By Jennifer Dhanaraj
RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends
and Analyses
Volume
10, Issue 5 | May 2018
The Islamic State (IS) lost its most prized
battlefield victories in Mosul and Raqqa by November 2017, effectively ending
the physical Islamic “caliphate three years after it was proclaimed. This, as
widely acknowledged, does not mean that IS has been decisively defeated. While
their networks and financial sources have been disrupted and some of their top
leaders were killed, IS continues to pose a security threat. But IS’ mastery of
modern technologies such as open social media platforms and closed messaging
applications are key tools used to radicalise individuals and create a virtual
tribe
Introduction
IS defeat in Iraq and Syria has not stopped the group
from continuing to espouse its radical Islamist ideology to radicalise people
through its skilful use of social media. The resulting virtual tribe becomes a
perceived kinship that will continue to inspire more people to become lone wolf
terrorists or to form small, autonomous cells that will be part of a larger
leaderless jihad movement. As IS no longer controls territory and will likely
find it difficult to establish a physical “caliphate” in the near future, the
group will continue to use social media to exploit indigenous grievances. The
resulting intensification of kinship bonds will motivate IS lone wolves and
autonomous cells to perpetrate violent attacks in their own countries.
IS Use of Social Media and a
Sense of Belonging
An increasingly globalised world has resulted in a
more homogenised identity that threatens and dilutes local cultural identities
and ethnicities in favour of a larger, unifying culture that is often dominated
by the Western world. As a result, racial diasporas and minorities often find
that their cultural values are being threatened or side lined by the forces of
globalisation, causing feelings of marginalisation or discrimination within
their societies. In part, this phenomenon leads to a vulnerable segment of the Muslim community seeking a sense of belonging,
thus increasing IS ’ attractiveness and ability to radicalise. IS also provides
this group with a sense of solidarity and unity against Western influence and
perceived immoralities. IS has been able to capitalise on the alienation of
some Muslims within their communities and has tailored its propaganda to evoke
a sense of belonging to lure potential jihadists into joining its virtual
tribe. Virtual tribe, in this case, refers to a group that consists of
potentially vulnerable members that are tied together by their religion. They
do not have a physical space, but instead organise and communicate in the cyber
space. The creation of a virtual tribe is triggered by disassociation and
alienation from their communities.
IS has achieved the creation of a virtual
tribe through their regular publication of well - designed magazines, which are
produced in various languages including English, Malay, French and German. The
diversity of languages has helped IS target Muslim majority and
minority communities in different parts of the world. IS publications and videos often
show fighters relaxing and singing with each other and this depicts a sense of
brotherhood and camaraderie that potential jihadists may feel is lacking in
their own exploits to target new recruits. He added that the group focuses on
recruiting foreign fighters to replenish its ranks. During its growth from 2014 to 2015, IS used Facebook and Twitter to
spread its message and effectively cement its branding as a social movement. On
Twitter, IS had about 46,000 overt supporter accounts and a maximum of 90,000
supporter accounts from September to December 2014. Each account had an average
of about 500 -1,000 followers each, which was higher than the normal average
for the typical Twitter user. This shows how social media has amplified IS’
branding and its message. Research by Jeffrey Kaplan and Christopher P. Costa
suggests that terrorists seek to become a part of a movement that will change
the world. Potential lone wolf attackers as well as individuals looking to form
small autonomous cells subscribe to IS ’ propaganda of establishing a caliphate
because they want to become a part of a cohesive and
supportive milieu While Al -Qaeda had also inspired
attacks by recruiting lone wolves and creating small autonomous cells, these
attacks were often undertaken for the ideology and not for Al- Qaeda as an organisation.
However, IS ’ virtual tribe of followers are willing to perpetrate violent
attacks in the name of IS.
This can be seen in the case of Omar Mateen, the lone
wolf terrorist behind the fatal shootings at a nightclub that killed 49 people in Orlando, Florida in 2016. Omar Mateen
was a lone
wolf who was inspired by IS to conduct violent attacks in the hope that he
could be part of a virtual tribe. He was born and raised in the United States
(US), but experienced alienation and a ck of belonging. He was also taunted for
being a Muslim while he was at work, making him feel marginalised and
discriminated. Omar’s experience in the US may have made him more receptive to
extremist material online and this eventually resulted in his radicalisation.
In a 911 call during the attack, Mateen described himself as an Islamic soldier
and pledged allegiance to “Abu Bakr al –Baghdadi …on behalf of the Islamic
State ”,which indicates his desire to belong to a group or IS ’ virtual tribe.
He also said that the US military operations against IS in Iraq and Syria
motivated him to carry out the attacks. These actions also fall in line with
the characteristics of lone wolves as described by Ramon Spaaij. Spaaij asserts
that lone wolf terrorists often combine their own personal vendettas with
broader political or religious grievances, which is apparent in Mateen’s case.
In addition, the strikes in Syria made him
identify with the Muslims there, after which he took action to avenge the
attacks and join the group. As IS espoused values that made him feel like he
belonged to a group, Mateen carried out the attack on behalf of the
organisation that gave him an identity, while the role of ideology was
secondary. In the 911 call, he also referred to the Tsarnaev brothers, who were
the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombings. They were radicalised by Inspire,
an English -language
Al-Qaeda magazine made available online. Mateen’s inability to distinguish
between Al-Qaeda and IS
shows that ideology did not play a huge role in his radicalisation. Instead, it
can be argued that a desire to belong was one of his primary motivations. This
was also evident in his Facebook posts written just after the attack. He
wrote “Now taste the Islamic State vengeance”, and also denounced “the filthy ways
of the west”. This clearly indicates that he does not identify with the West
even though he was born and grew up there. He also added: “You kill innocent
women and children by doing us [sic] airstrikes”. This further confirms
that he developed a ‘Us Versus Them’ thinking where he identified as a Muslim
whose group tent was being threatened in Iraq and Syria. This perceived threat then spurred him to act.
Forging an
Aspirational Tribe
IS’ creation
of such a virtual tribe after declaring a “caliphate” in 2014 has helped to compensate
for its subsequent losses in Iraq and Syria. IS had been developing its virtual
tribe since its creation, but has now been forced to largely rely on it as a
means of showcasing its strength in view of its territorial losses. IS has now
projected an image of success by indirectly ‘carrying out’ high-profile operations
with mass casualties and high media visibility as well, especially in the West.
This ensures that the group does not lose relevance and more importantly, is
still able to attract recruits. To continue attracting recruits, IS needs to
show that it has a strong tribe that many will
aspire to be a part of. Kaplan and Costa argued that there were two main types of
tribalism: ascriptive tribalism and aspirational tribalism. Ascriptive
tribalism refers to groups that are formed based on primordial ties like blood
and racial ethnicity. Aspirational tribalism, on the other hand,constitutes
groups made up of actors, both actual and virtual, that are ‘born outside of
the tribal system’ but desire to be part
of the tribe. While they can aspire to be part of an ascriptive tribe, it is
more common for them to aspire to be a part of an aspirational tribe, whose
messages are usually broadcasted globally through social media. Such
aspirational tribes are usually formed with the use of both traditional
platforms and social media applications like Facebook and Twitter and encrypted
messaging applications.
IS has masterfully exploited these tools to create a
strong aspirational tribe that lone wolf terrorists and small, autonomous cells
desire to be a part of. The group projects the image of IS as a ‘messianic
organisation’ as opposed to a group that is simply perceived to be Al-Qaeda’s
political rival. In addition, much of IS’ success also stems from its ability
to declare a “caliphate” by securing territories and this is what their
branding relies on, even now. It is important to note that the image of IS as a
‘messianic organisation’ and a virtual tribe is not just made possible by the dissemination
of information from the group’s official social media channels. A large part of
why the group has seen so many aspirants is because IS supporters on social
media share personalised information, including poetry, memes, photos and video
montages derived from official propaganda. The creation of such content is more
appealing, personalised and is more likely to inspire others. Even though IS material
is taken down regularly, the shelf life of such material is lengthened as
members download and share it on personal messaging applications. These posts
on social media are also able to reach a much larger group as opposed to just
their official propaganda on magazines or official social media channels. As
such, social media allows anyone to publish posts or disseminate information to
a ‘limitless audience’ and in an interactive and two-way exchange. Social media
and messaging applications are inexpensive and accessible
and so they allow individuals and communities to ‘share, co-create, discuss and
modify content’. The content that results from such engagement helps to further
sharpen and focus the image of IS as an aspirational tribe that has already
been disseminating its official material.
Creating a
Geographical Space for IS’ Virtual Tribe
Social
bonding plays an important role in the online radicalisation process, and this cements
bonds within a virtual tribe. Gabriel Weimann argues that online radicalisation
is a multi-step process which begins with the group uploading videos on all
platforms, including websites, YouTube and Facebook to cast a wide net. But
this does not necessarily radicalise all individuals who come across the material.
It is the interactivity that the internet and social media applications provide
that encourage interested individuals to cultivate the mind-set of a terrorist.
Individuals who are receptive to the material posted on the wider platforms
will begin to seek out one another and go through processes of “social bonding”
where they exchange their grievances and expose one another to similar ideological
material. The next step occurs when selected target members are directed to further
self-radicalise through “continuous exposure to online radical material” and
online guidance, which may include virtual packs that may guide potential lone
wolf terrorists on how to conduct attacks. Virtual packs refer to guides and
instructions, including bombmaking recipes or methods of perpetrating violence,
which are published online by terrorist groups. For example, Sayfullo Saipov,
the perpetrator behind the New York truck attacks in 2017 was self-radicalised online
and was exposed to virtual packs. As such, he “followed exactly almost to a ‘T’
the instructions that ISIS has put out in its social media channels before,
with instructions to their followers on how to carry out such an attack”. As
Facebook and Twitter continue to crack down on accounts supporting IS, social bonding
now takes place on encrypted messaging applications such as Whatsapp and
Telegram. Telegram is arguably the more popular of the two because Facebook
owns Whatsapp and terrorist groups are deterred by the possibility of their
conversations being monitored by a technology giant. Telegram, on the other
hand, has consistently insisted that the core strength of the application is
user anonymity, making it the preferred tool for jihadists.
Arguably one of Telegram’s most important features that has helped to
facilitate the growth of IS’ virtual tribe are its public channels that were
first launched in 2015. Telegram’s public channels enable private one-to-one
conversations as well as one-to many communications, and this has allowed IS
followers and affiliates to disseminate and distribute information without the
instructions or directions from a more central command. The free exchange of
information on the application has created a semblance of geographical space
that enables the social bonding that strengthens the virtual tribe. This space
transcends traditional boundaries, but still functions like a geographic space
where people can exchange opinions, information and even assemble. While the
members of the tribe lack primordial ties, they are instead bound together by
their “internet ethnicities”, a phenomenon that was discussed by Mark Juergensmeyer
in his book “Terror in the Mind of God”. People who do not share primordial ties,
are bonded culturally through the internet despite the fact that they have
diverse places of residence. People who have such Internet ethnicities
transcend borders and physical boundaries and are instead united by social media.
However, they should not be dismissed just because they may not resemble
typical traditional societies. Their ties are still strong and exist in reality
as ‘extensions of traditional societies’ whose cultures are
dispersed throughout the world. This is exemplified in the increasing
popularity of ‘virtual seminaries’ that refer to exclusive, invite-only
‘mentoring circles’ and closed social media group pages that do not outwardly
indicate any links to IS. Instead, any dissemination of IS ideology is only
done through peer-to-peer interactions.
Leaderless
Jihadi Movements: Not Just Leaderless
Arguably,
while other online networks are restricted to a specific ethnicity, the IS
network is extremely diverse. As such, a tribe filled with people who identify
with having an ‘internet ethnicity’ should not be dismissed, as they form a much
stronger and even coordinated leaderless jihad movement that can pose a significant
threat to state security agencies. “Leaderless jihad” is a term coined by Marc Sageman
and the concept is based on leaderless resistance, developed by Louis Beam, who
was the leader of a right-wing militia. Beam argued that a leaderless resistance
is necessary to continue the fight against the FBI opposition. In addition,
amid heightened global security, Al-Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Suri also advocated
for a leaderless jihad strategy in his book, The Call to Global Islamic
Resistance. Sageman stated that leaderless jihad can be identified as, “a strategy
of fighting an overwhelming enemy using self-organising clandestine networks”. The
strategy was a result of desperation because it was becoming easier for law enforcement
agencies to detect traditional hierarchical organisations.
Once the leaders of
those organisations were decapitated, the group was operationally weakened and
it became more difficult for them to plan high level terrorist attacks.
Leaderless jihad movements, which can comprise lone wolf actors and small,
autonomous networks, are much more likely to survive and adapt. If members of a
particular group are detained, the other networks are protected from detection
by law enforcement agencies as they operate independently. Though they can adapt
easily, Sageman stated that leaderless jihad movements could also be weak due
to the lack of clear direction and political goals. However, I argue that as IS
continues to strengthen its virtual tribe, the lone wolf actors and clandestine
networks within this imagined community will begin to form loose, abstract structures
and become harder to detect, therefore increasing their effectiveness. However,
Sageman argues that as disparate lone wolf actors conduct attacks with
different, seemingly random targets, weapons or locations, that leaderless
resistance can ultimately become a message-less resistance. There are no clear
political messages that can be derived from such seemingly random attacks, even
if they were meant to be acts of terror. More importantly, such acts of
message-less resistance do not inspire others within the movement to act. This can
be seen in the example of serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin, who was a member
of the National Socialist White People’s Party in 1966. Franklin was a lone
wolf actor, who conducted shooting rampages on random targets in different
locales. It was only when fellow white supremacist William L. Pierce wrote the
book, Hunter, based on Franklin’s killings
that more people were motivated to emulate his example.
IS lone wolves often use
similar methods for killing (knives or vehicle-ramming) and commit acts of
terror, that have gained attention worldwide. It is therefore possible that
their attacks might become more coordinated in the form of timing, for example,
to heighten the impact of the attacks. Encrypted messaging applications such as
Telegram and more recently, Zello, a walkie-talkie application that allows for
large groups to communicate regardless of distance, enable IS to broadcast its
message to the tribe and glorify it. They facilitate the formation of these
loose structures within a tribe. These actors are still able to act on their
own and are not limited to instructions or directions from anyone else.
However, the level of coordination
among these actors should be a cause for concern as it poses a much bigger threat
than that of a typical leaderless jihad movement. Technology now allows one
actor to motivate another actor while giving him or her guidance on how to conduct
specific attacks. For example, a plot to attack an exhibition of pictures of
the Prophet Mohammad by three men in Garland, Texas was uncovered in May 2015.
It was first classified as an attack that was planned entirely inside the
country, and merely inspired by IS. However, later developments showed that
Junaid Hussain, a Syria-based IS follower, had given the men very specific directions,
including the choice of target. This shows how virtual networks can coordinate
attacks, targets, weapons, locations, and even timings so that the impacts of
these violent acts can be enhanced. They may in turn inspire more lone-wolf
actors and autonomous cell networks to carry out their own attacks. As such, it
can be argued that the resistance has become less “leaderless”. More
accurately, they are virtual networks that have the characteristics of a
leaderless resistance movement, but social media and messaging applications
permit them to be more interactive and therefore more organised. Members of
these networks focus on providing logistical support to one another. This
support can include tactical guidance such as the choice of weapons or methods
for conducting attacks as well as theological advice.There
have also been concerns that previous terror attacks that were believed to be conducted
by lone wolf actors and were classified as ‘IS-inspired’ attacks were actually
planned with the help of high-level operatives.
An April 2017 terror attack in Stockholm
where the suspect Rakhmat Akilov ploughed into a busy shopping street and killed
four, was initially believed to be an IS inspired attack. However,
investigations revealed that Akilov was in “direct contact with high-level
members of IS before, during and after the April 2017 attack”. Akilov said that
he received guidance from Abu Osama Noraki, who he believed was the ‘Emir’ of Tajikistan.
It was also reported that Akilov was in contact with other high-level non-Arab leaders
in Mosul, indicating that it was a coordinated attack. This shows that seemingly
leaderless resistance movements, with the help of social media and messaging applications,
are becoming less leaderless as lone-wolf actors can now seek guidance from high-ranking
members.
IS Not Completely
Defeated
Adapting
itself as a partially leaderless resistance movement is IS’ strategy, but it is
one borne out of weakness and loss. Ultimately, IS wants to aintain its position as the leader of the
global Salafi-jihadist movement. However, to be the true leader of the
movement, IS recognises the importance of declaring a caliphate and securing
territory in different parts of the world. In order to achieve that, IS will
regroup, recoup and recover. It has already been reported that some IS foreign
fighters have not returned to their home countries after the group lost control
of Raqqa, the group’s self-proclaimed capital.
Instead, many fighters have escaped and gone into hiding near the Syrian capital
of Damascus and the country’s northwest. These fighters would continue to wait
for orders sent by insurgent leaders on encrypted communications channels and
are ready to fight in the future. The Vice -Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Paul J. Selva, has said that the senior IS leadership is
maintaining ‘fairly robust’ communications with its network of fighters, who
are now on the run. The New York Times also reported that IS has been
placing more importance on asymmetric tactics like “suicide bombings against
soft targets in government-secured areas like Baghdad”. As it attempts to
regroup, IS will use its virtual tribe to achieve real-world objectives. IS will now be
relying more on successful terrorist operations. These operations are now a strategic
necessity.
Policy Implications
In order to
prevent the creation of social bonds in the online space and a stronger virtual
tribe, it is necessary for technology companies to work with law enforcement
agencies to regulate the ‘geographical spaces’ that allow the free
exchange of ideas, information, opinion and the freedom to assemble. This could
assist in weakening the virtual tribes and in turn reduce the impact of
leaderless jihad movements. When such movements are weakened, the relevance of
groups like IS would likely decrease as there will be less recruits willing to
join them. In addition, it is also important for states to combat the global Salafi-jihadist
movement as a whole. IS and Al-Qaeda are
representatives of the movement that continues to garner great support by
bereaved and alienated individuals. However, even if specific groups are
decimated, it is possible that another group will rise to assume the leadership
of the global Salafi-jihadist movement.
About the author
Jennifer Dhanaraj is a Research
Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
(ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
