Black Flags in Kashmir – Mere Shadows or the Coming of Islamic State?

By Mehmood ur Rashid

The Wire, January 07, 2019

A riotous appearance of black flags at Jamia Masjid in Srinagar conjures up the spectre once again – ISIS. Once again phantoms raid the town and creep many out. The immediate response is condemnation from all over, coupled with an expression to oppose it openly. But it is still a mix of denial and lurking fear that guides Kashmir’s response to this new species of masked faces and black flags.

For some time, a pack of this species, shouting a new set of slogans, have a blitz on the scene. Jamia Masjid in Srinagar is the latest, certainly not the last. Earlier it happened at the funerals of some militants. This group tried hard to create a new imagery by waving huge black flags – with the same marks and slogans that the global eye knows as ISIS. As a deliberate reaction to this, we then saw green flags all over the funerals – draping dead bodies, and waving in thousand hands. A clear indication that a new variant of militancy is trying hard to displace the old, and the old is hitting back harder: Black vs Green. The incident at Jamia Masjid reiterates the contest.

Why Jamia Masjid?

Well, this can be just another attempt at just another place. It can also be only for optics – for this mosque is always in the eye of media. Before the massive 2016 public uprising, young boys were noticed waving black flags just outside this mosque. It brought a lot of attention to the Black, but it was largely ignored as a provocative sneer that added zing to the atmosphere where boys and young men hurled stones at government forces.

But there are signs that tell the choice of spot is deliberate, dropping a message sombre and significant. Jamia Masjid symbolises the core of Kashmir’s mainstream Muslim culture. It also acts as a principal spot for what Kashmiris call freedom, or resistance politics. All the underground armed groups that existed – or exist – in Kashmir have accepted its centrality one way or the other.

For three decades – beginning 1990 – Jamia Masjid has been the lone space that neither the unionist parties nor the government forces have been able to snatch from the azadi politics. If ISIS succeeds to barge into this space, it means a tectonic displacement in the politics and society of Kashmir.

Right now, ISIS is a faint murmur somewhere in the back of beyond, occasionally relaying the waves into the habitations. There is hardly any acceptability to it in Kashmir. The force that denies ISIS a foothold in Kashmir is two-fold, and Jamia Masjid serves as a locale for both. One, Kashmir’s mainstream Muslim culture. Two, the existing structure of azadi politics.

Azadi politics

Kashmir’s mainstream Muslim culture is not a monolith. It comprises multiple strands. There are different religious sects, and belongings. There are groups and parties upholding various ideologies. But across these differences – from Salafis to Sufis – there are no takers for the brutal violence ISIS symbolises. The general impression is that this group does no good to Muslims – it only maligns Islam. This comprises the core opposition to anything sounding ISIS in Kashmir.

The active opposition comes from the existing structure of what is known as resistance or azadi camp in Kashmir. For those outside the Valley, it might sound strange that there is a structured opposition to even the idea of ISIS-type armed groups establishing itself in Kashmir – from the very armed groups that exist there. Political formations like the Hurriyat Conference have also openly denounced it. In fact, it was Geelani who first spoke openly against ISIS.

But the reasons for this opposition are largely pragmatic. The existing structure of azadi politics, comprising political formations like Hurriyat Conference, JRL and the armed groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba base their case on the globally known character of Kashmir issue. To all these groups, Kashmir is an internationally-recognised dispute, and that is what gives them legitimacy. In case ISIS takes over, the whole scheme is turned upside down. It would herald an existential crisis for them.

Pakistan also sits in the same line of thinking. ISIS plainly tries to dislodge all of this. It pushes aside azadi and Pakistan with equal vehemence, bringing in a new utopia by the name of Khilafat. It carries a symbolism embedded in Muslim history, and a virulent form of theological notions. And it knows that its theological content is not easy to reject for the religio-political parties of Kashmir. In the days ahead, this will make the contest between the black and the green curious and complex.

What next?

Pushing aside what happened at Jamia Masjid as just unpleasant is not a wise option. If we are not already, we will soon be in for a rude awakening. Right now, a bundle of unquiet thoughts is delivered at our doorstep in a treacherous way. We cannot refuse to open the door in the hope that someone else will carry the bundle off for us. The sinister seems to have marched in, desperately trying to drop anchor. The signals may be feeble, and far off, but certainly too dangerous to be missed.

A sense of foreboding creeps up. A changing dynamic of Kashmir conflict can turn ISIS into an entrenched interest, involving multiple players, state and non-state. The only thing that can break this tide-in-the-making is a return to political. A serious call for New Delhi, Islamabad and Kashmiri leadership to act with a sense of urgency.

True, all the political initiatives so far have yielded little, some would say absolutely nothing. And nothing sums it up like nothing. But the alternative to political is violent, and ISIS signals taking violence to a new high. It’s not the magnitude of violence that scares as does the character of that violence.

About the Author:

Mehmood ur Rashid is Opinion Editor of the Greater Kashmir, published from Srinagar. He writes a regular column for the same news paper.

Reference:

https://thewire.in/politics/kashmir-isis-jamia-masjid-azadi-politics/amp/

Online Radicalisation: The Example of Burhan Wani

By Prabha Rao

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Dated: July 16, 2016

Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a Hizbul Mujahideen commander for South Kashmir, died in an encounter in Bundoora village of Kokernag on July 8, 2016, along with two other militants, Sartaj Ahmad Sheikh and Pervaiz Ahmad Lashkari. Wani’s death has generated unprecedented public hysteria, in keeping with his image as a glamourous, tech savvy, insurgent. The lessons to be drawn from this event go beyond the conventional understanding of violence in Kashmir.

A school dropout from the Shareefabad area of Tral, Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, Burhan Wani effectively played the victimhood narrative by stating that he had joined the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) at the age of 15 in reaction to the brutality of the Security Forces, which had beaten his brother, Khalid, unconscious in the summer of 2010 on the streets of Tral. Wani eschewed the traditional gun-toting route and innovatively used his social media skills, thus changing the public face of militancy in Kashmir by crowd sourcing support in a manner popularised by the agitators of the Arab Spring and the ISIS in Syria/Iraq.

Wani’s Use of Social Media

Wani’s initial stint in the HM in 2011 was that of a courier/messenger; the differentiator came with his cyber outreach. He created a Twitter handle @Gazi_Burhan in October 2012, which he used to upload photographs of atrocities – overtly graphic pictures of violence – allegedly perpetrated by Security forces as well as virulently anti-India and anti-Modi content.2 His calls for joining the ‘Jihad’ were accompanied by qur’anic verses, emotive demands for “Azadi” and exhortations to establish the Nizam-e-Mustafa (God’s government) in Kashmir. In a first action of its kind, he started sending photographs of himself and other militants with faces uncovered, in identifiable locations around Srinagar, which gave disaffected youth a sense of identity and imparted the idea that militancy was a heroic, fairly risk-free, job. His message to join the ‘Jihad’, and not become informers of the Army or Police, gained traction. And in an obvious recruitment drive, he offered remunerations of Rs 35,000 to whomever was willing to join. His video and twitter messages highlighted his fight against the Indian establishment. And because of his tweets, Mohammad Ikhlaq, lynched in Dadri on suspicion of consuming beef, and Zahid Ahmed, a Kashmiri trucker who was attacked in Udhampur, have become household names across the Valley.

In August 2015, Wani uploaded a video on a Facebook account calling for the establishment of a Khilafat in Kashmir. This was a message sent to his target audience to emphasise the Islamic underpinnings of his initiatives. There were no calls for plebiscite or implementation of UN resolutions on Kashmir, etc. Instead, the communication was directed to the Kashmiri youth, urging them to join his outfit, and to the Kashmir police, asking them to shun their fight against the militants. There were no references to the ageing Hurriyat Council or the HM leadership in Pakistan. The video, which was professionally made with Burhan Wani and two other militants in military fatigues, with a Kalashnikov, a pistol and a Quran prominently displayed, went viral in minutes and was widely circulated on WhatsApp in Kashmir, before the Kashmir police took action to block the page. The Cyber Cell of Kashmir police in Srinagar has been valiantly combating the activities of Wani and other militants/sympathisers in the virtual world, but is seriously constrained by lack of qualified staff and meagre resources.

In a video uploaded on YouTube and Facebook on June 8, 2016, Wani commented on controversies around the proposal for the establishment of Sainik Colonies and a separate township for Kashmiri Pandits. He tapped into the resentment among Kashmiri Muslims on this matter. His message was: “The Hindus of this place, who reside outside, they can come to their homes to stay there. If they stay at places where they have their homes, their land, they will find us as their guards… But these separate Israel-type colonies, this is an Indian conspiracy against us. We will act against them (separate Pandit colonies).” In the same video, he stated that the HM would “act against every man in uniform who stands for the Indian Constitution,”6 and urged the general public to keep note of the police personnel and their movements. This message again was widely circulated through the Valley, and it can be seen that attacks on the army, paramilitary forces and the police have escalated sharply since Wani started his diatribes against the security forces. To give an immediate example, the wife and daughter of Mohammad Ashraf Pal who is posted as duty officer at Sangam police post in Bijbehara area of Anantnag district, were beaten up by a mob on July 13 – a departure from the militants’ usual practice of not attacking families of officers. Organised activities by the Sanghbaaz – the stone pelters – have shown an upsurge, reminiscent of the situation in 2010, with social media activists terming it as Kashmiri Intifada.

More recently, focussing on the current controversies around Dr. Zakir Naik and his purported role in radicalising the Dhaka terrorists, Wani tweeted a picture of the televangelist on July 7, a day before he died, with the text, “Support Zakir Naik or Time Will Come When Qur'an Recitation Will Be Banned.” He had tagged Dukhtaran-e-Millat chief Aasiya Andrabi, Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Sayeed, Hurriyat Conference leader Mirwaiz Farooq, Canadian Wahhabi preacher Bilal Philips, former Fox international fellow at Yale University Inshah Malik, and Dukhtaran-e-Millat general secretary Nahida Nasreen Noor. Support for Dr. Zakir Naik has gathered momentum in the Valley following the tweet and Burhan’s death.

Wani’s Target Audience

Wani’s social media outreach had created a hype in the press, both in India and Pakistan, with commentaries stating that he was the emerging cult figure in Kashmir who had generated a new phase in the separatist movement which had been quiescent since 2010. Around 60 per cent of the Valley’s population is below 30, often unemployed, and hyperactive on the social media, giving Wani a readymade target audience. By 2013, he was being called the poster boy of the Kashmir insurgency by both the national and international media, given his dedicated fan following in the Valley and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). According to the J&K Police,9 while it would be difficult to quantify the reach of Wani’s cyber blitz, he has undeniably attracted and influenced young minds to the idea of militancy. Evidence of this was seen in the crowds who attended his funeral on July 9, defying curfews, and far outnumbering the funeral processions for Mufti Mohammad Syed. Consequently, after a hiatus of 15 years, local Kashmiri youth are once again outnumbering Pakistani terrorists. According to official figures, north Kashmir has 66 local and 44 foreign terrorists; and, in south Kashmir, locals number 109 and foreign terrorists are a mere seven, according to police records. Commenting on the trend, Lt Gen Satish Dua, Corps Commander, 15 Corps, had opined that “The new strategy is to recruit locals and give them rudimentary training in the hinterland because the adversary (read Pakistan) is not able to push terrorists across the line of control.”In view of Wani’s disruptive activities, the Government of India had in July 2105 announced a bounty of 10 lakh rupees for information leading to his arrest.

Protests against his killing

Given the above backdrop, Burhan Wani’s killing has been a major operational success for the Special Operations Group of J&K Police. Adverse public reaction in Kashmir, though expected, snowballed into mass protests (with 33 people dead and over 500 injured), underscoring the extent of alienation in the Valley. This trend has been noted earlier during the funeral of Lashkar-e-Taiba commander Abu Qasim (October 31, 2015), who had ambushed and killed J&K Police sub-inspector Mohammed Altaf, when over 20,000 people attended his funeral. The high-pitched support for a slain Pakistani terrorist showed that there was a wide swath of support for the Lashkar’s religio-militant zeal, a fault line Burhan Wani was able to exploit. To reiterate, Wani’s funeral gathered an unprecedented number of mourners from all walks of life, including women and children, but predominantly young men in the age group of 15 to 30 years. Many were seen treading several kilometres on foot, travelling in mini-buses, load carriers, trucks, cars and motor-bikes, and shouting pro-freedom, pro-Hizb, pro-Burhan and anti-India slogans. “We will fight our own battles, there will be a Burhan Wani coming out of every Kashmiri house” was the slogan of choice, demonstrating that for a large number of mourners the killing of Wani was a call to rejuvenate the armed resistance.

Another incendiary development was that several mosques were echoing the mourners and asking people to join the “Jihad: against India — a theme that is likely to be repeated in the Friday Qutbah prayers on July 15. This is a cause for concern as the maulvis in many of the mosques in Kashmir are not locals, but are from Uttar Pradesh and are more Wahhabist/Salafist in their leanings, adhering to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa line in Pakistan, as against the essentially Sufi form of Islam traditionally practiced in Kashmir.

The Pakistan Angle

Eye witnesses quoted by Times of Islamabad said that Wani’s family wrapped his dead body in a Pakistani flag during his funeral and he was also buried with it. Pakistani flags, according to the “Greater Kashmir” website, were displayed around the Wani household and Burhan Wani’s father, Muzzafar Wani, a school principal, has been a long-time member of the Jamaat-e-Islami, with pro separatist sentiments. The website has quoted another family member as saying that “The Geneva convention gives us the right to fight for our right to have the self-determination as we are an internationally recognized disputed territory under the United Nation’s resolutions on which India has signed.” A Facebook comment by JNU student Umar Khalid, who is out on bail in a sedition case, comparing Burhan Wani to Che Guevara – “I don’t care if I fall as long as someone else picks up my gun and keeps on shooting. These were the words of Che Guevara, but could have just been Burhan Wani’s too” – has also found prominent place in the Pakistani media. Over the past week, the Pakistani media has used the death of Burhan Wani to drive the message to local and international audiences that Kashmiri support is firmly with Pakistan.

Pakistan’s role in cultivating, grooming and nurturing Kashmiri militants needs no elaboration. Reports suggest that Hafiz Saeed mooted the idea of using social media extensively in order to fuel anti-India sentiments in the Valley. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa/Lashkar-e-Taiba has several well trained social media cells across Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed has been working extensively on these cells to defy a ban imposed on the JuD's media coverage in Pakistan. These cells have been used under the umbrella of several front organisations such as Difa-e-Pakistan Council and Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation Pakistan. The symbiotic relationship between JuD and HM often extends to training and motivating cadres, and it is conceivable that social media initiatives by young militants like Burhan Wani not only gained approval but also support from these groups. The ‘virtual’ war was an innovative weapon, which could be used separately but in a syncretic way with the Hurriyat Council and the older Kashmiri leaders. Online messaging, while very effective in opinion creation, gained extra traction in Kashmir due to the prevailing disenchantment with the political elite. According to officials dealing with counter-insurgency, this helped an HM cadre like Burhan Wani, with no real militant credentials, to quickly gain iconic status. They also opine that he was a ‘Pakistani trap’, which the Indian security agencies fell into.

Pakistan is trying to maintain the anti-Indian tempo generated by Burhan Wani’s killing by keeping a firm hold on the activities of the HM. The Hizb command Council met on July 12 under the chairmanship of the outfit’s supreme commander, Syed Salahuddin, at Muzaffarabad in PoK and decided to appoint Mehmood Ghaznavi to replace Burhan Wani as the new HM commander in Kashmir. Ghaznavi is an unknown militant who has not got a photograph of himself in the public domain, and is not immediately recognisable as an associate of Wani’s. Simultaneously, the group has appointed Sabzar Ahmad, @‘Sab Don’, son of Ghulam Hassan Bhat, resident of Ruthsana in Tral, as the new commander of one of its wings in south Kashmir. Sabzar Ahmad was a close associate and childhood friend of Burhan Wani, and joined HM in 2015 after Burhan Wani's older brother, Khalid, was killed. He was seen by the public in Wani’s funeral, and is reported to be aware of his contacts across the LoC. He is known to be very tech savvy, and had contributed extensively to Burhan Wani’s media outreach. He is supposed to have uploaded the photographs of the Burhan Wani group on the internet. The HM will be able to fill the vacuum created by Wani’s death with comparative ease, using Sabzar Ahmad, and maintain overall control via an unknown/unidentified commander like Mehmood Ghaznavi.

Burhan Wani has certainly changed the dynamics of militancy in Kashmir. Though Omar Abdullah, Hafeez Saeed, and Syed Salahuddin sent tweets condemning his killing, none attended his funeral, which was actually marked by a groundswell of public support, especially among the youth. Sustained publicity is being given to young casualties, including feeds that over a hundred have been shot in the eyes. Pakistan-based terrorists have been feasting on these images, and spewing venom about the excesses of the Indian State. Hafiz Saeed’s Twitter handle @hafizsaeedlive was suspended by Twitter following reports by Indian security agencies that it was being used to incite violence in Kashmir.22 Now, the suspension issue is being used by the JuD to generate Tweets from various supporters that the United States of America supports India in the latter’s oppression of Kashmir, emphasising thereby that Pakistan was the only recourse left for the Kashmiri people. This was the line adopted by Pakistan in the UN on July 13, but which found little support from the international community. At home, however, New Delhi has to contend with a restive Kashmir which has been exposed to sustained online rabble rousing. Hence, while the security forces will certainly bring order to the situation sooner rather than later, the endemic issues of disaffection and alienation in Kashmir need urgent redressal.

About the author

Prabha Rao is Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Reference:

https://idsa.in/issuebrief/online-radicalisation-burhan-wani_prao_160716

Salafi-Jihad in Kashmir: New Cat among the Pigeons

By Dr. Adil Rasheed,

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Dated: May 15, 2017 

For a long time Indian strategists have sought to devise a credible strategic communications programme against the devious indoctrination of the vulnerable sections in Kashmir society by Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled terror groups, which has increasingly taken on a religious colour, but is mainly directed at weaning the state of Jammu and Kashmir away from India.

However, in the absence of any effective public relations or ideological counter-narratives campaign, it is ironic that the act of discrediting Kashmiri secessionism has come from a highly unlikely quarter.

Salafi jihadi groups, particularly ISIS operatives, using social media apps like Telegram have been quite busy these days denouncing the so-called Kashmir independence movement as ‘un-Islamic’. To them, jihad should not be conducted for nationalistic reasons but instead waged solely to please Allah (what they call ‘jihad fi Sabilillah’), which, in practical terms, implies the imposition of the most Salafized version of Shariah. According to the transnational Salafi terror outfits, the championing of democracy by Kashmiri separatists and leaving the character of the political dispensation of a prospective breakaway Kashmiri state to the will of its people delegitimizes the Islamic credentials of the movement.

In addition, the methods and means adopted for the so-called resistance by segments of the Kashmiri populace has also come under criticism by the purveyors of global jihad. Thus, ISIS elements have denounced the participation of Kashmiri women in stone-pelting activities against Indian soldiers, which, to them, violates the conservative Islamist norms regarding Muslim women’s conduct in public life.

Pakistan’s provision of support to the secessionist Kashmiris is also denounced as irreligious by the ISIS and Al-Qaeda, because, in their view, the state of Pakistan is an ‘apostate’ power, in that it has avoided the full implementation of Shariah rule and has ostensibly sided with the international coalition against terror.

This growing vilification of the Kashmiri movement by Salafi-Jihadi terror groups is a part of their overt radicalization attempts aimed at hijacking the sub-nationalist insurgency. There is a new cat among the pigeons! In fact, there are early signs of doctrinal wedges appearing among the jihadist outfits operating in the valley and this ideological dissonance is intended to prepare the ground for a turf war between the forces of jihadist globalization and the indigenous secessionist leadership represented by the Hurriyat.

The ideological wedge has widened to the extent that Burhan Wani’s successor as the leader of Hizbul Mujahideen in Kashmir, Zakir Musa, has himself quit the organization. Following the Salafi-jihadi line of jihadism, he has called for the creation of an Islamic State of Jammu and Kashmir. In this action, Zakir has reportedly drawn the support of two other militant outfits — Harkatul Mujahideeen (HuM) and Kashmir Taliban.

The confusion among the Pakistan-backed jihadi groups and Kashmiri secessionist forces over the growing ideological influence of the ISIS and Al-Qaeda on the trajectory of the movement is palpable in the Hurriyat’s recent strongly-worded condemnation of ISIS and other foreign jihadist groups. A portion of the joint statement issued by the three main Hurriyat leaders – Syed Ali Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Yasin Malik – posted on the coalition’s website on May 8 reads, “Our movement has nothing to do with these world level groups (Al-Qaeda, ISIS etc.) and practically they are non-existent in the state. There is no role for these groups in our movement.”

But the statement does not stop at dissociating the movement from global jihad. In order to fend off disturbing Islamist claims, Hurriyat leaders have resorted to blaming their ‘Other’ (i.e. the Indian government) for even this alleged ‘conspiracy’. This can be seen from the following sentences on its web portal: “Authorities in Delhi have now started to play a vicious game under the garb and label of ‘holy war’. It is a ploy to create a wedge between people and brave hearts, said they (sic). Quoting reliable sources, leadership disclosed that agencies are hiring some sick minded and Ikhwan type goons (sic) and they have been assigned the task for creating chaos in state.”

The outrageous conceit of placing the blame for ISIS’s criticism of the Kashmir movement on the Indian government in order to defend the indefensible, inane and ludicrous as is, only highlights the heightened sense of unease and desperation among Hurriyat leaders in the wake of their receding credibility among the Kashmiri masses.

It is to be noted that this Salafi-jihadist ideological salvo comes at a time when there is growing resentment among young Kashmiri radicals, who are questioning the commitment of the Hurriyat leaders towards their avowed cause. Writing on a secessionist website dubbed Kashmir Despatch, a purported resident of the province going by the name Inamur Rahman has criticized Hurriyat leaders of being engaged in pointless academic pursuits at a time when the insurgency was at its most critical moment. He criticises Geelani for having the time to write and release a book on 20th century poet Sir Muhammad Iqbal in April 2017 even as the civil strife following Burhan Wani’s death last year petered to an inconsequential end. He then refers to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s PhD, which was on a 14th century saint rather than on the ongoing Kashmir conflict. The author claims, “This shows how much the Hurriyat is disengaged, disinterested and disconnected with the masses.”

Do these developments point to a gradual shift in the ideological drivers of the Kashmir insurgency? Does it mark the decline of the self-styled leaders of the Kashmir uprising and the emergence of a more rabid, extreme global Salafi-jihadist movement? Will this trend gain momentum and alter the course of the secessionist movement? Answers to these question are essential if the Indian authorities are to successfully navigate these treacherous waters in the times ahead.

About the Author:

Dr. Adil Rasheed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. 

Reference:

https://idsa.in/idsacomments/salafi-jihad-in-kashmir_adil-rasheed_150517

Are we witnessing the last gasp of terrorism in Kashmir?

By Col Vivek Chadha (Retd)

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 

Dated:July 11, 2017

The increase in violence levels on the streets of Kashmir and participation of the local population became a cause for worry in 2016. The peace dividend achieved at great ost only a couple of years earlier seemed to be losing out to the mindlessness of violent mobs. This was accompanied by enhanced local recruitment, especially within the ranks of the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM). A larger proportion of the new recruits came from South Kashmir, unlike in the past when North Kashmir was the hub of violence and terrorism. The situation seemed to be going downhill from the perspective of an average peace loving Kashmiri who in the past had seen schools being burnt by terrorists. The security forces were routinely the target of stone pelting mobs. And finally, children and women had been pushed into the line of pellets and bullets due to relentless propaganda, coercion and the resultant cycle of violence.

In the midst of these incidents, a series of events seems to indicate the arrival of a watershed moment in Kashmir, which could result in Pakistan-sponsored terrorism becoming a victim of its own machinations. On June 22, Deputy Superintendent of Police Mohammed Ayub Pandit was lynched by a mob at Nowhatta, near Srinagar. Just about a week before that, Feroz Ahmad Dar and five of his J&K police compatriots were killed in Anantnag by terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). And a little over a month earlier, Lieutenant Ummer Fayyaz, an unarmed young officer of the Rajputana Rifles, an illustrious infantry regiment of the army, was kidnapped and shot dead by terrorists in Shopian district. Fayyaz was on leave to attend a family wedding. The latest in this series of violent incidents was the July 10 targeting by terrorists of a bus ferrying pilgrims to Amarnath, resulting in the death of seven innocent people, including five women. This was the first attack against Amarnath yatris after the year 2000.

All this should normally indicate an upswing in the levels of violence and a hardening of approach by Pakistan, which controls and coordinates major terrorist groups like the LeT and HM. It should further suggest the increased effectiveness and lethality of the terrorist groups themselves. Contrary to this seemingly obvious conclusion, however, the reality could be the very opposite. In fact, we may well witness a shift in the ground situation in Kashmir.

This is best illustrated by the experience in Punjab, which had suffered painful years of terrorist violence in the eighties and the first few years of the nineties. Even as terrorism was at its peak in the state, the criminalisation of terrorist groups had led to senseless violence, with humiliation and atrocities being unleashed against policemen and their families as well as common citizens. This led to a fight for survival between the people and the local police on one side and the terrorists on the other. Given the nature of violent acts perpetrated by the terrorists, the struggle also became personal. There were incidents of women picking up weapons to protect themselves and their families against mindless terrorist violence. The alienation of the population and victimisation of the local police turned the tide in favour of the State. The gradual rise in terrorism in Punjab stood in contrast to its sudden elimination. Terrorists were hunted down without pity or remorse. Even as some of their leaders continued to nurse their hurt pride and wounded sentiment sitting in Pakistan, terrorism was defeated decisively on the ground in Punjab.

The series of events cited above in relation to Kashmir appears to be following a similar course. The misdirected angst of terrorists against policemen, their families, a defenceless Kashmiri army officer on leave and innocent pilgrims all appear to represent a sign of disarray in their ranks. It is a reflection of the frustration that has surfaced against Kashmiris employed in the police and in the security forces as well as against the syncretic culture of tolerance prevalent in the state. The various incidents of violence are possibly aimed at breaking the will of the security forces and the population at large through the tool of sensational terrorist attacks. But, as the debacle of terrorism in Punjab suggests, all this could push the common people who came for the funerals of terrorists to shift their loyalties. They will also contribute to the hardening of the resolve of the Kashmir police to not only protect themselves but also take the fight to the terrorists. Finally, the return of violence also sets back any possibility of bringing different groups to the negotiating table in the near future.

The turning of the tide through a series of counter terrorism operations seems to suggest that the shift is already underway. June 2017 witnessed a series of successful strikes by security forces against terrorists and especially their leaders. To a casual observer, this may seem to be a coincidence. But the reality is that these strikes were enabled by accurate intelligence provided by angry locals who may not be able to voice their dissent in public, given their fear of being targeted by terrorists, but have helped punish them for their wanton acts of violence. For anyone who has operated in J&K, the elimination of terrorist leaders, who are normally shielded by layers of security, is an indication of excellent human intelligence. It further reflects the effectiveness of the local police network, which has clearly decided to work overtime and pay back the terrorists in the language they best understand.

For the common Kashmiri people, the Amarnath pilgrimage is an important event in the annual calendar that contributes significantly to their income. The attempt to disrupt it suggests a disconnect with the local economics of the region.

The distancing of every segment of Kashmiri politics, population and even separatists from the Amarnath pilgrim attack is a clear indication of anger and frustration that seems to be building up against senseless acts of terrorism. It is also a reality check for Kashmiri leaders, both mainstream and separatist. Seeds of violence once sown have almost always unleashed unrestrained and uncontrolled destruction. Be it the fabric of a society or its very soul, such violence can hold it captive or worse extinguish the spirit that guides its civilizational destiny. The breakup of HM and the allegiance extended by some of its cadres to the Daesh is a reflection of this shift. The decision of some within terrorist ranks to reject Kashmiriyat and secularism is likely to propagate a radical ideology that the present leadership in the state will be unable to reconcile with their own objectives.

If this reality does not lead to a rejection of senseless violence, it is a matter of time before the people and their police in Kashmir turn the tide of violence and defeat terrorism in conjunction with other security forces, as happened in Punjab.

About the Author:

Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. 

Reference:

https://idsa.in/idsacomments/are-we-witnessing-the-last-gasp-of-terrorism-in-kashmir_vchadha_110717

Belying police claims, IS shadow lengthens over Valley

       By Vijaita Singh and Peerzada Ashiq

      The Hindu, Dated: September 16, 2018

Asif Nazir Dar, an engineering dropout, is remembered by locals and friends in Pulwama’s Panzgam area as a “polite and religious person who never participated in street protests”.

Dar was found dead on September 8 outside Srinagar’s Kashmir University campus.

Social media tussle

Soon messages on social media platforms affiliated to the Islamic State said he had been killed on the orders of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Riyaz Naikoo.

However, a day later, another message was posted that Dar was killed by “Indian agencies.”

Confirming the latter post, a senior J&K police official said Dar was the tenth militant influenced by the Islamic State (IS) ideology to be killed in the past 10 months in the Valley.The social media post showed him posing with a sophisticated weapon with the typical, black IS flag in the background.

The latest death also challenges the police narrative that the strength of IS-influenced cadre in Kashmir is in single digits, and was limited to the unfurling of black flags at the funerals of militants.

Dar alias Abu Anwar al-Kashmiri, according to the police, was the third amir(chief) of ISJK to be killed, after Eisa Fazli in March and Dawood Ahmad Sofi in June.

“Numberwise their presence is minuscule. But it is the radical ideology propagated by this group that is spreading fast. Their numbers are nothing in terms of Hizbul, who have organisational backing from Pakistan, but they are a serious challenge… There are around four-five active members and all of them are identified. They were involved in snatching weapons from policemen,” said a senior Home Ministry official.

The United Jihad Council has accused the group of “creating confusion” and warned it of “dire consequences”.At his funeral, Dar was wrapped in a black flag with IS inscribed on it. He was a Bachelor of Technology student at Jammu when he disappeared in January 2017. He reappeared online holding a rifle.

Dar reflects the profile of most IS cadre killed or active in Kashmir at present — youth from well-educated and aspiring middle-class families, who avoid street protests but are known to discuss religious affairs. Dar’s father was an employee with the state-run BSNL; one of his brothers teaches at a government school while another is pursuing an MBA course.

Hurriyat under fire

“ISJK recruits are angry with the Hurriyat and the militant conglomerate United Jehad Council’s approach. They deem it too soft and are calling for a more hardline narrative and approach, in line with Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence),” a senior police officer told The Hindu .

On March 12, Mohammad Taufeeq alias Sultan Zabul al Hind, a resident of Hyderabad’s Khamam district, was killed in Anantnag along with two local militants of the ISJK. In April, Qamer Uz Zaman, a resident of Jamunamukh town in central Assam’s Hojai, was seen posing with a gun in pro-militant online accounts. He was arrested by the Uttar Pradesh police this week.

On September 7, Delhi police arrested two Kashmiri men for allegedly collecting weapons for the ISJK. Since October, 2017 Al Qaraar, an IS-backed social media channel is engaged in fierce competition the Al Qaeda to promote its propaganda through social media.

Reference:

https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-miscellaneous/tp-others/belying-police-claims-is-shadow-lengthens-over-valley/article24959168.ece

Why Has the Islamic State Failed to Grow in Kashmir?

By Mohammed Sinan Siyech

RSIS  Counter Terrorist  Trends and Analyses

Volume 10, Issue 5 | May 2018

Global jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have failed to exploit the Kashmir conflict, unlike conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, given that it is framed as a territorial issue and political dispute as opposed to an Islamist conflict. This article maps out the nature and magnitude of the IS footprint in the Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir (IAJK) by examining the local dynamics of the insurgency. In doing so, it explains that opposition by local insurgent groups and citizens as well as the difficulty of penetration have denied IS any substantive presence in the valley.

Introduction

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Indian administered Jammu & Kashmir (IAJK) has been mired in diplomatic and international tensions between India and Pakistan. Decades of poor governance, corruption, political disenfranchisement and lack of socio-economic  development in the region culminated in a mass insurgency in 1988 and is still continuing today with an estimated death toll of 45,000 to 80,000.The Indian government has fought off various Kashmiri groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), as well as Pakistan supported militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) among others. Following a relative lull in violence in the 2000s, the insurgency was reignited in 2016 after the killing of Burhan Wani, a local militant commander with extensive social media following. Notwithstanding the protracted insurgency in Kashmir, global jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and IS have struggled to cultivate a substantial presence in the region. Given the two groups’ success in attracting foreign militants into other conflict zones such as Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, their limited traction in Kashmir is notable. This contribution examines the reasons for the limited IS’ presence in Kashmir by looking at the strength of the Kashmir narrative and Kashmiri identity over translational Islamist identities, and opposition by local insurgent groups.

IS’ Footprint in Kashmir

Initial signs of IS presence in Kashmir became visible in 2016, after the locals waved the organisation’s flag on multiple occasions. Most of these incidents were driven by the frustration of the Kashmiri populace. Towards the end of 2017, its media channel Al-Qaraar increased its Kashmir-centric propaganda  when it released a document that criticised the role of ‘groups with links to Pakistani intelligence agencies’ who, they believed, were fighting for national causes rather than for Islam.5 Shortly thereafter, Al-Qaraar  released another document specifically naming various leaders of Kashmiri political and separatist parties and censuring their secular credentials and willingness to accede to international mediation by the United Nations (UN). Operationally, IS has claimed two separate assassinations of security officials in 2017 and 2018. However, given IS’ propensity to falsely claim responsibility for attacks, these reports are unconfirmed and flimsy at best. Indian security agencies have maintained that IS does not have a strong presence in the valley, citing a lack of members as the major determining factor. As such, IS’ influence in Kashmir is mostly limited to the online sphere where it is struggling to recruit youth.

Non-existent Global Jihad in Kashmir

The IS-led global Jihadist movement has displayed an affinity to latch itself onto conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, by attracting foreign fighters from various countries. Despite this, IS has abstained from directing fighters into, or attracting fighters from Kashmir and the insurgency there has remained a primarily indigenous Kashmiri and Pakistani based movement.

Three broad factors explain the disinterest in sending foreign fighters (FF) to the valley:

(i)           access to the battlefront,

(ii)         cohesion between local and foreign actors and

(iii)        chances of Victory.

(i)       Access to the Battlefront

In the case of Afghanistan in the 1980s and Syria since 2011, major mobilisation of foreign fighters was witnessed with strong access to conflict zones (the battlefront). This was facilitated by the Maktab Al-Khidmat headquartered in Peshawar, run by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, that arranged logistics for foreign fighters who intended to fight in Afghanistan. For instance, due to the cold war between the US and Russia in the 1980s, many countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen among others were eager to facilitate foreign fighters to topple the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Afghanistan and develop closer ties with the US. This was further reflected in Pakistan’s decision to keep its borders open to fighters who were travelling to Afghanistan. More or less the same dynamics were at play in Syria where Turkey played the facilitating role However, in the case of Kashmir, two factors have hindered or discouraged IS from establishing a foothold. First, the Kashmiri conflict is framed as a territorial and political dispute between India and Pakistan rather than an ideological dispute driven by religious factors. Moreover, it does not occupy the same level of importance for Muslims as conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. Barring one attempt, IS has not overtly reached out to Kashmiri groups or made it a central focus of its online propaganda. Secondly, Kashmir is a heavily militarized conflict zone that has a strong presence of over 700,000 Indian military personnel. This means that Indians or global members of IS who might use mainland India to travel into Kashmir will find it difficult to escape the elaborate security measures of Indian security forces.

(ii)   Internal Cohesion

In Kashmir, current insurgent groups are broadly united in their desire to bring Kashmir under the control of Pakistan, a Muslim majority country. While this may seem like a religious ambition, the reality is different since these groups use Islamist rhetoric for furthering recruitment and ideological justification. This was evident during the demise of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) during the 1990s. As Chowdhary noted, the JKLF’s demands for independence instead of a merger with Pakistan was heavily undermined by pro-Pakistan militant groups such as HM and LeT. This was done through targeted assassinations of its leaders and HM passing information regarding JKLF’s key positions to the Indian military. Thus, the IS rhetoric of a so-called global Sunni caliphate has discouraged the local Kashmiri jihadist groups from joining, thereby reducing its chances of expanding in the valley. The groups fear that IS will not only dilute the indigenous character and nationalist outlook of the Kashmir conflict, but any internationalisation of the dispute will also provide the Indian military with increased space and justification to eliminate armed opposition. Moreover, IS’ criticism of Kashmiri militant groups in its propaganda also undermines its chances of making any gains in the region. Other than rejection of IS by Kashmiri militant groups’, the local population had its apprehension of the group as well. Even though most locals disapproved of the  internationalisation of the Kashmiri conflict, some of these individuals supported the notion and externalised their frustrations towards India, Pakistan and Kashmiri groups by draping slain militants with IS flags. Additionally, security officials reported the presence of IS flags in many areas, representing their displeasure towards all the actors involved. Thus, such efforts by Kashmiri locals were mainly due to political frustration rather than ideological devoutness with regards to IS. At its core, this resistance to Islamism stems from the concept of ‘Kashmiriyat’ that the locals adhere to. ‘Kashmiriyat’ or ‘Kashmiriness’ is an ideology rooted in the ethnicity of the Kashmiri people that propagates love for the motherland, shared language and customs. Given the 14^th century origin of this ideology and its deep seated nature among the Kashmiri populace, there is little space for external ideologies to uproot it, especially due to the exclusivist nature of IS’ ideology that seeks to dominate and eliminate sub-identities (including those driven by ethnicity, language and nationality). Hegghammer has argued that the evolution of Islamism played a strong role in globalising jihad in any country, lending credence to the idea that the presence of a pervasive ideology such as ‘Kashmiriyat’ makes it difficult for IS' ideology to penetrate the population.

(iii)       Chances of Victory

Low chances of achieving a victory or separation from the Indian state in Kashmir have also discouraged IS from creating a foothold in the region. In fact, even with their strongest operational capabilities, the insurgent groups could not have toppled the Indian administration in Kashmir. The presence of militant outfits was often used to direct increased expenditure on security to quash the insurgency. Even though Kashmir sporadically faces internecine violence, it remains relatively stable given the implementation of the rule of law, elections and other processes essential to peace, unlike conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the positioning of IS within the Kashmiri conflict would not result in support from the Indian Muslim population (which would act as a recruitment pool for IS). This is primarily because Muslims in India largely refrain from discussing Kashmir in weekly sermons or social activist events for fear of being seen as Pakistani agents – a highly popularised and predatory narrative peddled in India. Thus, IS might not consider India and Kashmir as attractive areas for operation and recruitment.

No Allegiances

So far, IS has failed to garner a pledge of allegiance from any Kashmiri militant group, which remains the group’s primary method of establishing a formal presence in any region. Militant groups often pledge allegiance in order to enhance tactical capabilities and training, increase funding and fight off other terrorist groups operating in the same conflict theatre.30 In Kashmir, none of these factors have compelled any group or breakaway faction to pledge allegiance to IS. As long as the larger groups are reasonably well funded and logistically powerful, there is not much that IS can offer them. Yet, IS has made an effort to attract smaller breakaway factions like Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, which is a splinter group of the Hizbul Mujahideen, even though the group pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The group has maintained ties with Al-Qaeda possibly due to the fear of drawing the ire of the Pakistani leaning terrorist groups like LeT and JeM, which are dominant in the valley. Another reason to explain why local militant groups have kept a distance from IS ideologically and operationally, would be that they want to prevent international condemnation and reduced legitimacy of the Kashmiri cause

Prospects of IS in Kashmir

The penetration of IS in Kashmir remains highly unlikely. However, Islamist groups in the valley and India are generally strengthened by feeding off pre-existing groups. For instance, IS in India’s chief recruiter Shafi Armar, was previously a member of the Indian Mujahideen. Similarly, Al-Qaeda’s Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (which IS has been trying to win over) is a breakaway faction of the current Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). If IS’ ideological narrative resonates with the members of existing local militant factions, the group may then have a chance to grow in Kashmir. Additionally, repression by the Indian state and specifically the harsh counter insurgency campaigns could continue to alienate the locals from the wider Indian state and increase the traction of extremist narratives. Given that younger Kashmiris have not witnessed an end to the instability in the state, they are likely to view older insurgent groups as incompetent and subsequently join Global Jihadist groups. However, even then, IS would have to compete with Al-Qaeda for popularity in Kashmir. In this case, there is no certainty that IS will gain more traction than Al-Qaeda.

In conclusion, IS has not made inroads into the Kashmiri militant landscape, and this status quo will remain unchanged in the near future due to the factors discussed. However, the incidences of IS’ presence in Kashmir suggest that the Indian state needs to rethink its approach towards the Kashmir insurgency. The problematic military approach of suppressing the insurgency has created pockets of marginalised citizens who may be at risk of joining IS. India’s approach to countering the problem in Kashmir has to combine this with soft measures, and the authorities would have to be more mindful of the population if it wants to continue its current record of defeating and weakening insurgent and terrorist groups in the valley.

About the author

Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Kin, neighbours spur youth to join militancy

The Hindu

Dated: June 02, 2018

By Suhasini Haider

Reports point to crucial role of friends and social media rather than IS or religious ideology

When Hizbul Mujahideen militant Rauf Khanday, 21, from a village in Anantnag was killed in March 2018, thousands attended his funeral, and the footage was streamed across social media in Kashmir.

Amongst those watching was Zubair Ahmad Wani, who lived just a kilometre away from Khanday’s home, and had known him well. Wani, an M.Phil student in political science at a university in Madhya Pradesh, said not a word at the funeral, according to his family. But three weeks later, Wani, who was not known to have expressed a desire for militancy ever before, took up the gun.

Changing profile

The cases of both Khanday, who, too, had given no inkling that he would join militancy, and Wani are evidence in studies that show that extremist ideology and pan-Islamic discourse have much less to do with the recruitment of militants in the latest round of violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The studies found that only 2% of the militants had ever studied at a madrassa or religious school.

Instead, local factors like geography, involvement of friends, family and neighbours, and social media shares amongst close groups have had a much higher role to play in motivating these men, mostly in their 20s to become militants and terrorists.

Officials say that despite a year-on-year escalation in the numbers of militants in Jammu-Kashmir, a series of official reports by Jammu and Kashmir police, and at least one by a notable international think-tank have found that pan-Islamic, Wahhabi or Salafi Islam and Islamic State ideology have had a negligible impact amongst those taking up the gun.

The results were put out by security agencies in the State, and considered important during the Central government’s decision to extend a “Cease-Ops” to the Kashmir valley in an effort to break the cycle of violence caused by connections such as the one between Khanday and Wani, to create more militants.

The results were put out by security agencies in the state, and considered important during the Central government’s decision to extend a “Cease-Ops” to the Kashmir valley in an effort to break the cycle of violence caused by connections such as the one between Khanday and Wani, to create more militants.

156 case studies

Their studies analysed about 156 militants recruited between 2010-2015 (Radicalisation and Terrorism in J&K), and two studies of the situation since 2016 when terrorist Burhan Wani was killed, and about 265 militant recruits unleashed a new wave of violence in the valley (Analysis of recruitment by terrorist groups and Recruitment v/s Militant killings).

The studies found that only 2% of the militants had ever studied at a madrassa or religious school, and amongst the largest militant group Hizbul Mujahideen, which is considered a “local Kashmiri group” as opposed to Pakistan-based Lashkar e Toiba and Jaish e Mohammad, as much as 64% of the recruits had not indicated strong religious inclinations before becoming militants. Only 3% of those surveyed through interrogations or questions put to their friends and families had identified themselves as “Salafist” or “Wahabbi” the more radical ideologies followed by pan-Islamic terror groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State.

Middle-class roots

“The new age militant comes from a middle class family with all the ingredients of a normal Kashmiri family. This militant who is the new poster boy of radicalisation wave is quite interestingly from the Hanafite family background with [only a] medium percentage ideologically inclined towards the puritan/revivalist version of Islam like Salafi, Jamaat- e- Islami etc. and his parents sharing cordial relationship, debunking the notion that this militant is child of broken family,” one of the reports concluded.

The studies found that nearly half (47%) of the militants recruited in the last two years lived in a radius of 10 kilometres of a militant who had been killed, and an additional one third (35%) lived within 20 kilometres of the militant’s home, raising a high probability that the recruit knew the militant personally, or knew someone who did. In addition the earlier studies had found that 95% of the recruits had shown strong “bonding” with their neighbours, 80% were very close to classmates and 81% of the recruits lived in an area, which had the presence of local militants.

“This is the exact opposite of the profile of the radicalized international terrorist we have seen,” explains a senior official working on the issue, who asked not to be identified. “All studies of ISIS and Al Qaeda recruits abroad found that the radicalized individual will give up their family, will move into the company of other terrorists and people online who share their values etc., and increasingly would justify the killing of innocents by speaking of their own death and the afterlife. None of these fit with the studies [in Jammu and Kashmir].”

Marginal presence

As a result, despite a few instances of ISIS flags being used at militant funerals, and the ISIS mouthpiece claiming credit for the killing of a policeman on the outskirts of Srinagar in February this year, officials estimate that the Islamic State-J&K and Al-Qaeda-motivated Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind have cadres in the single digits at present, and have not increased their numbers in the last year.

“Obviously, we can never discount the potential of such groups to radicalise youth in Jammu and Kashmir, but statistically, what we have seen is that peer pressure, neighbourhood influence, social sanction and romanticised notions of heroism are much more responsible for militant recruitment, than any religious ideology,” Inspector General of Kashmir S.P. Wani told The Hindu, adding that compared to the rest of India, where about 104 Indians had joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, only 2 from Kashmir had joined the brutally violent movement, and neither Kashmiri had been directly recruited. Even the figures of all Indians who had travelled to join ISIS are meager, given that only 47 went to Syria directly from India from a total Muslim population of 174 million.

Significantly, the studies in the Kashmir and for the rest of India have been backed by a new international study, that has found a very negligible presence of “cluster points” that denote online activity related to ISIS today. The study, called “Spiders of the Caliphate” which maps the Islamic State’s Global Support Network, was published in May 2018 by two British authors for the “Counter Extremism Project”. It found that while the ISIS network still exists on online networking sites like Facebook, “cluster maps” of South Asia found only one Indian ISIS supporter connected to ISIS communities in Afghanistan and Bangladesh, making India a “circuit breaker” in the region. The report mentions the ISIS claims in Jammu and Kashmir, but doesn’t find support for it on the ground.

“The South Asia data confirms the long-standing belief that India’s Muslim population is largely resistant to both al-Qaeda and IS recruitment. This large geographic gap in the IS online network helps to separate the Afghan [Pakistan] and Bangladeshi networks,” the report concludes, adding that India would require to remain vigilant along its borders which were frontiers of the “virtual caliphate”.

“What is most interesting is the fact that in this matter, the pan-Islamic radicalisation in Jammu and Kashmir has not been very different from the rest of India, unlike what is seen directly across the LoC and Border” the senior official said, indicating that even Pakistan’s influence over the current wave of militancy may be limited.

Reference:

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kin-neighbours-spur-youth-to-join-militancy/article24069531.ece