From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq

By Derek Henry Flood

Combating Terrorism Centre

Volume11, Issue 08, September 2018

Abstract: Cave and tunnel complexes, which the Islamic State started constructing in the Hamrin mountain region well before the collapse of the caliphate, have become key to the group’s insurgent campaign in northern Iraq. With a new government yet to form following parliamentary elections in May 2018, there is a risk that focus in Baghdad will ebb on clearing out these mountain safe havens straddling Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala governorates.

Cave and tunnel complexes that the Islamic State started constructing well before the collapse of the caliphate have become a core element of the group’s asymmetric war fighting strategy. In the Hamrin mountain region, an area that straddles Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Kirkuk governorates, the Islamic State has put considerable effort into constructing vast rural tunnel networks with weapons depots and foodstuffs well ensconced in both natural and man-made caves. The cave complexes, insulated with USAID tarps once intended for Iraqi internally displaced persons, are being discovered throughout this region.The caves serve as rugged redoubts from which the group wages guerilla war against the Iraqi state and its affiliated militias. As Iraqi and local ground forces supply geolocations, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) has been carrying out airstrikes aimed at dismantling the Hamrin tunnel network along with outlying bunker positions to smash the infrastructure undergirding the insurgency.

This article is based in part on the author’s field reporting in Iraq in early 2018. Iraqi and pan-Arab news outlets have also reported on the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the Hamrin Mountains. It is an area where al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) in the last decade had a significant freedom of movement, even with a large U.S. troop presence in Iraq. It is now a significant safe haven for the Islamic State.

In their efforts to flush out Islamic State militants, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Shi`a militiamen incorporated under the Hashd al-Shaabi umbrella have been reaching the Hamrin foothills by Humvee and Toyota Hilux and then dismounting to scale higher elevations on foot while backed up by Iraqi Army helicopters.Sunni Arab tribal militias, known as Hashd al-Asha’iri, are also involved in security efforts around the Hamrin Mountains. In contrast to many Shi`a Arab fighters in Hashd al-Shaabi militias, Hashd al-Asha’iri are most often of local origin and allied to regional tribal leaders; they provide both indigenous intelligence and credibility in insurgency-affected districts of federally controlled northern governorates where fighters from the Shi`a-majority south are viewed as outsiders while also enlarging the security footprint of the ISF and the Hashd al-Shaabi. The current conflict in the greater Hamrin region is primarily a shadow war with little direct kinetic contact between opposing forces. Holding the high ground, jihadi militants have been able to retreat deeper into the hills as ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi expeditionary forces have approached at a distance from the lowlands.

Difficult Terrain

The topography of the Hamrin range, a ripple of the Greater Zagros Mountains located in western Iran, demarcates a natural boundary between northern and central Iraq.The range runs along a diagonal axis from northwest to southeast. Its northern reaches begin in the northeastern part of Tikrit district in Salah ad-Din Governorate. It then runs along the southwestern periphery of Al-Hawija and Daquq districts in Kirkuk Governorate (see Map 1) before reaching its southern limit at Lake Hamrin in Diyala Governorate’s Khanaqin district (see Map 2). On October 7, 2017, ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi announced that they had gained control of the mountains just two days after the liberation of Hawija. Although Iraqi state and paramilitary forces may have temporarily cleared the area, militants who had been using the Hamrin for logistics as well as weapons storage and disbursement quickly remerged. Via its Amaq News Agency propaganda arm in June 2018, the Islamic State featured masked caravan members living a semi-nomadic existence in the Hamrin. A notable component of Baghdad’s interest in clearing the Hamrin of militants is its desire to open up new trade links with Tehran after Kurdish forces were pushed out of Kirkuk in October 2017. The al-Abadi government has sought to secure the Hamrin mountain region and the adjacent Lake Hamrin basin in northeastern Diyala Governorate in order to transport crude oil by truck from Kirkuk’s abundant fields to the Iranian refinery of Kermanshah via the border gate of Khanaqin. Furthermore, Iran’s petroleum minister Bijan Namdar Zangeneh stated that Tehran desires a pipeline to be constructed through this region from Kirkuk directly to Iranian territory.

The difficult-to-reach Hamrin mountain terrain is being used by Islamic State militants to train and organize attacks in nearby areas of northern Iraq. Islamic State commanders and fighters have maintained training camps along the Hamrin range to learn and maintain the skills of their jihadi recruits. Additionally, Islamic State fighters have reportedly built medical facilities in the mountains to treat their wounded.Vulnerable oil infrastructure in the fields abutting the Hamrin range is often a target of the group’s asymmetric attacks.The Islamic State employs sabotage tactics meant to inflame issues in Iraq that have remained unresolved since 2003. For example, on May 24, 2018, militants damaged power lines in the village of Barimah located north of the Bajii-Kirkuk road, which resulted in cutting off power to the Sunni Arab majority cities of Hawija and Tikrit in the midst of a heat wave.Public anger over power shortages^d has been further stoked by Islamic State militants sabotaging energy infrastructure in the Kirkuk-Diyala-Salah ad Din belt to further widen the rift between average Iraqis and the central government. The attack on an otherwise significant village like Barimah signifies that the Islamic State cells that sought refuge in the Qori Chai river valley northeast of the Hamrin Mountains are now regularly launching operations out of this rugged area on an assortment of vulnerable targets in Kirkuk’s under-policed hinterlands. Militants launch nighttime attacks in villages where the Federal Police presence is either minimal or nonexistent.

Digging In

The Islamic State’s construction of cave and tunnel complexes in northern Iraq began well before the demise of the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate, with many completed before that time. The Hamrin have a history as an insurgent redoubt. AQI, along with Ansar al-Sunna, and Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandiyya, used the mountains in a chaotic post-2003 Iraq in a manner analogous to the Islamic State’s current use. ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi brigades have discovered tunnels nestled deep in the mountains with generator-rigged electrical systems and makeshift water lines that they torch once they have been discovered and inspected  to discourage the jihadis from returning to the area.

Accurate ground intelligence by indigenous forces in locating the tunnels that are naturally concealed by the Hamrin range’s geologic formations is vital in coordinating supporting airstrikes. As an indication of the Islamic State’s longer-term planning, in February 2018, the ISF discovered a tunnel complex 20 kilometers south of Baquba, the seat of Diyala Governorate, outfitted with refrigerators with several months’ worth of food and washing machines all powered by a hidden solar grid above ground. The meticulousness with which the tunneling is carried out and the network’s food stores and ammunition caches indicate that the Islamic State laid the groundwork to sustain a protracted guerilla war while world attention focused on the Stalingrad-like battle for Mosul to the northwest. Well before Mosul fell to the ISF, Islamic State fighters were already launching attacks from their Hamrin hideouts in Diyala and Salah ad-Din governorates.

In fact, the Islamic State’s tunneling efforts in some parts of Iraq long predated the battle for Mosul. In Diyala Governorate in particular, the Islamic State reverted to insurgency soon after its rapid territorial conquest of northern Iraq. Diyala was declared—at least publicly—entirely freed of Islamic State control by Staff Lieutenant General Abdulamir al-Zaidi on January 26, 2015, after the militants had been holding territory there for approximately six months.Likely calculating that its grip there was tenuous, the Islamic State bored tunnels in the Diyala sector of the Hamrin range as it occupied towns in the Lake Hamrin basin in the second half of 2014. In May 2015, Saraya Ansar al-Aqeedah, a Shi`a militia group under the banner of Hashd al-Shaabi, posted a video to its social media of Islamic State tunnels they were discovering in Diyala only months after ISF had declared the territory liberated.

The tunnel and cave complexes formed part of wider preparations for the Islamic State’s insurgency. As the group was cleared at the village level—at least officially—in the governorates spanning the belt from Diyala to Ninewa connecting Iran to Syria between January 2015 and October 2017, the militants left booby-trapped homes in their wake, making numerous villages extremely perilous for returning IDPs as well as ISF not properly trained in high-risk ordinance removal. This IED-laying tactic has proven effective in making the region difficult to pacify. This security vacuum allowed the Islamic State the space to revert quickly to insurgent tactics in Diyala while it was busy establishing administrative control in Mosul and other key cities elsewhere in Iraqi lands it had seized. The strategy the Islamic State had already implemented in Diyala was replicated in northern districts of Salah ad-Din and southern districts of Kirkuk once the key towns of Shirqat and Hawija were declared freed of Islamic State control in early fall of 2017.

In many ways, Diyala has acted as an ethno-sectarian microcosm for security dynamics for the whole of Iraq. Its proximity to Baghdad, as well as the Iranian frontier, made it a priority for the al-Abadi government and Hashd al-Shaabi’s Iranian sponsors to control. Diyala was, for a time, the easternmost declared wilaya, or province, of the then-incipient caliphate project. It was the first significant area the Islamic State lost to state and sub-state forces in Iraq. Today, militants employ the Hamrin Mountains as a logistical lifeline stretching from Diyala to Kirkuk via Salah ad-Din.

In July 2018, former Iraqi Minister of Interior Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi said that he estimated the Islamic State controlled some 75 villages in Kirkuk, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala. These areas were never entirely taken under full control by the central government after the liberation of Hawija in early October 2017. In early 2018, frontlines hardened between the Islamic State and Federal Police in a string of agricultural villages southwest of Daquq town in Kirkuk Governorate.

This past summer, vulnerable populations faced regular attacks in Kirkuk Governorate’s southern sub-districts.Religious minorities such as the Sufis and followers of the secretive syncretic Kakai faith along with local Sunni Arabs the Islamic State deems collaborators for cooperating with ISFcontinue to be at great risk from attacks by jihadis based in the low-slung Hamrin Mountains and the Qori Chai river valley, which begins near the tiny villages of Dabaj and Qaryat Tamur to the north of the Hamrin Mountains. The Qori Chai was described to the author as a “militant highway” whereby jihadis can traverse from the plains below the Hamrin northward to attack cities and towns in Kirkuk Governorate, which begins near the tiny villages of Dabaj and Qaryat Tamur to the north of the Hamrin Mountains.

The Islamic State has been mounting regular assaults on pro-Baghdad Sunni Arab tribal militias across Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah ad-Din governorates. In areas like Dibis district in northern Kirkuk Governorate that had been largely secured by Peshmerga until late 2017, the Islamic State claims to be launching nighttime raids against poorly funded Hashd al-Asha’iri encampments.The Islamic State’s assaults on minorities is patterned after past AQI tactics whereby vulnerable communities in the vicinity of the Hamrin Mountains and Lake Hamrin basin perceive themselves to be insufficiently protected by ISF, and ethno-sectarian tensions are further exacerbated as a result.

A Delicate Political Environment

The ongoing religio-political violence is taking place against the backdrop of the widely disputed May 12, 2018, parliamentary election, which saw Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon Alliance receive the highest vote share. Sairoon ran on a nationalist platform focused on a long hoped for anti-corruption drive and the delivery of services to ordinary Iraqis in a coalition comprised primarily of the Sadrist Movement and Hizb al-Shwiyu’i al-Iraqi (Iraqi Communist Party). Sairoon then controversially formed a post-election alliance with the pro-Tehran Fatah alliance of Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of al-Badr organization, which forms the backbone of the Hashd al-Shaabi militia.

When the al-Sadr-led Sairoon and al-Amiri’s Fatah allied themselves for a time in June 2018 as a matter of sheer pragmatism within Iraq’s fissured political spectrum, questions arose about the future of Hashd al-Shaabi. Two of Iraq’s most powerful men have starkly divergent views on the umbrella organization’s core task and purpose. This has potential implication for counterinsurgency efforts in the Hamrin Mountains given that the Hashd al-Shaabi have played a key role in these operations.

Al-Sadr espouses comparatively broader Iraqi nationalism blended with local Iraqi Shi`a identity politics while al-Amiri and other Shi`a militia leaders under Fatah have considerable fealty to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali al-Khamenei and the revolutionary ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih (‘Guardianship of Jurist’). In the months since the election, the various blocs—primarily Sairoon, Fatah, Nasr, and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition—vying for power have failed to form a new, effective coalition government.

The political turmoil extends far beyond Baghdad. In post-KRG Kirkuk, the allegations of electoral fraud were perhaps most acute. There have been demonstrations from Arab and Turkmen communities alleging irregularities and demanding a recount after the late Iraqi president Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan won the largest share of the Kirkuk vote even though Asayish^f and Peshmerga forces withdrew from the city and the bulk of the governorate in mid-October 2017 following a reported deal between the Talabani family and Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

The ongoing political stalemate in Baghdad coupled with anti-corruption protests in Iraq’s Shi`a-majority southern governorates has already, inevitably, diverted some focus away from the Hamrin operations as forces ranging from the elite Counter Terror Service to Hashd al-Shaabi’s Badr Organization have been dispatched to Basra to protect infrastructure and disperse protestors. Lacking the same visceral, unifying existential threat the territorial caliphate once posed to Iraqi Shi`a identity, the raison d’être for some of the most prominent pro-Iranian Hashd al-Shaabi leaders has shifted from war-fighting in northern and western Iraq toward an increased focus on evolving political and economic interests. Although ISF, Hashd al-Shaabi, and Hashd al-Asha’iri brigades have continued counterinsurgency operations in the Hamrin Mountains and other contiguous districts of northern Iraq, the current febrile political environment risks deprioritizing the fight against remaining Islamic State cells in the Hamrin Mountains.

Conclusion

Political turmoil in Baghdad risks taking the focus of Iraqi political leaders away from clearing militants from the Hamrin mountain range, which has emerged as key redoubt for Islamic State fighters and a launching pad for the group’s insurgency in northern Iraq. Baghdad lacks a coherent strategy for dealing with militants hiding in the depths of the Hamrin and nearby Makhoul Mountains, the Lake Hamrin basin, and the craggy Qori Chai river valley northeast of the Hamrin Mountains. It is in these remote areas and this difficult terrain that the jihadis have survived to fight another day in a battlespace far less familiar to their opponents. As political elites in Baghdad and Najaf jockey to form a new government, the still-serving al-Abadi government’s low-intensity war is making little headway.

In a further possible distraction to tackling militants in the Hamrin Mountains, ISF and Hashd al-Shaabi are also contending with a burgeoning protest movement railing against endemic corruption and power shortages in cities across the underserved southern governorates.⁵⁰ The stakes are high. If the Islamic State continues to strengthen its position in the Hamrin Mountains, its insurgency could spread wider across Iraq’s federally administered northern governorates. 

About the author:

Derek Henry Flood is an independent security analyst with an emphasis on the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia. He is a contributor to IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review and Terrorism and Security Monitor. Flood’s research for this article included travel to Kirkuk Governorate in February and March 2018. 

Reference:

https://ctc.usma.edu/caliphate-caves-islamic-states-asymmetric-war-northern-iraq/

A Perfect Storm in the Making for 17 Years: A Reflection and Call to Action

By Deepa Iyer

September 10, 2018

The attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing backlash against Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and Arab communities represented a turning point in the lives of many people, including mine. As we mark the 17th anniversary of 9/11 this week, I’m sharing resources and reflections each day . Today, September 10th, I am sharing an essay I wrote. Please feel free to share your own reflections, resources, and questions in the comments.

As Americans mark the 17th anniversary of the September 11th attacks this week, we will reflect on where we were on that horrible day, honor the memories of the people who lost their lives, and pay tribute to the first responders who were on the scenes in New York City, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. But no national reckoning of 9/11 would be complete without a clear-eyed assessment of the domestic War on Terror waged against Muslims, South Asians, North Africans, and Arabs for the decade and a half after the attacks.

Such a review isn’t merely a historical exercise. It is particularly relevant today because the policies and practices that many Americans are outraged by like the Muslim ban, the denaturalization taskforce, and aggressive immigration enforcement all have their origins in the post 9/11 era. Today’s devastating policies targeting immigrants and refugees are rooted in anti-Black racism, xenophobia, and imperialism, andthey became commonplace and even palatable in the post 9/11 era through a framework of fear and national security. And now the perfect storm that began brewing in the months and years after 9/11 is wreaking havoc on everyone.

Painful as it was, it wasn’t a complete surprise that the first salvo in the Trump Administration’s assaults on immigrants and communities of color began with the Muslim and refugee ban. That’s because it has a post 9/11 antecedent in a program called the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which required males 16 years and older from 25 Muslim-majority countries to submit themselves for interrogation and fingerprinting at immigration offices. NSEERS, along with lesser-known programs implemented in the wake of 9/11 like the Absconder Apprehension Initiative and the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), set the stage for the government to profile people on the basis of national origin, faith and immigration status, deport thousands of immigrants, and call into question sacrosanct privileges of citizenship.

In the years after 9/11, local and federal law enforcement routinely worked together to map and surveil mosques, Muslim schools, and restaurants through the New York Police Department’s Demographics Unit, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the countering violent extremism (CVE) program. Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) flexed its enforcement muscles by empowering Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officials to develop arbitrary watch lists, to engage in warrantless searches, interrogations and investigations, and to conduct raids of South Asian, Arab, and Muslim small businesses and neighborhoods.

Under the Bush and Obama Administrations, law enforcement agencies honed and sharpened the narratives, tools and infrastructure to carry out surveillance, incarceration, and deportation. The Trump Administration has taken these mechanisms to target not only Muslim, South Asian, Arab and Sikh immigrants, but all Brown and Black immigrants and refugees. Once it was apparent that Muslims could be subjected to mistreatment without widespread public indignation, it became easier to target other vulnerable communities as well by using the same rhetoric of fear, suspicion, and criminality.

The Trump Administration wants us to believe that every Black and Brown immigrant is a potential terrorist, criminal, job-stealer and culture corruptor. The impact of this dangerous narrative has already been devastating. In just the first year and a half of this Administration, we have witnessed a barrage of anti-immigrant policies including the denaturalization taskforce, the denial of passports to U.S. citizens of Latino descent at the border, barriers to entry for international students, H-1B workers, and refugees, abuses of child detainees, and discriminatory treatment of Sikh asylum seekers.

The government has also eliminated temporary protected status, which could force an exodus of 300,000 people to countries like Haiti, Sudan and Nepal, and increased deportations of Vietnamese Americans. Looming on the horizon is the Administration’s plan to revoke employment visas for the spouses of H-1B workers, the lowering of refugee admissions, and a proposed rule that could restrict green card eligibility for immigrants, including pregnant women and children, who avail themselves of social service programs like Medicaid and food stamps. At the same time, hate violence continues to be on the rise; a recent report by South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) found a link between the Administration’s anti-Muslim policies and rhetoric and hate incidents against South Asian, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, Middle Eastern, and Arab communities.

In these difficult times, there is hope and there is help. People-centered movements are rising up now, as they did in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Back then, Muslim, South Asian, Arab and Sikh communities were forced into a posture of crisis management and rapid response. We created temporary scaffolding in the form of grassroots and national organizations, legal workshops, and information exchange networks to shore up and protect our neighborhoods, places of worship, and families. For my part, I began working at South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT), and by the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, it was clear that we weren’t in the midst of a temporary “backlash” anymore. We sounded the alarm bells on the long-standing effects on the War on Terror while building our communities’ safety, well-being and power at the same time, an extremely difficult balancing act to maintain and sustain.

Today, Muslim, South Asian, Arab and Sikh communities remain in a posture of constant vigilance. Community organizers are sharing their knowledge with the latest immigrant and refugee communities targeted by the Administration. Advocates are replicating the power of the multiracial coalitions that stopped anti-Sharia legislation from being enacted in Tennessee, that successfully guided the passage of the Community Safety Act, an anti-profiling law in New York City, and that persuaded the mayor of Los Angeles to decline federal funds for countering violent extremism programs. At the same time, grassroots groups are also creating new visions for community safety, healing, and liberation in these darkest of hours to prepare for the dawn that is ahead. Some examples include Aman Zones, a project of the National Network on Arab American Communities, wellness programs organized by DC’s Justice for Muslims Collective, anti-racism trainings convened by the Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative, power hours hosted by the Partnership for the Advancement for New Americans in San Diego, Black Muslim psychology convenings organized by the Muslim Wellness Foundation, and hate-free zones supported by groups including DRUM — Desis Rising Up and Moving in New York City.

To withstand the hostilities of the current climate — and to recover from it, which will take decades at minimum — we must make both rapid response and long-term interventions. For example, community-based organizations must receive significant investments from philanthropists and foundations to build their long-term capacity and stability, not just to create one emergency program after another. We must promote the leadership of an emerging cohort of women from Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities who are organizers, lawyers, leaders, and elected officials. We must support the growth of organizations and individuals who work at the intersections of various identities, including Black Muslims, undocumented Sikhs, and queer and trans South Asians. We must highlight storytellers, artists, and writers who utilize the arts, literature, and media to shape accurate and inclusive representations of Muslim, Arab, South Asian and Sikh communities. Community groups should have the resources, space and time to address the other pressing issues confronting people, such as access to housing, education, and a living wage. And, we need to understand the impact of multigenerational trauma on our communities and make room for healing and recovery.

But our communities cannot take on the work of rapid response and rebuilding alone. Mayors and city councils at the local level must acknowledge their roles in allowing detention centers and collaborating with national security taskforces, and sever those ties in favor of policies and partnerships that uphold a vision of a multiracial democracy. University presidents, civic and business leaders must use their platforms to speak out strongly against Islamophobia and xenophobia. Every workplace in America must establish programs and practices to ensure the safety and well-being of employees who feel most vulnerable in the current political climate. Media outlets should come to our communities for analysis and information about how the Trump Administration’s policies are affecting us. Allies must reframe the idea of “national security” through the lens of racial and immigrant justice, and counter Islamophobia at every level. From houses of worship to family dining rooms, we must make room for conversations about anti-Black racism, Islamophobia, and white supremacy.

It shouldn’t have taken nearly twenty years after a national crisis and the ascendancy of an administration with ties to white supremacists and the Islamophobia industry for us to understand the scope of the 9/11 War on Terror. As we mark the 17th anniversary of 9/11, let us ask ourselves what could have happened if we had taken a different path in the aftermath of 9/11. What could have happened if more Americans had heeded the alarm bells that community advocates were ringing about the dehumanization of entire groups of people, rather than capitulating to fear and tacitly accepting discriminatory policies? Or, instead of embarking on a war against Muslims and immigrants, what if our government, along with civic, business, and educational stakeholders had launched campaigns and efforts to build mutual understanding and respect? These are the reflections and conversations we must have now in order to prepare for what’s ahead.

On the 17th anniversary of 9/11, let us pledge to stay vigilant and not succumb to fear, to offer alternative models and examples that center communities, and to raise our voices at every sign of dehumanization against any group of people.

About the Author:

Author of We Too Sing America; host of the Solidarity is This podcast; Senior Fellow at Race Forward; former ED of SAALT. 

Reference:

https://medium.com/@dviyer/a-perfect-storm-in-the-making-for-17-years-a-reflection-and-call-to-action-711425228a70

When Muslims condemn terrorism, does it matter?

TRT World, By Faisal Ali

Dated: August 23, 2018

Heraa Hashmi compiled a 712-page Google doc of times when Muslims have condemned terror attacks. A year on she reflects on that decision.

Heraa Hashmi was propelled into the public eye when she compiled a worldwide list of as many different instances as she could find of Muslims condemning terrorism.

A Muslim-American of Indian ancestry, Heraa was moved to action following a disappointing conversation with a classmate who wondered why Muslims are so silent about the violence of some of their co-religionists. The list was turned into a publicly available spreadsheet with 5720 examples of Muslim condemning terror which can be found on a website she created with some friends. 

A year on, she visits Istanbul and ponders the efficacy of the decision due to her concern that the list played into the “moderate Muslim” narrative.

The idea of a ‘moderate Muslim’ she argues is “an invention of a global system of capital and political hegemony” which uses the ‘moderate’ Muslim category “to include those Muslims whose lifestyles and beliefs are approved”, and exclude, arrest, torture and kill those who aren’t.

A student of molecular biology at the University of Colorado Boulder, Heraa is also a prolific YouTuber, a writer of fiction and runs an online blog with friends called Traversing Tradition which explores Islam for counter-cultural perspectives. . 

Heraa, 20, speaks to TRT World.

Explain to us the context and exactly what drove you to collect all these condemnations of violence?

HERAA HASHMI: This was around the time of the US election, there were quite a lot of terrorist attacks and there was a buildup of Islamophobic sentiment. And one thing that kept coming up in the media was why are Muslims so silent? Which was very interesting to me because growing up very well-acquainted with the Muslim community, from my perspective it felt like we were continuously talking about these things. We were developing programs to prevent radicalism, we were going out and speaking and building relationships with other communities and so it just felt very odd.

But I remember my breaking point, when it really set in that this was a problem was when I was in class and it was a few weeks before the election and we were studying the role of religion in European history. There was one student who turned to me and asked why Muslims don’t condemn this violence. He suggested this violence was a “Muslim problem” and that really upset me. We talked and had a bit of a back and forth but I didn’t feel like that conversation was going anywhere. So, I went home thinking I’ll do some research and just send him a list. As I started researching I realized that there is a lot of information out there. It’s not that Muslims aren’t speaking up, it’s just that message isn’t being received or covered enough in mainstream media. That’s the story behind the list.

Take us through how you collected this list, because it seems really long and mundane process.

 HH: I won’t lie it was very mundane at times. I was cooped up in my room for three weeks and missed a few classes, but the more I got into Google deep dive, the more I realised that there is so much information available. And you have to realise I’m not a computer science student. Someone even asked me if I used a web crawler and I didn’t know what that was then. There was no method to my madness, just raw googling. Page after page, right the way through to the end, searching phrases like “Muslims condemn” or “Muslims against terrorism” collecting all the information in a spreadsheet. I spoke with a friend after about three weeks of collecting the information, and she said it was good enough to turn into a public resource, so that’s what I did. 

What did you hope to achieve by compiling this list?

HH: Part of me wanted to question discourses which present Muslims as violent, but I was also focused on how Muslims have internalised some of these ideas. To an extent we have internalised the idea that Muslims, and Muslim countries are backwards or barbaric, and violence prone. I just wanted to help people think critically about these issues, and consider the likelihood that there are other factors involved with Muslims in the US and outside the US.

In the long run, I hoped people would question the things they hear about Muslims, and investigate what’s causing this rhetoric and what’s actually behind it.

How was the initiative received by Muslims and your wider community? 

HH: Within the Muslim community most of the feedback was positive. A lot of people felt like this was a problem and this was a great way to address it. But there were people who critiqued the idea and I feel like I’ve grown from that critique.

The biggest criticism was by people who told me I was pandering and was being apologetic. That in trying to set aside the accusations of those that say Muslims don’t condemn terrorism, I was falling into the “moderate-extreme” Muslim trap. With hindsight, I feel like that was a fair critique because if you look at US media the spectrum of Muslims that get a voice goes from terror hating to those who are apologetic, and we don’t really exist outside that frame. I actually wrote about this in Traversing Tradition, a blog that we run.

We sometimes play into this by attempting to present ourselves as “moderate Muslims”, Muslims who only exist in a way that makes other people feel comfortable in their prejudices. And of course, we condemn terror, but a Muslim isn’t just a person who has an ethnic sounding name, eats exotic food, and might wear strange clothes. Me practicing my faith makes people uncomfortable, and that feeds into ideas about Islam and Muslims being violent. That point helped me realize that this is just a symptom of a much larger problem and we need to talk about it.

What do you think that problem is?

HH: That problem is a general and unhealthy climate of fear regarding the Muslim community. There is a bias in the way we view violence and how we attribute these things. There are so many studies that show domestic terrorism by people who aren’t Muslim is a far larger threat.

It’s so interesting that when terrorist attacks happen in quote on quote “Western countries”, like the UK or the US people are shocked globally, but when an attack happens in Kabul, Morocco or Turkey even in areas that aren’t warzones the perception is that these places are just war-torn countries and its normal when in many cases they’re not. And we just don’t get as angry or as bothered by those things as a society. That double standard has a lot to do with the assumption that Muslims and Muslim countries are violent which links back into the problem of fear.

What more needs to be done? 

HH: I was recently reading some research published by Pew, and they found that most Americans have never met a Muslim. I think a lot of the problems people have with the Muslim community, and their ideas about who we are come from the reality that many have never met any of us and a lot of the hatred could be resolved if people went out and talked to Muslims.

But we also need to uplift Muslims and give them a real space on different platforms without these unhelpful binaries. And it doesn’t make a difference where that is, whether it be comedy, acting, writing or politics. Young Muslims have a voice, they have ideas, but they just need a mic to reach larger audiences.

Reference:

https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/when-muslims-condemn-terrorism-does-it-matter--19767

Scholars, Islamic clerics to be part of counter-terror plan: Rajnath Singh

Indian Express, By Rahul Tripathi

Dated: August 30, 2018

To counter radicalisation among youth, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh has sought to rope in experts with the help of National Commission for Minorities (NCM) to build a counter-narrative. Singh, along with Home Secretary Rajiv Gauba, took up the issues of de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation at a review meeting on Monday.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has arrested many youths over the last few months across the country for alleged affiliation to the Islamic State.

Besides scholars and researchers, Singh said that clerics who can counsel young people about Islam should be engaged in this counter-radicalisation move. The civil society should ascertain the reasons behind the youth taking up radical beliefs and then use the influence of community interventions, he is learned to have said in the meeting.

Singh also sought to modernise police forces to provide an elaborate insight into religious radicalisation and all forms of extremism, counter-insurgency, and cyber and economic crimes.

During the review, Singh also discussed proposed amendments to the National Investigation Act, 2008. The amendments, which give broader powers to the NIA, is pending before the Cabinet and was to be introduced in the recent Monsoon Session of Parliament but was delayed due to objections raised by some states for giving powers to the director-general of NIA for seizure and attachment of property representing proceeds of terrorism, said officials who were part of the meeting.

At present, the NIA requires the approval of the D-G of the state police concerned.

The draft provisions of the Bill include mandating the NIA to launch parallel probes into terror attacks on Indians and their properties abroad. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has similar powers that were exercised to conduct a parallel probe after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed six American nationals.

The Bill also proposes to designate any individual suspected of having terror links in the list of terrorist entities.

The decision was taken after a surge in the number of youths joining the Islamic State, following which the Home Ministry held consultations with central agencies and state governments. The amendment, according to officials, will lead to a ban on individuals who may not be associated with any terrorist organisation but are indulging in terror acts independently.

At present, there are 39 groups in the list of banned terrorist organisations under Section 35 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, (UAPA), the latest being NSCN (Khaplang), which carried out an attack on Indian Army personnel last year.

The proposed amendments also give empowers NIA inspectors to investigate offences under UAPA. Earlier, an officer of the level of deputy SP or above was empowered to probe UAPA cases.

Reference:

https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rajnath-singh-proposes-scholars-islamic-clerics-to-be-part-of-counter-terror-plan-5332051/lite/?__twitter_impression=true

Number of women and children who joined Isis 'significantly underestimated'

The Guardian, By Nadia Khomami

Dated: July 23, 2018

Experts have warned of the growing threat of women and minors linked to Islamic State, suggesting that the number returning to Britain from Syria and Iraq has been significantly underestimated.

According to a new report from King’s College London, a combination of an absence of government data and a changing view within Isis of when women should take up arms means that the danger they pose is likely to be much greater than official figures suggest.

The report, from the university’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, found that women had recently been actively involved in plots across the world. It said that 4,761 (13%) of 41,490 foreign citizens who became affiliated with Isis in Iraq and Syria between April 2013 and June 2018 were women. A further 4,640 (12%) were minors.

How London teenager plotted attacks with all-female terror cell

The ICSR researchers Joana Cook and Gina Vale said 850 British citizens became affiliated with Isis in Iraq and Syria, including 145 women and 50 minors. Of the 425 who returned to the UK, only two women and four minors were confirmed. The figures are believed to be vast underestimates due to an absence of official government data, they added.

“The British citizens that have now been confirmed as returning to the UK have not been differentiated by gender, or age delineation, though women and minors accounted for 23% of British IS [Isis] affiliates in Syria and Iraq,” said Cook.

“We believe some women may now pose a particular security threat based on several factors. These include the physical security roles and related training that some women have undertaken in IS-held territory, and the potential to transfer or apply these skills in other locations, or to their children.

“The narratives within IS itself related to women’s roles in combat have also evolved, broadening the circumstances under which women may be asked to take up arms. We have also seen women active in IS-linked plots (directed or inspired by the group) in countries such as France, Morocco, Kenya, Indonesia and the US, suggesting that women are indeed important to consider as potential threats.”

The report, From Daesh to Diaspora: tracing the women and minors of Islamic State, said the threat posed by women’s “evolving and seemingly increasing roles as perpetrators of terrorist attacks” has appeared to take three general forms: women-only cells, family cells, or individual women perpetrating attacks.

In October 2016 in Morocco, 10 women were arrested for plotting a suicide attack during parliamentary elections, four of which had seemingly married Isis members in Iraq and Syria over the internet.

Last year, British security services foiled a terror attack on the British Museum in London, and the country’s first all-female terror cell linked to Isis was arrested and convicted this year. Safaa Boular, a British teenager who went on to marry an Isis fighter online, was part-radicalised by a female Australian national in Syria.

Researchers said while Isis frequently brought to mind “images of masked men waving the black flag of IS, fighting on the battlefield, or in more brutal scenes carrying out theatrically staged executions”, it was the assistance of those with specialised skills including judges, doctors and engineers, and the presence and support of women and minors, that helped legitimise its vision.

Women played a variety of roles that went beyond those of “jihadi brides”. They were active in recruiting other women, disseminating propaganda and fundraising for the caliphate. In Canada, a female recruiter based in Edmonton who offered an online Qur’an course reportedly radicalised at least one young woman, and facilitated travel for her to Syria. In Ceuta, Spain, two friends led a ring that recruited other women for Isis in Iraq and Syria before travelling themselves.

The report cited push-and-pull factors for women who travel to Isis, including feelings of discrimination, persecution or those of not belonging to their society, as well as ideological motivations and efforts by Isis to portray women’s empowerment. This narrative has played itself out in many countries around the world, including the UK, where in 2015 four schoolgirls from Bethnal Green travelled to Syria to marry Isis fighters. The loss of the Bethnal Green girls was a severe blow to the Muslim community in east London and a powerful indication of how strong the lure of Isis could be.

After the fall of the caliphate in 2017, the status of many women remains unknown. While Isis originally restricted roles for women in combat operations, since 2015 there have been increasing indications that their position is changing.

In February this year, for example, Isis produced and released a video of a woman appearing in combat on the battlefield for the first time alongside male soldiers – reflecting a trend largely unique to the terrorist group.

Europol has noted that 96 women were arrested for terrorism-related charges in 2014, 171 in 2015 and 180 in 2016 (though this fell to 123 in 2017).

The report also found that at least 730 infants have been born inside the Isis caliphate to international parents. It drew on figures reported between April 2013 and June 2018 in line with the formal announcement of Isis by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, official government sources and figures, and academic or institutional publications and media reports deemed credible.

The researchers have encouraged governments to work with local regional authorities to identify the location and status of their citizens and ensure they are dealt with in accordance with international law.

They said minors in particular required nuanced consideration, including clear rehabilitative, rather than punitive, policies for those returning.

“Although the number of attacks independently perpetrated by inspired minors remains low, foreign minors possess the ideological commitment and practical skills to pose a potential threat upon return to their home countries,” said Vale.

“Robust and tailored efforts are needed to effectively disengage, de-radicalise and rehabilitate minors who have been born and/or raised in IS. Without such holistic responses, the stigma of the ‘IS-affiliate’ label may become a source of future isolation, disenfranchisement, and possibly radicalisation of the next generation/incarnation of IS.”

Shiraz Maher, the director of the ICSR, added: “These findings are significant as considerations of foreign IS-affiliates in Syria and Iraq have largely focused on the status and activities of its male members.

“Women and minors are poised to play a significant role in carrying on the ideology and organisation of IS now that the caliphate has fallen, so it is essential that governments recognise these affiliates as two distinct groups who need their own unique responses.”

Reference:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/number-of-women-and-children-joining-isis-significantly-underestimated?CMP=share_btn_link

Combating Terrorism Online: Possible Actors and Their Roles

Lawfare, By Zan Isacson

Dated: September 2, 2018

Editor’s Note: Fighting terrorism online is one of those ideas that everyone agrees with in principle but disagrees on in practice. What should be regulated and who should do so are among the many areas of disagreement. Zann Isacson of Georgetown examines the different actors that might play a role, including Congress, technology companies and of course the executive branch, and assesses what each might bring to the table.

                                                                                                                        Daniel Byman

For many Americans, the Islamic State gained notoriety through widely circulated beheadingvideos, beginning with the execution of American journalist James Foley. These grizzly videos demonstrated the monstrous tactics of the group, who filmed and disseminated gruesome murders for global consumption and disgust. Of course, the Islamic State did not invent beheading for publicity—in recent memory, American journalist Daniel Pearl was killed in Pakistan in 2002. Yet, as the Washington Post noted in 2014 after Foley’s death, extremists filmed Pearl’s murder on a camcorder and distributed the video by tape, which limited the scope of circulation and the potential audience. When terrorists shifted to posting the videos online, as with the decapitations of Nick Berg, Kenneth Bigley and others, the online infrastructure to instantly share videos did not exist. The advent of social media allows any video, photo, or audio clip to reach audiences across continents. The hashtags #A_Message_To_America and #NewMessageFromISIStoUS associated with the video of Foley amassed more than 2,000 tweets in the first three hours of the video’s release, according to SITE Intelligence Group, and polling shows that more than 80 percent of adults in Great Britain knew about the video of Foley’s murder within days of it being posted online.

The White House and Congress condemned the violence by the Islamic State, especially against U.S. citizens. However, they omitted any reference to the role of technology companies—such as web-hosting platforms, communication applications, and social media—in sharing the content. More than three years later, the United States still lacks a policy to confront terrorist propaganda on social media.

Terrorism relies on publicity. Defeating the Islamic State and its successors will in part require removing their access to these technology platforms, which includes assigning responsibility for regulating this content. The preferred approach might lie with Congress deeming certain content inappropriate and mandating its removal, tech companies acting to self-regulate, or even inaction. This article surveys the costs and benefits of three very different approaches: government-led policy, private sector-led policy and a passive approach.   

Government Responsibility

A government-led policy would involve Congress and the president assuming some role in limiting pro-terrorism content. The U.S. public expects their government to ensure their safety and security. Legislation could draw the boundaries for technology companies, require the removal of specific content, or mandate data sharing between the private and public sectors. Legislation of this sort would likely entail some aspect of censorship.

Without conjuring images of “Fahrenheit 451,” the U.S. public has accepted some censorship as a society. The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) illustrates the standard example: U.S. courts have determined that the First Amendment does not protect obscene material, and broadcast television and radio channels may not air indecent material when children will likely have access to programming. As such, the FCC restricts the content of private corporations for mass audiences, and Americans have accepted this censorship in support of appropriate material for audiences at large. Although not under the purview of the FCC, much of terrorist groups’ propaganda arguably could fall into this category, though some may be subject to First Amendment protections for free speech. The Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list functionally serves to identify foreign enemies; an argument can be made that any propaganda originating from one of these groups would represent measures to undermine the United States. Congress could start with restricting content emanating from these groups.

The U.S. government has an interest in limiting the dissemination of terrorist content from both a national security and public safety perspective. The Islamic State’s videos encouraged “lone wolf” attacks in the United States. Al-Qaeda’s online literature influenced one of the Boston bombers, and then-FBI Director James Comey confirmed that the Orlando nightclub shooter had in part been radicalized online. More recently, FBI agents found 90 Islamic State videos on a cell phone belonging to Sayfullo Saipov, the perpetrator of the 2017 truck-ramming attack in New York City. Even with the contentious state of congressional politics, legislation aimed to combat terrorist propaganda should gain support from both sides of the aisle.

The U.S. government also maintains the expertise to determine the type of accounts and content that cause the most harm. Across government agencies, an array of counterterrorism, counter-radicalization, counter-extremism and law-enforcement experts focus on the threats to the United States and how to best oppose them. These experts could decide which groups or content to block. Terrorism is a muddy concept that is difficult to define. For example, the FTO list identifies groups abroad, but no domestic equivalent exists. As such, would white supremacist groups be included in regulation? An American’s account that posts pro-Islamic State articles? The U.S. government could outline these determinations, rather than a tech company that likely lacks the knowledge to prioritize threats. Defining what constitutes terrorist propaganda and determining the scope of egregious content should inform potential legislation.

Furthermore, government regulation will ensure more uniform implementation across tech companies in the United States. Currently, tech companies self-police, which leads to responses that vary in severity. In response to the beheadings by the Islamic State, some companies removed all content of the beheadings, while others took more targeted action depending on the situation. Twitter responded by deleting all images of Foley’s murder and suspending accounts that uploaded or shared the image. YouTube also took down the video as a violation of its terms of service, which stipulate that terrorist organizations may not upload videos through the platform. Facebook acts on a case-by-case basis. Legislation could ensure that all companies respond consistently. This would help prevent terrorist organizations from exploiting particular companies with lax policies. Regardless of the company, the offending content would be removed.

Even if tech companies proactively support government efforts, the U.S. government could provide cover to help these companies save face to consumers and stakeholders.

The public split on the removal of the Foley beheading videos: Some lauded this act of self-censorship, while others balked at these organizations determining the bounds of acceptable media. Government regulation that blocks some content would allow tech companies to take the same action as before but attribute it to legislation. Regulation would allow tech companies to shift blame while still complying.

Technology Companies

Tech companies represent the other side of the coin. As private companies, they can limit the content hosted on their sites (of course, within reason). The terms of service generally outline what may or may not be hosted. Holding tech companies responsible would require public pressure to push these organizations to remove offending material and encourage them to more effectively monitor terrorist organizations on their platforms.

Tech companies have acted in response to public pressure faster than government regulation could accomplish. It is in the best interest of these companies to prevent their platforms from becoming a conduit of radicalization or used to promote violence; inaction would diminish companies’ brands, discourage investors, and invite regulation or oversight. As such, many tech companies have been proactive: Twitter suspended more than 300,000 accounts linked to terrorism in the first half of 2017 alone, while YouTube blocked videos by Anwar al-Awlaki. In addition, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Google formed the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism in June 2017 to “share information and best practices about how to counter the threat of terrorist content online.” These actions suggest an industry effort to prevent terrorists and their organizations from exploiting these platforms.

Although Silicon Valley’s preliminary actions may appear insufficient relative to the U.S. government’s threat assessment, the paradigm must shift to view tech companies as partners in counterterrorism. As terrorist communication and recruitment has shifted into the online space with MP3s and YouTube videos replacing audio and video cassettes, the role of tech companies has become more consequential. As Philip Mudd, senior fellow at New America, told the House Committee on Homeland Security, “The adversary is recruiting not personally but digitally… We don’t own the data. PayPal does, Google does, Verizon does.” Tech companies know their products and how to combat unwelcome users and content. The U.S. government should work with these companies; Mudd suggests the government should ask Silicon Valley “what should we do?” and enable those in this space to determine solutions.

Turning to tech companies for solutions rather than regulating content supports innovation. Government is notoriously slow to embrace change and any regulation to come out of Congress will likely be vague, focus on existing companies rather than future technologies, and require removing content. A censorship-based approach will push terrorists to find new technologies or develop measures to evade identification. Rather than this game of cat and mouse, an approach that allowed technology companies to lead would leave space for social technologies to develop innovative ways to target terrorists online.

It is unclear what regulation would accomplish or how the government would enforce rules and penalize violations. To return to the FCC example, the FCC fines violators. Would fines be the appropriate penalization for hosting terrorists or terrorism-promoting content? Considering that large social-media platforms host millions of users, it is unrealistic that all unsavory content could be removed immediately. Would enforcement target only the most egregious accounts? Or would it focus on the length of the account’s operation? Zoe Bedell and Benjamin Wittes previously discussed some of these issues in a three-part series, “Tweeting Terrorists.” The difficulties in determining the parameters of regulation suggest that the U.S. government must rely on the tech companies to act.

An additional benefit of tech companies setting regulations is that they can be implemented uniformly, rather than on a country-by-country basis. If a tech company determines content is unacceptable, then the content will be removed from the platform entirely; this is the only sure way to block its dissemination. If, by contrast, governments make these determinations, then countries with stricter laws on creating or disseminating terrorist content will remove or block all applicable content and countries that prioritize privacy protections will allow the same content to stay live. Geoblocking, or restricting content based on location, may limit content to some audiences while allowing it to remain on the platform. However, this is not a perfect solution because the content remains available to most audiences, and even in countries where the content should be inaccessible, VPNs, TOR browsers and other mechanisms allow users to obscure their location and access the blocked material. When tech companies determine unacceptable content, the content is removed from the platform, not simply blocked based on location. This more effectively prevents users from accessing the egregious content on a single platform, regardless of location.

Relying on private companies to limit the content hosted on their platforms will also assuage concerns about government censorship and support internet freedom. Censorship makes many American politicians cringe, no matter how appalling the target. Legislation that limits the First Amendment faces political hurdles and opposition due to the “slippery slope” argument: Today, we limit the Islamic State and tomorrow, we burn books. Free speech advocates share this concern and criticize potential government regulation on the grounds that it creates a dangerous precedent for future content and may overstretch to include dissent or other political speech. Alternatively, a private corporation limiting the use of its product simply alters the purpose of the platform without infringing on First Amendment protections.

Finally, tech companies promote transparency. Many tech companies, including Appleand Twitter, publish transparency reports that detail government requests for information that may include warrant canaries that hint at received National Security Letters. Watchdogs and privacy protection organizations use this information to understand the extent of government oversight and monitor government influence online. Governments will likely classify the equivalent information that they maintain and restrict the information that tech companies may provide, preventing its dissemination to the public. As such, tech companies have responded with legal actionto push to release more information. Relying on tech companies will provide more information to the public on government involvement with their platforms.

Inaction

Rather than pointing to tech companies or the government to act, possibly the solution lies with inaction. Both companies and the government must dedicate an astronomical amount of resources, in terms of people and programs, to prevent the proliferation of terrorist accounts and content, even though this will not entirely prevent terrorists from using these platforms. In addition, as technology progresses and more applications are created, terrorists will use newer platforms. Regulators will be spread thin policing outdated platforms as terrorists exploit new apps on the digital frontier. The Islamic State, for example, now prefers the application Telegram over Twitter because, among other reasons, it allows for end-to-end encryption. Instead of focusing resources on current, popular technologies, a more efficient allocation of resources could focus on research and development for nascent systems.

Censorship will only develop into a prolonged whack-a-mole exercise. Preventing the dissemination of terrorist content will not prevent terrorist organizations from creating propaganda—rather, terrorists will search for new outlets or means to spread the content as the U.S. government tries to remove it. Removing content alone will not destroy the cause. For instance, even though Germany bans Nazi symbols, domestic far-right movements and violence drastically rose over the past few years. Censorship alone is insufficient to prevent supporters from accessing content.

Some analysts also propose keeping these social media accounts active as a tool to gain actionable intelligence. As a previous article I c-authored with Daniel Byman, Sarah Tate Chambers, and Chris Meserole notes, “Terrorists’ tweets, Facebook posts and communications can be monitored, and often, security services discover unknown threats or find compelling evidence that can be used to disrupt terrorist attacks.” In at least some cases, the intelligence community may prefer to monitor these accounts and accept the consequences of greater publicity than to lose real-time data by shutting them down.

Censoring terrorist propaganda may also backfire. Preventing the dissemination of content may give credence to terrorists’ claims of victimization. Censorship may also pique curiosity and encourage individuals to seek out this media. Some individuals who may have dismissed the propaganda as false and obscene may be persuaded to seek out the content to determine independently why the government labeled the content as egregious.  

The potential precedent such censorship represents would be the most troubling and significant consequence. Illiberal governments disparage their political opponents as terrorists to delegitimize them. If the U.S. government or American companies block social media under a counterterrorism policy, then we risk losing our high ground when China or Syria’s Bashar al-Assad obstruct opposition speech under a similar guise. Social media has become an important tool for organizing and messaging for pro-democracy forces, including for the 2011 revolutions in the Middle East. As the traditional supporter of democratic movements around the world, the United States should be wary of efforts that may constrain legitimate protest movements in the future.

This debate over how to respond to terrorist content online faces competing priorities, including First Amendment concerns, national security, business interests, international norms, and state sovereignty. The United States has yet to determine how to proceed, and this survey of potential policies only manages to highlight the benefits and costs of delegating responsibility. Before determining a course of action (or none), lawmakers and companies must determine the expectations of technology, what legislation would accomplish, and the consequences of government involvement—and if the costs outweigh the potential national security gains.

Reference:

https://www.lawfareblog.com/combating-terrorism-online-possible-actors-and-their-roles