husain provides a lucid account of the doctrines and early history of Islam, the shaping of Sharia (jurisprudence) in the schools in the Islamic fold, the Sunni-Shia schism in Islam, and the persona of the average Muslim today. Husain devotes considerable attention to the Sufi tradition in Islam and highlights its significance through the lives and writings of stalwarts such as Rumi, Omar Khayyam, Abdul Qadir Jeelani and, interestingly, Princess Jahanara, the daughter of Emperor Shah Jahan. Sufis played a major role in the spread of Islam, conquering new lands “with their love, miracles and esoteric teachings, and by living pious lives among the masses”, and have hundreds of millions of followers today. The author correctly points out that, as the Muslim realm expanded under the banner of the new faith, it was moderate and flexible in the enforcement of doctrine, upholding public welfare rather the strict letter of the law.Again, it generally espoused policies of accommodation and pluralism where other faiths were concerned. This supremacy of Islam, political and civilisational, ended with the rise of Western scientific and industrial prowess and the military superiority this provided western powers. The defeat of Muslim empires was not just military; it was a total defeat – political, economic, intellectual and cultural.

Husain’s assertion that Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab only compiled Koranic verses and Hadith and wrote no commentaries is wrong: he was a great theologian and scholar and authored numerous commentaries on the Koran and Hadith, as even a superficial look at his biography will confirm

The author believes that three currents are influencing Muslim life today. First, Arabisation, the “disproportionate Arab influence on the Muslim world”. Though Arabs constitute only 20 percent of the world’s Muslims, contemporary Muslim affairs – political, economic, religious, social and moral – are being impacted mainly by Gulf Arab culture, promoted by petro-dollars, that is diluting the colour and variety of doctrinal and cultural expression of Islam world-wide.The second current is Westernisation, the influence of Western secularism and its liberal culture that is undermining traditional belief-systems and cultural norms. The juxtaposition of these two currents has led to “confusion” as the third current. This is the uneasy co-existence of two contradictory world-views in which American sartorial styles, music, eating habits and life-style inhabit the same space as adherence to jihad and wanton attacks on western and domestic targets, demands for a caliphate and calls for the destruction of Israel.Husain then examines Islamism, Salafi-Wahhabism and jihad, and the doctrinal bases of these precepts that ignite contemporary Muslim violence.He starts with the South Asian ideologue Abul Aala Maududi, moves rapidly to Hassan al-Banna and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, quickly links Banna with Muslim extremist violence in the late twentieth century, goes back and briefly looks at the ideologue Sayyid Qutb, goes even further back to the Kharijite extremists of early Islam, and then highlights the recent early twenty-first “moderation” of the Tunisian ideologue Rachid Ghannouchi, all in fifteen breathless pages!Surprisingly, there is no reference to the role played by the “global jihad” in Afghanistan, sponsored by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the 1980s, in providing the organisation, leadership, weaponry, training, battle-field experience and, above all, doctrinal justification, for jihad.Husain’s discussion of what he calls “Salafi-Wahhabism” is replete with errors of fact and understanding. He conflates modern Salafism with Wahhabism, blames Saudi Arabia for the influence of this ‘baneful’ ideology, sees no difference between Wahhabism and jihadism, and finally loses all scholarly restraint by demanding that “Salafi-Wahhabism must be brought to an end” before it takes hold in other capitals.Husain has got it all wrong. Contemporary political Islam has three distinct expressions all of which are avowedly ‘Salafi’: Wahhabism, the informing doctrine of Saudi Arabia, is quietist in that politics and is the sole prerogative of the ruler. The second strand is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, which espouses political activism, reflects diverse belief-systems, and, within an Islamic framework, can accommodate modern-day democratic politics. Neither Wahhabism nor the Brotherhood countenance violence as part of their belief-system.Jihadism, also called “Salafi-Jihadism”, insists that, in the prevailing political circumstances, the Islamist order can and should be attained only through violence, which is divinely sanctioned. Its intellectual moorings originate, not in the literature of Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, but in the writings of Maududi, Qutb, and, more recently, Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the ideologue of ISIS, Turki bin Al Ali. None of them is part of mainstream Islamic doctrine and all of them draw conclusions from earlier commentaries in terms that suit their political posture and their actions.

The Saudi social-moral order has little to do with Wahhabi doctrine; it is based on pre-Islamic Najdi tribal norms. Wahhabism is primarily used to provide legitimacy for royal rule and the justification to exercise coercive authority in the state in the name of Islam Now, the errors. No, Puritans have not ceased to exist as a movement in the west; they are represented today by the various fundamentalist ‘Millenialist’ movements that emerged in 19th century US, whose adherents today constitute the majority among American Protestants.The Saudi social-moral order has little to do with Wahhabi doctrine; it is based on pre-Islamic Najdi tribal norms. Wahhabism is primarily used to provide legitimacy for royal rule and the justification to exercise coercive authority in the state in the name of Islam.Husain’s assertion that Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab only compiled Koranic verses and Hadith and wrote no commentaries is wrong: he was a great theologian and scholar and authored numerous commentaries on the Koran and Hadith, as even a superficial look at his biography will confirm. Husain’s description of the inclusion of Mecca and Medina in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an “occupation” reflects prejudice of the author and absence of scholarly balance.Finally, Husain’s view that the ISIS is a contemporary version of the early Kharijites makes little historical sense. While both are extremist movements and not amenable to compromise, the ISIS is the product of the unique political circumstances prevailing in Iraq during the Saddam era and later the US occupation.The ‘way forward’, Husain offers, to “heal the rifts and rancour in the Islamic world” consists of: creating a “Middle East Union”, implementing a “Muslim Marshall Plan”, and expelling violent extremists from the Muslim fold. None of these prescriptions has any basis in reality. Given the deep divides in West Asia and the visceral animosities that animate the principal powers, a political union is a remote prospect.Again, who will oust the jihadis from the Muslim fold when state powers have themselves used extremists to further their political interests – in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, Syria and Yemen?More seriously, Husain seems ambivalent about democracy in the Arab world: while he insists that the “ordinary Arab’s feeling of powerlessness needs to end” and emphasises the need to “open up pluralist political spaces and wider economic participation”, he also criticises western governments for calling for “secular, liberal, democratic” forms of government that do not allow for “global grey zones” or other forms of consensual or tribal forms of government.Ed Husain has made a brave attempt to explain Islam and contemporary Muslim politics and society to the lay reader. But, despite his earlier studies and personal experiences, the effort surprisingly is misleading, misdirected and deeply flawed in important respects, so that it produces confusion rather than clarity.

About the Author

The author is a former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia and writes extensively on Islam, jihad and West Asian politics

Reference:

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/reviews-recommendations/house-of-islam-under-siege-brave-but-flawed-book

Does Saudi-funded Muslim Radicalization Threaten India?

By Abhinav Pandaya, HAARETZ

Dated:April 16,2018

In India's hinterlands, a new and worrying phenomenon is brewing.

Sleepy, laid-back cities are the focus of violent clashes between moderate and radical Muslim groups. ISIS recruiters have been caught in cities like Jaipur and Ajmer, and several youngsters from relatively prosperous states like Kerala, Karnataka and metro cities like Hyderabad have travelled to Syria to join ISIS. New foreign-funded mosques have sprung up in Rajasthan. Arabic phrases are beginning to replace traditional Persian-inflected Muslim greetings, from "Khuda Hafiz" and "Ramzaan" to "Allah Hafiz" and "Ramadan."

India is at the crossroads. Its 172 million strong Muslim community that has so far remained resilient to the global spread of jihadi ideology is now showing signs of coming under its sway. Since 2014, only 75 Indians have so far joined ISIS despite India having world’s second largest Muslim population.

But a wave of Saudi-funded hardline proselytization is sweeping across the country, and this extremism is eating away at South Asia’s indigenous and far more liberal, Sufi-based Barelvi traditions. This radicalization may be surfacing publicly now, but it has been building for years.That means India needs to both dedicate more resources to studying the phenomenon of domestic radicalization, and to plan a far more sophisticated and thoughtful counter-radicalization program. But there is a serious gap in research regarding Muslim radicalization in India. Except for a few brief articles by Brookings, the Carnegie Endowment and The Hindu, this dynamic has not attracted the academic, rather than right-wing demagogic, attention it deserves. But this is what we know.

The Barelvi tradition of Islam, founded by Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) and which has 200 million followers in South Asia. Barelvis believe in personal devotion to Prophet Muhammad through intermediaries called dervishes (saints) and its distinct nature that has evolved over centuries of multicultural interaction with other faiths.Wahhabism, Salafism and Deobandism, extremist and literalist schools of Islam on the march in India, consider it contaminated by folk practices alien to their purist interpretation of Islam.

In common with other religions, Islam has undergone several waves of reform movements, such as Wahhabism and Deobandism, but they have generally been reactionary - to "bring back" an authentic, puritan and orthodox form of Islam. Wahhabism and, in essence, Deobandism, aimed to bring back the Islam which prevailed in seventh-century Arabia during the time of Prophet Mohammed and the reign of the first four caliphs, often referred to as the Golden Age of Islam.

Their own roots in India are both indigenous and foreign. The Deobandi school was founded in a madrassa in the small town of Deoband in North India in 1867, but it was based on an older 18th century tradition and now constitutes 20% of India’s Sunni Muslims.According to the Deobandi worldview, Muslim societies have deteriorated under the influence of amoral Western values; it is hostile to the concept that nation-states, rather than Islam, should be a source of loyalty for Muslims. Deobandi cadres in India are strictly opposed to the local custom of worshipping pirs (saints) and their tombs as objects of pilgrimage.

The general perception among India's intellectuals and intelligence community in is that the real threat lies in the challenge from outsiders - Wahhabi Muslims, whose proselytization efforts in India are financed and propped up by Saudi money. But the indigenous Deobandis have increasingly come under the influence of the Wahhabi school. This is poorly understood, even by senior police, foreign-service and administrative officials, who aren't often even familiar with basic differences between Deobandis and Barelvis.

How did Wahhabism first come to India? Its roots can be traced back to the days of British Raj in the person of Syed Ahmad of Rai Barelii (1786-1831) who returned from Mecca in 1824 to wage a jihad against Sikhs and return political power to Muslims.But the real acceleration of the Wahhabi presence in India is far more recent. According to leaked cables, over the last decade and a half Saudi Arabia has become increasingly uncomfortable with the rising Shia influence in India and with Tehran’s overtures. They therefore decided to provide a religious and cultural contra - pumping in money to promote Wahhabism in India.

During a single two year period (2011-2013), according to an  Indian Intelligence Bureau report, 25,000 Wahhabis visited India for missionary work; over that period they brought, in installments, $250 million to propagate Wahhabism, $460 million to set up madrasas and $300 million for miscellaneous costs, including alleged bribes to mosque authorities. Another key project is setting up four universities, at a cost of $1.2 billion. According to the cables, "The radical Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, which first set up base in Kashmir, is spearheading Wahhabi operations across India."

Christopher Jefferlot, in "The Saudi Connection," offers an overview of where Saudi proselytization is focused.Saudi-backed Salafis are gaining a stronghold in the southern Indian state of Kerala, he believes, noting that, "According to a Saudi embassy cable in Delhi, millions of riyals have been reserved" for local Islamic colleges, welfare organizations and political parties there. Sometimes the Saudis has taken over or co-opted existing Muslim groups.It's already noticeable in visiting Kerala that a process of Arabization among the Muslim population is already underway reflected in language, eating habits, belief systems and dress code; more women are wearing the hijab or even the niqab.

It may come as a surprise, but Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies in India appear to have won more appeal among the educated classes. Their austerity acts as a way of differentiating themselves from the "ignorant" and "superstitious" beliefs of rural Muslims. That is part of the reason why India's southern states like Kerala, Karnataka and cities like Hyderabad  - where Muslims are comparatively better off politically, educationally and economically - have supplied the majority of ISIS recruits from India, together with a long history of connections between these states' vast Indian Muslim diaspora and the Arab world, not least through working in the Gulf.Both Wahhabism and Deobandism, as ideologies and missionary projects, prepare the ground for radicalization. Radicalization – in which a text like the Quran is interpreted in a literal sense resulting in an exclusivist, hateful and intolerant mindset toward non-Muslims and those Muslims who dissent from this literalism - builds an extremist, exclusivist and intolerant mindset.

Radicalization does not automatically develop into violence or jihadi terrorism – but it is a required a priori step to prepare the ground. And there is clear evidence that intolerant strains of Islam function as a recruitment pool and conduit for violent activism. It's worth rememberingthat we've already witnessed other regions where radicalization has taken place, quietly, over a long period of time, before erupting into the glare of public attention. That happened in Kosovo (which, since 200, was the target of vigorous Saudi-funded Wahhabi proselytization, and has supplied numerous recruits for ISIS), Spain's Catalonia (the August 2017 Barcelona attack  came after years of Wahhabi radicalization there)  and Pakistan (where there are several jihadist groups whose foot soldiers have also joined ISIS in large numbers).

Of course, it is essential to maintain the distinction between terror advocates and the majority of lay Wahhabi Muslims or Deobandi followers who themselves and their religious institutions formally condemn the acts of terror. For instance, a Wahhabi Muslim provided Indian police with the first lead to the perpetrators of a series of bomb blasts in Ahmedabad in 2008. When I have raised the pressing issue of Saudi-funded radicalization issue with senior intelligence officials in Delhi, many agree about the gravity of the problem. They reply that because of its politically sensitive nature, and the lack of any national-level strategy and program to address Muslim radicalization, most of the time it is left to the state police to deal with such matters in a way that they deem fit, politically and pragmatically. But it's clear that state police do not have the requisite skills and infrastructure to detect such trends and take effective action against them.

A properly-thought out counter-radicalization program for India also faces another obstacle: the prevailing sentiment in India’s mainstream academia and media that domestic Muslim radicalization has increased in reaction to the Modi government’s embrace of Hindu nationalism. However, it's not clear that such a connection can be made. There have no major inter-communal riots, busting of terror sleeper cells or terrorist attacks within India since 2014, the year of Modi’s election. India's most lethal domestic terror attacks happened during the years of government by the Indian National Congress party.

There is no apparent correlation between the Indian states controlled by the Modi's BJP party and those which host a radicalizing trend. In Kerala’s communist regime, several activists with the Hindu nationalist RSS have been killed by Muslim extremists. The staunch anti-Modi regime of West Bengal has emerged as a hub of jihadi activities. Modi’s government has adopted a nuanced, cautious approach to Muslim matters. His government is making efforts to re-invigorate the relatively liberal Sufi Islam to push back against more extremist alternatives, and has been careful to avoid making drastic policy changes or overtly anti-Muslim governmental decisions. Delhi has maintained its support for Palestinian self-determination, and indeed voted at the UN against the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, despite warming ties with Israel.

This is not to downplay the overtly communal rhetoric of various Hindu fundamentalist leaders. When this has led to the murder of Muslims, it's no wonder that Muslim clerics and communal politicians sound alarm-bells of a threat to their faith. But the portrayal of the Modi government as a "threat to Islam" has also been exaggerated for political effect by hitherto fringe Muslim communal leaders. It is India’s large Muslim community itself that is the primary victim of this process of social and cultural radicalization, which holds back their economic and educational progress.

But a narrative of fear and victimization means when Indian Muslims face an increasing barrage of rigid and well-funded proselytizers who condemn their syncretic, liberal Muslim traditions as un-Islamic apostasy and behavior, they're more vulnerable. That is a dynamic that could erode Indian society's secularist status quo, and constitute a deeper threat to India's society and body politic in the future.

About the author:

Abhinav Pandya, a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, is a policy analyst specializing in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. He has written for the Vivekananda Foundation think tank, the Express Tribune (Pakistan), Huffington Post, Fair Observer (US), Indian Military Review, Policy Perspectives Foundation (India) and Quint. He is currently researching Wahhabi radicalization in India and is a consultant with Vidya Bhawan, Udaipur

Reference:

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/does-saudi-funded-muslim-radicalization-threaten-india-1.6008341

The mainstream Sunnis (Ahle Sunnat) are not Wahhabis; They are against Takfirism, Kharjism, Violent Extremism

By Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi, WordForPeace.com

The world’s premier pan-Arab daily newspaper, Asharq Al-Awsat, reported that an international Islamic conference was organised in Grozny, a city in Chechnya with more than 100 top Muslim clerics from all around the world. The agenda was to take an uncompromising stand against the growing Takfiri terrorism that is playing havoc across the world.

The globally renowned Sunni Islamic scholars and clergy unanimously took a stand that the Takfiri terrorists, who loudly claim to belong to ‘Sunni’ Islam, are not from among the Ahlus Sunnah (the Islamic terminology for the mainstream Sunni Muslims in the world).

Addressing the conference, leading Sufi Sunni scholar and the current Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayeb, defined what is meant by ‘Ahlus Sunnah‘ or Sunnism.

He stated: “Ahluls Sunna wal Jama’ah are the Ash’arites or Muturidis (adherents of Abu Mansur al-Maturidi’s systematic theology which is also identical to Imam Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari’s school of logical thought). In matters of belief, they are followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shaf’ai, Maliki or Hanbali) and are also the followers of pure Sufism in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification.”

This statement goes in Arabic as follows:

أهل السنة والجماعة هم الأشاعرة والماتريدية في الاعتقاد وأهل المذاهب الأربعة في الفقه، وأهل التصوف الصافي علما وأخلاقا وتزكية على طريقة سيد الطائفة الإمام الجنيد ومن سار على نهجه من أئمة الهدى

Having said that, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayeb allegedly excluded the “Salafists” from the term of Ahluls Sunna(Sunnis) stating that Salafists –also known as Wahhabis – are not from among the Sunnis.

This was, probably the first time that the global Sunni Islamic scholars have disassociated themselves so clearly from the Salafists, who also claim to be the Ahluls Sunna or ‘Sunnis’.

Though this report has not received the media attention it deserved, it should be caught up as one of the most underlying news emanating from the Muslim world.

 Over 100 Islamic clerics from around the world, including India, have attended this anti-Takfirism Sunni conference in Chechnya. They concluded that Salafism/Wahhabism, the state religion of the Saudi Kingdom flourishing in almost all Muslim-populated courtiers because of the massive Saudi funding, is not the part of mainstream Sunni Islam.

Given the significance of this epoch-making conference, the participating religious leaders called the conference a “significant turning point to correct the treacherous and lethal deviation from the true definition of Ahlus Sunna, as a result of the extremists’ attempts to hijack this glorious epithet, misusing it for themselves.”

Shaikh Muhammad Saad al-Azhari, a moderate Egyptian Islamic scholar and professor at the al-Azhar University, who is the religious affairs consultant for the Egyptian president, also participated in this conference. He is widely known in the Arab world for his scholarly refutation of the extremist jihadist theology of IS, as eloquently done in his Arabic book entitled, Al Haqq al-Mubeen fi al-Radd ala Man Tala’aba bil Deen. In this book, he has come up with original and fresh ideas attempting to rebut the theology of modern jihadism and political Islamism.

He masterly critiqued Sayyid Qutub, the chief political islamist ideologue and his commentary on the Quran Fi Dilal al-Quran (In the shade of the Quran). The theocratic interpretations on this commentary have twisted Islamic doctrines to fan the fire of Takfirist terrorism.

Therefore, Dr al-Azhari has refuted the radical Islamist underpinnings such as Hakimiyyah (Allah’s governance),  jihadism (violent misuse of Jihad), Khilafat (Sharia regime), Al wala Wal bara (loyalty to Muslims and disavowal towards others), Dar-ul Harb and Dar-ul Islam (religious classification of non-Muslim countries) point by point.

Remarkably, a considerable number of Indian Sunni Islamic scholars were also seen in this anti-extremism Islamic conclave. For instance, South Indian Sufi Sunni leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr Ahmad, who runs the largest Islamic seminary in Kerala – Jamia Markaz Saqafa Sunniya, and Shaikh Anwar Ahmad al-Baghdadi who teaches at a leading North Indian madrasa Jamia Alimia in UP were there to articulate an Islamic narrative of peace and counter-terror.

The mainstream Indian Sunni scholars have recently begun to refute the literature that has been compiled and disseminated in the country with a view to indoctrinating the radical Wahhabi ideology among Indian Muslim masses, particularly in Kashmir.

In India, the Wahhabi version of Islam, underpinned by Ibn Taimiya’s Minhaj al-Sunnah and Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawheed, still has to be confronted in a consistent and coherent way.  It took roots in the country when the earliest Salfism-inspired Indian clerics like Syed Ahmad ‘Shaheed’ Rai Barelwi and Maulana Ismail Dehlawi wrote books such as Taqweatul Imaan (strengthening the Islamic faith) and Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (the straight path). In these books, the term ‘jihad’ which actually elucidates an inner struggle to attain salvation was misconstrued, for the first time in India, as the strait path to the rebellion, separatism and wanton killing of the ‘infidels’.

Since the leading Islamic scholars of al-Azhar University have excluded the Salafists from the true adherents of Sunni Islam, it has inevitably caused an uproar among the Saudi Salafist clergy. Agitated reactions continue within the Salafist clerical circle in Saudi Arabia in a bid to oppose the Sunni conference hosted by the Chechen capital, Grozny.

In its report on the issue, the Arabic-language daily Ray al-Youm has told that that the Sunni conference has created a storm of anger among pro-government clerics in Saudi Arabia.

According to the report, several Saudi clerics accuse the Sunni-oriented conference of being an attempt by the Russian government to deepen the gap between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

“It is not prudent to ignite crises and trigger misadventures of political nature, as well as intellectual affiliations and sloganeering, to demonize the Muslims and thereby widening divisions,” the council said in a statement carried by the official Saudi Press Agency.

Notably, the Sunni leaders of the Chechnya conference have recommended the establishment of a national television channel, at the level of Russia, whose objective would be to “communicate the true image of Islam.”

It is interesting to note that the same Islamist discourse is playing out in India too. It is this very Salafist concern that several Islamist leaders in India expressed when the World Sufi Forum was held in New Delhi. They painted it as the Indian government’s effort to frame Sufism as a force opposing Wahhabism/Salafism, though India has averred to combat the religious extremism per se. However, the World Sufi Forum’s participants seemed more enthusiastic about promoting Sufism as a way of supporting inclusive democracy and pluralism rather than Muslim sectarianism.

As an earlier article on Firstpost noted that Sufis have come all out of their conclaves and hospices to fight back the evils of ideological extremism stemming from the hardcore philosophies in the name of Islam. But the anti-Sufism elements and new movements of extremism in the Indian Muslim society are misleading the nation. They disparage every anti-extremism Sufi practitioner as “pseudo-Sufi”.

About the Author

The author is a scholar of Comparative Religion, Classical Arabic and Islamic sciences, cultural analyst and researcher in Media and Communication Studies. Views are personal. He tweets at @GRDehlvi. Email: grdehlavi@gmail.com

Reference:

http://www.wordforpeace.com/the-mainstream-sunnis-ahle-sunnat-are-not-wahhabis-they-are-against-takfirism-kharjism-violent-extremism/