By Mohammed Sinan Siyech
RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses
Volume
10, Issue 5 | May 2018
Global
jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have failed to exploit
the Kashmir conflict, unlike conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, given
that it is framed as a territorial issue and political dispute as opposed to an
Islamist conflict. This article maps out the nature and magnitude of the IS
footprint in the Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir (IAJK) by examining
the local dynamics of the insurgency. In doing so, it explains that opposition
by local insurgent groups and citizens as well as the difficulty of penetration
have denied IS any substantive presence in the valley.
Introduction
Since the
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Indian administered Jammu
& Kashmir (IAJK) has been mired in diplomatic and international tensions
between India and Pakistan. Decades of poor governance, corruption, political
disenfranchisement and lack of socio-economic
development in the region culminated in a mass insurgency in 1988 and is
still continuing today with an estimated death toll of 45,000 to 80,000.The
Indian government has fought off various Kashmiri groups such as the Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), as well as Pakistan
supported militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) among others. Following a relative lull in violence in the 2000s, the
insurgency was reignited in 2016 after the killing of Burhan Wani, a local
militant commander with extensive social media following. Notwithstanding the
protracted insurgency in Kashmir, global jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and
IS have struggled to cultivate a substantial presence in the region. Given the
two groups’ success in attracting foreign militants into other conflict zones
such as Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, their limited traction in Kashmir is
notable. This contribution examines the reasons for the limited IS’ presence in
Kashmir by looking at the strength of the Kashmir narrative and Kashmiri
identity over translational Islamist identities, and opposition by local
insurgent groups.
IS’ Footprint in
Kashmir
Initial
signs of IS presence in Kashmir became visible in 2016, after the locals waved
the organisation’s flag on multiple occasions. Most of these incidents were
driven by the frustration of the Kashmiri populace. Towards the end of 2017,
its media channel Al-Qaraar increased its Kashmir-centric propaganda when it released a document that criticised
the role of ‘groups with links to Pakistani intelligence agencies’ who, they
believed, were fighting for national causes rather than for Islam.5 Shortly
thereafter, Al-Qaraar released another
document specifically naming various leaders of Kashmiri political and
separatist parties and censuring their secular credentials and willingness to
accede to international mediation by the United Nations (UN). Operationally, IS
has claimed two separate assassinations of security officials in 2017 and 2018.
However, given IS’ propensity to falsely claim responsibility for attacks,
these reports are unconfirmed and flimsy at best. Indian security agencies have
maintained that IS does not have a strong presence in the valley, citing a lack
of members as the major determining factor. As such, IS’ influence in Kashmir
is mostly limited to the online sphere where it is struggling to recruit youth.
Non-existent
Global Jihad in Kashmir
The IS-led
global Jihadist movement has displayed an affinity to latch itself onto
conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, by attracting foreign fighters
from various countries. Despite this, IS has abstained from directing fighters
into, or attracting fighters from Kashmir and the insurgency there has remained
a primarily indigenous Kashmiri and Pakistani based movement.
Three broad factors
explain the disinterest in sending foreign fighters (FF) to the valley:
(i)
access to the battlefront,
(ii)
cohesion between local and foreign actors and
(iii)
chances of Victory.
(i)
Access to the Battlefront
In the case
of Afghanistan in the 1980s and Syria since 2011, major mobilisation of foreign
fighters was witnessed with strong access to conflict zones (the battlefront).
This was facilitated by the Maktab Al-Khidmat headquartered in Peshawar, run by
Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, that arranged logistics for foreign
fighters who intended to fight in Afghanistan. For instance, due to the cold
war between the US and Russia in the 1980s, many countries including Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Yemen among others were eager to facilitate foreign fighters
to topple the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Afghanistan
and develop closer ties with the US. This was further reflected in Pakistan’s
decision to keep its borders open to fighters who were travelling to Afghanistan.
More or less the same dynamics were at play in Syria where Turkey played the
facilitating role However, in the case of Kashmir, two factors have hindered or
discouraged IS from establishing a foothold. First, the Kashmiri conflict is
framed as a territorial and political dispute between India and Pakistan rather
than an ideological dispute driven by religious factors. Moreover, it does not
occupy the same level of importance for Muslims as conflicts in Afghanistan,
Syria and Iraq. Barring one attempt, IS has not overtly reached out to Kashmiri
groups or made it a central focus of its online propaganda. Secondly, Kashmir
is a heavily militarized conflict zone that has a strong presence of over
700,000 Indian military personnel. This means that Indians or global members of
IS who might use mainland India to travel into Kashmir will find it difficult
to escape the elaborate security measures of Indian security forces.
(ii)
Internal
Cohesion
In Kashmir,
current insurgent groups are broadly united in their desire to bring Kashmir
under the control of Pakistan, a Muslim majority country. While this may seem
like a religious ambition, the reality is different since these groups use
Islamist rhetoric for furthering recruitment and ideological justification.
This was evident during the demise of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF) during the 1990s. As Chowdhary noted, the JKLF’s demands for
independence instead of a merger with Pakistan was heavily undermined by
pro-Pakistan militant groups such as HM and LeT. This was done through targeted
assassinations of its leaders and HM passing information regarding JKLF’s key
positions to the Indian military. Thus, the IS rhetoric of a so-called global
Sunni caliphate has discouraged the local Kashmiri jihadist groups from
joining, thereby reducing its chances of expanding in the valley. The groups
fear that IS will not only dilute the indigenous character and nationalist
outlook of the Kashmir conflict, but any internationalisation of the dispute
will also provide the Indian military with increased space and justification to
eliminate armed opposition. Moreover, IS’ criticism of Kashmiri militant groups
in its propaganda also undermines its chances of making any gains in the
region. Other than rejection of IS by Kashmiri militant groups’, the local
population had its apprehension of the group as well. Even though most locals
disapproved of the internationalisation
of the Kashmiri conflict, some of these individuals supported the notion and
externalised their frustrations towards India, Pakistan and Kashmiri groups by
draping slain militants with IS flags. Additionally, security officials
reported the presence of IS flags in many areas, representing their displeasure
towards all the actors involved. Thus, such efforts by Kashmiri locals were
mainly due to political frustration rather than ideological devoutness with
regards to IS. At its core, this resistance to Islamism stems from the concept
of ‘Kashmiriyat’ that the locals adhere to. ‘Kashmiriyat’ or ‘Kashmiriness’ is
an ideology rooted in the ethnicity of the Kashmiri people that propagates love
for the motherland, shared language and customs. Given the 14th
century origin of this ideology and its deep seated nature among the Kashmiri
populace, there is little space for external ideologies to uproot it,
especially due to the exclusivist nature of IS’ ideology that seeks to dominate
and eliminate sub-identities (including those driven by ethnicity, language and
nationality). Hegghammer has argued that the evolution of Islamism played a
strong role in globalising jihad in any country, lending credence to the idea
that the presence of a pervasive ideology such as ‘Kashmiriyat’ makes it
difficult for IS' ideology to penetrate the population.
(iii)
Chances of Victory
Low chances
of achieving a victory or separation from the Indian state in Kashmir have also
discouraged IS from creating a foothold in the region. In fact, even with their
strongest operational capabilities, the insurgent groups could not have toppled
the Indian administration in Kashmir. The presence of militant outfits was
often used to direct increased expenditure on security to quash the insurgency.
Even though Kashmir sporadically faces internecine violence, it remains
relatively stable given the implementation of the rule of law, elections and
other processes essential to peace, unlike conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. In
addition, the positioning of IS within the Kashmiri conflict would not result
in support from the Indian Muslim population (which would act as a recruitment
pool for IS). This is primarily because Muslims in India largely refrain from
discussing Kashmir in weekly sermons or social activist events for fear of
being seen as Pakistani agents – a highly popularised and predatory narrative
peddled in India. Thus, IS might not consider India and Kashmir as attractive
areas for operation and recruitment.
No Allegiances
So far, IS
has failed to garner a pledge of allegiance from any Kashmiri militant group,
which remains the group’s primary method of establishing a formal presence in
any region. Militant groups often pledge allegiance in order to enhance
tactical capabilities and training, increase funding and fight off other terrorist
groups operating in the same conflict theatre.30 In Kashmir, none of these
factors have compelled any group or breakaway faction to pledge allegiance to
IS. As long as the larger groups are reasonably well funded and logistically
powerful, there is not much that IS can offer them. Yet, IS has made an effort
to attract smaller breakaway factions like Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, which is a
splinter group of the Hizbul Mujahideen, even though the group pledged
allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The group has maintained ties with Al-Qaeda possibly
due to the fear of drawing the ire of the Pakistani leaning terrorist groups
like LeT and JeM, which are dominant in the valley. Another reason to explain
why local militant groups have kept a distance from IS ideologically and operationally,
would be that they want to prevent international condemnation and reduced
legitimacy of the Kashmiri cause
Prospects of
IS in Kashmir
The
penetration of IS in Kashmir remains highly unlikely. However, Islamist groups
in the valley and India are generally strengthened by feeding off pre-existing
groups. For instance, IS in India’s chief recruiter Shafi Armar, was previously
a member of the Indian Mujahideen. Similarly, Al-Qaeda’s Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind
(which IS has been trying to win over) is a breakaway faction of the current
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). If IS’ ideological narrative resonates with the members
of existing local militant factions, the group may then have a chance to grow
in Kashmir. Additionally, repression by the Indian state and specifically the
harsh counter insurgency campaigns could continue to alienate the locals from
the wider Indian state and increase the traction of extremist narratives. Given
that younger Kashmiris have not witnessed an end to the instability in the
state, they are likely to view older insurgent groups as incompetent and
subsequently join Global Jihadist groups. However, even then, IS would have to
compete with Al-Qaeda for popularity in Kashmir. In this case, there is no
certainty that IS will gain more traction than Al-Qaeda.
In
conclusion, IS has not made inroads into the Kashmiri militant landscape, and
this status quo will remain unchanged in the near future due to the factors
discussed. However, the incidences of IS’ presence in Kashmir suggest that the
Indian state needs to rethink its approach towards the Kashmir insurgency. The
problematic military approach of suppressing the insurgency has created pockets
of marginalised citizens who may be at risk of joining IS. India’s approach to
countering the problem in Kashmir has to combine this with soft measures, and
the authorities would have to be more mindful of the population if it wants to
continue its current record of defeating and weakening insurgent and terrorist
groups in the valley.
About the author
Mohammed
Sinan Siyech is a Research Analyst with the International
Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent
unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore
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